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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
AMERICAN OBESITY: ROOTED IN UNCERTAINTY, INSTITUIONS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
 Despite the efforts of policymakers, medical professionals, and other 
stakeholders, obesity and related health problems show no signs of receding from their 
record-high rates. Public policy has largely taken the form of consumer advice, (e.g., 
USDA’s Dietary Guidelines). Since consumers bear most of the costs associated with 
their obesity, the goal of obesity prevention appears to be incentive-compatible, prima 
facie. That is, there is no a priori case for much further policy intervention unless existing 
advice is deficient or consumers’ exhibit systematically poor decision-making.     
My review of the literature shows that scholars have long conveyed a consistent 
narrative regarding our scientific understanding of obesity—one which emphasizes the 
apparent behavioral ‘anomalies’ of consumers. Unacknowledged by most investigators is 
a body of scientific literature which, if valid, severely undermines the predictive and 
explanatory power of most accepted models of obesity. That is, credible institutions may 
prevent consumers from discovering obesity-alleviating diets because nutrition 
authorities and policymakers have condoned only one approach to healthy eating for 
several decades. I advance a theory of obesity rooted in Shacklean uncertainty about the 
operationally relevant characteristics upon which consumers should base their decisions. 
I relax the standard assumption that consumers exhibit open satiation isocalorically.  
To measure consumer preferences in the pre-obesity epidemic era, I perform a 
content analysis of American cookbooks from the early 18th to the middle of the 20th 
century. Results show that, if anything, past Americans preferred food that would be 
considered worse—even further from the USDA ideal. 
Using USDA survey data (1994-1996), I construct a finite mixture model to 
analyze Americans’ consumption patterns, preferences, knowledge, and beliefs about diet 
and health. My estimation shows that Americans were aware of the tenets of healthy 
eating at that time and consumption patterns were broadly consistent with the strength of 
these beliefs and preferences. I argue that economic theory would not predict rates of 
obesity doubling in the interim, given consumers’ continued exposure to information and 
their experiences. I hypothesize that this is evidence for a significant discrepancy 
between institutionalized advice and advice which is truly effective— a form of 
uncertainty. I use the extant scientific literature to show the ways in which healthy 
decision-making is constrained relative to what it would be under counterfactual policy 
arrangements. I do not reject the null hypothesis that consumers would have been at least 
as well off with no policy at all. I use the same dataset to replicate Butler’s (1982) work 
which models the relationship between social stigma and the decision-making of 
consumers who receive food stamps. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The latest numbers from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) indicate that any 
policy change that could bring about a significant reduction in obesity rates would pay 
huge dividends, all else equal (Fox, 206). According to the CDC, “The age-adjusted 
prevalence of obesity in 2013-2014 was 35 percent among men and 40.4 percent among 
women,” a new record in both categories. They estimate that the 38 percent of U.S. 
Adults and 17 percent of teenagers are currently obese. Suffice it to say, the personal 
incentives to avoid or alleviate obesity are significant and far more than cosmetic. 
Obesity, per se, may be among the lower-ranked concerns for the obese individual 
because it is also commonly associated with higher rates of heart disease, diabetes, some 
cancers, arthritis and Alzheimer's disease. Among the less obvious costs, a study by 
Gallup and Healthways estimated that obese adults are 29 percent more likely to say they 
lack purpose in life and nearly 34 percent more likely to suffer financially than non-obese 
adults. Despite the obvious costs associated with obesity, the latest estimates predict that 
the epidemic will not improve anytime soon (Fox, 2016). 
 In terms of costs, a 2015 Health Affairs article (“Severe obesity in adults cost 
state Medicaid programs nearly $8 billion in 2013”, Wang et al.) estimated that severe 
obesity alone cost the U.S. $69 billion, which is still only 60-perecent of total obesity 
costs, just in the year 2013. “Approximately 11 percent of the cost of severe obesity was 
paid for by Medicaid, 30 percent by Medicare and other federal health programs, 27 
percent by private health plans, and 30 percent out of pocket. Overall, severe obesity cost 
state Medicaid programs almost $8 billion a year, ranging from $5 million in Wyoming 
to $1.3 billion in California” (p. 1943). The authors predict that these costs will continue 
to rise as more obesity treatments become covered by Medicaid.  
 The modern definition of obesity is based on a formula pioneered by Adolphe 
Quetelet, a 19th century Belgian mathematician studying the relationship between height 
and overall body-size in order to come up with a relative weight index. He concluded 
that, for the most part, ‘‘the weight increases as the square of the height’ (Eknoyan, 2007) 
and lent his surname to the measurement. The concept was popularized and renamed the 
Body Mass Index (BMI) in 20th century by American cardiologist Ancel Keys. In 1972, 
 
 
2 
 
Keys concluded that BMI, the ratio of weight to the square of height, was best available 
way to measure overall fatness because it showed relatively little correlation with height 
and was consistent with more direct, independent measures of body fat (e.g., the 
thickness of the subcutaneous fat layer).  The threshold for obesity is crossed when BMI 
equals or exceeds 30. ‘Normal’ BMIs lie between 18 and 25 and overweight covers BMIs 
from 26 to 30.  
 Since obesity was first recognized as a serious, public health problem (around the 
turn of this century), most investigators in this area, (be they economists, nutritionists, 
public health researchers, etc.) have come to more or less agree on the major contributors 
to the obesity epidemic. There is a sense in the literature that widespread obesity is an 
inevitable consequence or tradeoff to the United States’ rapid increase in income, 
productivity, and technological progress in the post-World War II era. While all of these 
developments have made Americans’ lives much better in innumerable ways, it appears 
that American habits are no match for the ‘obesogenic’ environment that followed (Lake 
& Townshend, 2006). 
 More specifically, rising incomes and increased agricultural productivity mean 
that the cost of food, as a proportion of a household’s budget shared, has dropped 
significantly. In general, this is a good thing because now even the relatively poor can 
better afford to feed themselves than in the past. The tradeoff, of course, is that cheaper 
food may encourage consumers to buy more than they otherwise would, leading to 
‘overconsumption’ and, eventually, obesity. 
 Second, changes in the American labor market and physical environment reduce 
the incentives for losing weight. Fewer jobs require strenuous physical effort than in the 
past, meaning there is no strong incentive for consumers to lose weight to increase their 
productivity or wages. More generally, the physical environment in many areas is such 
that it also discourages everyday physical exertion by, for example, encouraging driving 
over walking or other means. Technology may also contribute to Americans’ inactivity 
because it provides entertainment options that require little physical exertion (watching 
Netflix versus going to the theater or doing something outside). Again, the benefits of 
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easier work-lives and more convenience seem to be partially offset by worsening health 
outcomes.  
 Finally, modern medicine makes obesity (and the other maladies associated with 
it) a less costly health problem than it once was, further reducing the incentives that 
would otherwise encourage Americans to lose weight and eat well. An obvious example 
is that Type 2 diabetes, commonly associated with obesity, has become a much more 
treatable and tolerable condition than it once was (American Diabetes Association, 2013).  
 The same goes for heart disease, although it remains the number one killer of 
Americans, aside from Asian Americans, Pacific-Islanders, Native Americans or Alaska 
Natives, for whom the number one cause is cancer. According to the CDC, 49% of 
Americans have at least one of the following three risk factors: high blood pressure, high 
LDL cholesterol, and smoking. There are also several lifestyle choices that are associated 
with a higher risk of heart disease: diabetes, overweight and obesity, poor diet, physical 
inactivity, and excessive alcohol consumption (CDC, 2016).  While researchers have yet 
to pin down the precise relationship between these afflictions and choices, the benefits to 
eating better are manifold since doing so appears to reduces the risk of developing several 
chronic diseases and premature death.  
 The interaction of bad consumer habits and increasing medical productivity over 
time is interesting because the latter is, to some extent, intended to reduce the costs 
associated with the former. That is, consumers with access to medical care have the 
opportunity to make a trade-off between short-term behavior change and paying for 
treatment. Given this choice, the consumer’s decision to change her long-term habits 
becomes relatively less appealing than it otherwise would be. A more trivial example not 
directly related to obesity is the increased marketing of heartburn medications, which 
allows consumers to avoid even the short-term costs of eating whatever they are used to. 
Of course, medical care and lifestyle change can also be viewed as complements to one 
another but the marginal costs and benefits of each will determine the efficient mix for a 
given patient. 
 The three developments mentioned above (cheaper food, lower costs to obesity in 
general, and significant medical advances) are often marshalled as evidence to explain 
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why American dietary habits have, apparently, proven so resistant to change. In this 
dissertation, I do not reject these as contributing factors but, rather, argue that they are 
probably not sufficient to explain obesity’s high prevalence and resistance to social 
interventions. While all of these changes make obesity more likely to develop and easier 
to live with, they do not change the fact that obesity imposes high costs upon American 
consumers and society, as discussed above. The mere fact that obesity is cheaper than it 
otherwise would be does not necessarily imply that the costs of habit change are too high 
to be undertaken, a priori.  
 In this dissertation, I hope to bring a new perspective to the obesity debate by 
revealing the ways in which credible stakeholders in the nutrition domain (including 
government, experts, and professionals) may have, despite their best intentions, actually 
contributed to the ‘bad’ habits that are now so commonplace in the United States. In fact, 
they may be encouraging the persistence of obesity among at least some Americans 
because a set of plausible nutritional hypotheses were prematurely enshrined in policy at 
a time when heart disease was the big, nutrition-related health concern and obesity was 
receiving relatively little public attention. Starting in 1978 (when obesity rates were low), 
federal agencies began to offer advice to Americans about what they should eat in order 
to live long, healthy lives—advice that has changed little since that time. 
In other words, my null hypothesis is that prevalence of obesity would be no 
higher than it is today had the federal government chosen to enact no formal nutrition 
policy, in direct contradiction to conventional wisdom. My alternative hypothesis, which 
I can test only indirectly, is that a significant proportion of the rise in the prevalence of 
obesity came about because consumer choice has been inefficiently restricted by a 
nutrition policy that has long granted a monopoly on credibility to those (still unproven) 
hypotheses. Over time, policy has interacted with other credible social institutions, 
ultimately shaping habits, preferences, and health outcomes in unpredicted ways. I 
interpret the fact that obesity rates have not receded as potential evidence for a 
discrepancy between advice or information that is institutionally credible and advice that 
is appropriate for the individual consumer in question. Specifically, policy advice and 
credible institutions have long emphasized the importance of calorie-reduction and 
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exercise as a means to lose weight, and fat-reduction to avoid heart-disease. Based on my 
review of the scientific literature, there may, in fact, be a range of other viable strategies 
for healthy weight-loss that conflict or directly contradict this advice.  
 If I am correct, then uncertainty may play a much larger role than is commonly 
thought because Americans assume conventional nutrition advice is credible while diets 
that differ significantly from it are not. As a result, the menu of dietary options (i.e., the 
range of choices the consumers deems viable) may be unnecessarily restricted. If that is 
the case, it reduces the explanatory appeal of obesity models which emphasize a lack of 
self-control because those models assume consumers know what they ‘need’ to do but are 
unable to commit to their plan in the long-term. If consumers are not aware of efficient 
choices that would be strictly-preferred, then the more fundamental problem at issue is a 
lack of information about the proper course of action—i.e., uncertainty. As I will discuss, 
the nature of credence goods (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006) and consumer habits may 
contribute to this uncertainty and a dearth of market-based experimentation and learning. 
It is, after all, generally considered rational to take behavioral cues from credible 
institutions. But, this does not imply that institutional wisdom is always correct. 
 In contrast to the conventional wisdom, I hypothesize that consumers have 
attempted to act much more rationally to prevent and alleviate obesity than is commonly 
supposed. I do not reject the premise that some consumers might ‘rationally’ become 
obese because of the nature of their intertemporal preferences. However, I do argue that a 
rational consumer who does wish to lose weight may soon find herself disappointed by 
the results of her behavior change. This does not imply that she will give up on dieting 
immediately, but, on the other hand, it is hard to fathom why someone would continue to 
try the same, ineffective advice indefinitely.  
Over time, consumers may become discouraged and revert to their old, preferred 
eating habits. It is not that they cannot follow conventional advice, but that the advice is 
ineffective providing little incentive to continue eating the healthy diet. To the extent that 
this advice is ill-suited to these discouraged dieters, the choice to revert to old habits may 
become more utility-enhancing over time because doing so at least allows the consumer 
to derive some short-term benefit from her diet. Again, this is distinct from the usual 
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situation in which a fully informed consumer rationally trades-off the short-term benefits 
of eating poorly with the long-term costs of doing so.  
Since food is generally modelled as an economic good, and calories are the unit of 
measurement that is used to measure food quantity, economists, among others, have long 
assumed that consumers are characterized by non-satiation with respect calories, all else 
equal. Furthermore, Americans’ inability to reduce their calorie consumption is generally 
taken as evidence for the stable preferences that appear to be preventing widespread habit 
change. While this may be a good first approximation of the problem, closer inspection 
reveals that satiation may be idiosyncratic and significantly affected by food 
characteristics other than calories. Importantly, policy advice tends to discourage 
consumers from eating some of the more satiating American foods (e.g., red meat) and 
encourages them to eat less hearty foods (e.g., fruits, vegetables, and whole grains) in 
their place. If the healthier diet is both ineffective and less satiating, I hypothesize that 
this may explain why preferences have remained stable—consumers have enough 
practical experience with healthy eating to know it’s not for them. 
The latest election results (2016) indicate that a majority of voters in four 
municipalities (Albany, Oakland, and San Francisco, California and Boulder, Colorado) 
believe direct taxes on sugary beverages are, indeed, justified as a more direct, albeit 
more regressive, way to discourage unhealthy eating habits. The trend toward more direct 
market interventions to address obesity is increasingly popular worldwide amongst public 
health advocates (Aubrey, 2016). While I do not deny that Americans could stand to eat 
less sugar, and would probably benefit from doing so, the problem with such 
interventions is that they may still be based on a model of obesity which emphasizes the 
wrong characteristics in the first place. The purpose of the tax is ultimately to reduce 
consumption of calories but, as I discuss at length below, the tax may not have been 
needed if Americans were not consistently encouraged by nutrition policy and experts to 
fixate upon calorie and fat reduction for the past 36 years or so 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Before I discuss the social science literature directly related to the United States’ 
obesity epidemic, I will begin by introducing a few basic theoretical concepts from 
economics and public policy that I believe are relevant to the current inquiry.  I expand 
upon and apply those concepts in subsequent sections of this, and later chapters. 
Information and Uncertainty 
 Any serviceable economic analysis of a consumer’s utility maximization problem 
considers the agent’s information state and how it may change over time. Most economic 
models begin with consumers who have rational expectations about the future. That is, 
consumers learn to expect a list or range of payoffs from particular courses of action and 
use that information to maximize their expected utility through their consumption 
activities. But consumers are always subject to some level of risk (Quiggin, 1993, p. 4) 
because they do not know the exact value of potential payoffs, at most only their 
distributions. Economic theory has tended to focus on event uncertainty or uncertainty 
over exogenous events, a more tractable problem than market uncertainty, under which 
consumers are uncertain about other agents’ supply or demand offers (Hirschleifer, 
1979). Depending on the expected payoff to their known, possible courses of action, 
consumers may either rationally adapt to their current state of information, or decide to 
acquire information in order to update their beliefs about the probability of future states 
of the world.  
 Economists have tended to use the terms risk and uncertainty rather 
interchangeably, though Knight (1921) distinguished between the two: risk applies to 
situations where probabilities are known while uncertainty is reserved for those in which 
the probabilities attached to particular courses of action are unknown. Although 
generalized expected utility theory is now the most common and accepted way to treat 
uncertainty, other economists have expanded upon Knight’s observation that not all kinds 
of uncertainty are the same. Shackle wrote at length about the shortcomings of this now 
dominant approach (Epistemics & Economics, 1976).  
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 Shackle takes major issue with the use of probability as a way for measuring 
knowledge. Much of his criticism questions the validity of assuming that all possible 
consequences of all actions are known in advance to the agent. Shackle introduces the 
idea of a “surprise function”, which measures the degree of surprise the agent experiences 
following an unexpected outcome or payoff. In theory, the agent could rank the degree of 
surprise she would experience among a number of different payoffs. Outcomes, or sets of 
outcomes, which are known to occur with certainty, on the other hand, would take on a 
zero value. This is an intuitive enough concept, e.g., if used to think about innovation, but 
the inherent difficulty of modelling such situations may explain the concepts’ failure to 
take hold in the literature (Shackle, 1976).  
 As mentioned, if an agent finds herself in an uncertain state, she may, and in 
many cases will, rationally decide to acquire more information about the products she 
wishes to consume. Economists frequently model consumers as having preferences for 
‘goods’ (not “products” per se) which, along with prices, can be transformed into demand 
schedules, curves, and so on. Although this is convenient and intuitive enough, it is a 
somewhat circular simplification of reality—goods (including services) are simply things 
for which some consumers have positive demand while economic “bads” are things for 
which some, or often most consumers have negative demand or would pay to avoid. 
Although this approach does not objectively delineate which products should be 
categorized as goods or bads, in the way a physicist can distinguish between different 
elements, both terms do retain objective, empirically testable definitions.  
 Upon closer inspection, and with the inclusion of market prices, the intuition of 
the basic model is generally enough to overcome its logical shortcomings because 
rational consumers are highly unlikely to consistently pay positive prices for things they 
do not consider desirable or “good”. Producers know this and act accordingly in how they 
design and market their products. Over time, an efficient equilibrium would theoretically 
develop in which “products” and “goods” are more or less equivalent concepts. 
 As useful as it is, the convention of modelling products as goods per se is not 
always appropriate. In an uncertain state, the consumer will tend to seek out information 
on a variety of goods offered in the market. In the process of doing so, she may come 
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across multiple, non-identical products purporting to offer the same benefits at similar 
prices. Ergo, the decision-making process for a rational consumer must be finer-grained 
than one which treats goods and products as equivalent. 
Characteristics and Uncertainty 
 Lancaster recognized this shortcoming in traditional demand theory (“A New 
Approach to Consumer Theory”, 1966). He popularized and refined the idea that 
consumers are more appropriately modelled as having demand for the characteristics or 
properties that are embodied in the goods they actually buy in the market. Since budget 
constraints are over goods while preferences are over characteristics, the consumer 
actually faces an additional constraint relative to the traditional model. The consumption 
technology is Lancaster’s term for the objective link between goods and characteristics. 
As in the traditional model, preferences still vary subjectively depending on how much 
weight consumers attach to different characteristics. In the market, consumers will 
ultimately choose the best bundle of characteristics (good) available to them subject to 
budget constraint. 
 In the introduction to Modern Consumer Theory (1972), Lancaster highlights 
several implications of his model that differentiate it from traditional approaches. The 
first is the importance of adequate consumer information about characteristics so that 
consumers are capable of arriving at their preferred bundle. Second, the small number of 
characteristic that enter into consumers’ decision-making relative to the number of goods 
in the marketplace means modeling aggregate demand in terms of a “representative 
consumer” (p. 5) is less plausible than a model based on a diversity of preferences. 
Finally, the structure of the consumption technology can be used to quantifiably compare 
or differentiate otherwise incomparable goods in terms of the quantities of characteristics 
which they do or do not possess. 
 Lancaster’s more fine-grained analysis of the realities inherent in consumer 
decision-making shows that the process can be more complex than it appears. In a state of 
uncertainty, a rational consumer may rather quickly turn her attention to the 
characteristics of a given class of goods.  In Lancaster’s model, the consumer must decide 
which characteristics or groups of characteristics are relevant to the current choice. She 
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can then compare goods within distinct groups horizontally according to the proportion of 
relevant characteristics they contain. Lancaster further posits the existence of vertical 
separability of the utility function between groups of goods, an adaptation of the 
separability of utility in goods space to characteristics space, which preserves the “multi-
stage optimization property” found in traditional demand analysis. 
 In traditional demand analysis, the economics of information is important to a 
complete understanding of consumer preferences. Since acquiring information is costly, it 
stands to reason that consumers’ stock of information may be associated with their 
observable characteristics, (e.g., education and delay-of-gratification) that predict rational 
behavior in other domains. In economics of health applications, this is called health 
capital and used to understand consumers’ varying levels of demand for health 
(Grossman, 1972).  Consumers with more health capital are predicted to have more 
information or have an easier ability to use health information, all else equal, and better 
health outcomes. The reverse is true of those with low stocks of human capital, though 
this may change as their preferences or circumstances dictate. 
 Since Lancaster’s model preserves many of the properties of traditional demand 
theories, it is possible to relax the assumption of consumer certainty regarding the most 
efficient consumption technology. By construction, Lancaster’s consumption technology 
can be changed or improved in a number of different ways over time (1972, p.44, 48-49). 
He takes this as further theoretical support for the provision (presumably via some form 
of policy) of better consumer information in order to increase household efficiency in 
consumption. The inclusion of consumer uncertainty over the consumption technology 
allows for the possibility that consumers could be uncertain about the characteristics or 
group of characteristics most relevant to their decisions. This is particularly true in a 
world of with more goods than characteristics, which is what motivated Lancaster’s more 
modern theory. 
 Aside from increased provision of information, Lancaster does not specifically 
address this hypothetical problem. Or, more precisely, Lancaster assumes the efficient 
consumption technology is known and uniform, in which case “efficient choices are the 
same for all consumers” (p.45). In this scenario, the uncertainty the consumer has over 
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groups of characteristics can be successfully corrected because the rational consumer is 
or will rationally become aware of the consumption technology. In a market of many 
goods possessing many characteristics in variable proportions, awareness of such 
technologies would be drastically more efficient than, say, learning by trial-and-error.  
 Does economic theory offer any guidance to consumers for how to choose the 
correct consumption technology? If, as Lancaster writes, the consumption technology is 
known to be efficient for all consumers, then economic theory suggests consumers should 
use it and economists ought to try to understand consumers who do not. The technology 
itself is assumed to be exogenous, as is the knowledge of the validity and value of this 
new technology. 
 If, on the other hand, the consumption technology’s true value is technically 
uncertain, economic theory cannot proceed with nearly as much confidence. In either 
case, economists must rely on sources of information outside their own discipline to 
model consumer demand in many different markets, particularly in order to establish 
technical relationships (Barzun 1966). If those sources are accurate, actual consumer 
behavior can be compared to a hypothetical consumer who acts ‘perfectly’ upon such 
information, potentially revealing areas where consumers are prone to error. Importantly, 
due to the division of knowledge in society, researchers may not have the skill nor the 
opportunity to completely vet research outside their respective fields. As a result, models 
tend to be built upon sources of information that are considered institutionally credible.  
Satiation 
 In a chapter based on a lesser-known article included in Modern Consumer 
Theory (“Operationally Relevant Characteristics in the Theory of Consumer Behaviour)”, 
Lancaster uses his characteristics-based theory of demand to analyze another fundamental 
assumption in traditional demand analysis, that of non-satiation. In economic jargon, 
satiation occurs when a consumer is not made better off by additional units of a good. 
Economists typically assume that consumer ‘true’ demand for goods is unlimited, all else 
equal, but that consumers must optimize their utility function subject to a budget 
constraint. The demand for money, subject mainly to time and human capital constraints, 
is a context where non-satiation is a reasonable assumption. 
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 Although satiation is not a particularly popular topic in economics, some authors 
argue that it helps to explain the incredible growth of modern market-based economies 
(Witt, 2001).  If consumer demand were easily satiated by simple goods, consumers 
would not experiment with new goods or new varieties of goods and there would be little 
incentive for firms to innovate and compete for their business—the economy would 
become stagnant. The market encourages innovation and competition because there is 
always some unmet demand for firms to compete for.  
 To be clear, this unmet demand does not occur simply because markets encourage 
efficiency, leading to higher real incomes, an expanded budget set, and so on. Non-
satiation could easily apply in situations where real income is held constant, leading firms 
to expand or change their variety of products through cost-cutting measures or better 
consumer research. New, more innovative and nimble firms could still enter the market.  
 Lancaster shows that, for more complex goods, satiation may depend on the 
particular characteristics of the good in question. His example is food and he uses the 
characteristics of calories and flavor to model the relationship between a consumer’s 
degree of satiation and the mix of those two characteristics. The resulting indifference 
curves are more “C”-shaped than in those exhibiting non-satiation. As in traditional 
versions, there is a negatively sloped portion where consumers are made better off by 
additional units of the y-axis good (calories). This is followed by a region of “neutral” 
satiation, represented by a vertical line segment, where consumers are indifferent to 
additional units of the y-axis good. Finally, the curve’s slope turns positive to represent 
the fact that the consumer regards additional units of the x-axis good (flavor) negatively. 
 There are a number of implications to these satiation curves that do not apply to 
traditional indifference curves with single-peaked preferences. A region of neutral 
satiation implies there may be a wider range of choices on a given budget constraint over 
which the consumer would be indifferent, as opposed to strictly preferring one choice out 
of many. Second, consumers who lie on the positively sloped portion of their satiation 
curve could be made better off by “taking” a characteristic away, either by buying an 
alternative good with less of the characteristic (which may or may not be available in the 
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market) or, perhaps, by modifying the good itself. Analyses of demands for goods which 
assume non-satiation do not allow for this possibility. 
 Modelling satiation in this way is intuitive. When applied to food, satiation 
implies a feeling of “fullness”, a physical limit to how much can be consumed in a 
period. Therefore, literal non-satiation clearly does not apply in this domain (though it 
may still be a useful assumption) because consumers do stop eating periodically, as 
Becker (1992) also noted (“Habits, Addictions, and Traditions”). However, in Lancaster’s 
example, the consumer’s satiation is not determined by physical feelings or cues but 
psychological ones—weight-consciousness leads the consumer to regard calories past the 
neutral zone as negative.  
Institutions, Information and Habits 
 As a social construct, institutions are “rules of the game” in a given society. 
Institutions are economically important because they influence the menu of options 
consumers consider to be efficient in a given context. They are bigger than, and affect the 
behavior of, organizations, firms and individuals. Religion is an obvious example of an 
institution that gives individuals rather explicit rules of conduct. Cultural norms serve a 
similar, if subtler, purpose. Government is an institution in theory but an organization of 
individuals who make rules in practice. The market in general sets the rules used to trade 
most goods while firms and consumers typically operate in accordance with those rules, 
i.e., within the confines of that institutionally defined environment. Science, too, can be 
modelled as a social institution which tends to enhance society’s understanding of the 
natural world (Barzun 1966). Like the other examples of institutions, markets can 
facilitate the efficient expansion of technology, but technological progress itself can still 
occur independent of the market process.  
 Information, therefore, is institutionally credible if it reflects the prevailing 
opinion of individuals within a socially relevant institution. The socially relevant 
institutions in a given domain have considerable sway over which characteristics should 
be considered relevant in that domain. For example, in medicine, if a hypothetical 
government regulation to reduce mistakes in the operating room were strongly opposed 
on basic, technical grounds that it simply would not work by the major professional 
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organization representing surgeons, it would not be an institutionally credible regulation. 
The regulation’s goal attempts to remedy a characteristic of the good, surgery, that is 
clearly relevant to both sides of the market, but an institutionally credible, non-market 
organization could play an important role in preventing bad policy at the hands of 
misguided regulators. The political reality is that such organizations will inevitably find a 
way to influence any policies they deem relevant to their domain (Olson, 1971). 
 Institutions can prevent short-sighted mistakes because they tend to change more 
slowly, to act more deliberately, than organizations or firms. When they are functioning 
well, institutions can enhance the efficiency of decision-making by reducing uncertainty 
and doubt because they are often the best-known and most reliable sources of 
information. As a result, pervasive social institutions can help to severely cut down on 
costs of searching for information about traded goods, particularly in contexts where 
characteristics are numerous. In the long-run, more efficient widespread habits, which at 
least approximate the wisdom embodied in some institutions, may take hold in a 
population. 
 As Becker (“Habits, Addictions, and Traditions”, 1992) discusses, social 
institutions must compete with habits, addictions and traditions in attempting to influence 
consumer behavior. According to Becker, habitual behavior displays a positive relation 
between past and current consumption and may be beneficial or harmful. Addictive 
behavior is defined as a strong habit and traditional behavior as “habits that are sensitive 
to choices in the more distant past” (p. 330).  
 In Shackle’s language, there should be no place for a surprise function in 
consumers’ demand if social institutions are functioning efficiently because they should 
convey the necessary information (i.e., the consumption technology) to consumers, or at 
least point them to it. Over time, the process of utility-maximization should lead 
consumers to systematically avoid forming bad habits—i.e., patterns of behaviors that 
differ significantly from the recommended credible consumption technology. Such 
actions would, themselves, be surprising only because they would be considered 
irrational in such a context. Institutions can bring society to an equilibrium that is 
superior to a world without good institutions but still short of a perfectly competitive 
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equilibrium. Depending on how they evolve, they may indeed nudge society along in a 
more efficient direction over time. 
Behavioral Economics 
 For many social scientists today the word “nudge” is associated with more 
specific strategies or public policies intended to improve consumer decision-making 
(Sunstein 2008). “Nudges” are policy interventions which are meant to bring about 
improved consumer behavior by making minor changes to the environment. There are a 
variety of policy areas in which nudges have become popular, many of them health-
related. They are generally assessed positively by obesity researchers as part of a strategy 
to change consumer habits. Nudges are generally preferred to direct regulations because 
they are meant to be less onerous to market participants because they are not meant to 
bring about large increases in actual prices (Marteau et al., 2011). 
 Studies in behavioral economics reveal the ways in which relatively minor 
changes to the environment can affect decision-making in important, unobserved ways. 
Present-biased preferences, visceral factors, and status quo bias are examples to explain 
sub-par decision-making in the context of food-related decision-making (Liu, et al., 
2014). Behavioral economists tend to point out the ways in which actual consumer 
decision-making differs from the ‘rational’ behavior found in the models economists 
have tended to use.  Theoretically, public policy may enhance decision-making by 
structuring the environment so that it nudges some consumers toward the more efficient 
decision without any loss of efficiency in the choices made by the un-nudged 
consumers—so-called libertarian paternalism (Thaler, Sunstein 2003). 
 Behavioral economics has gained popularity in recent years but the roots of the 
field can be traced at least back to Herbert Simon’s paper in which consumers “satisfice” 
given their situation, rather than optimize subject to some assumed set of constraints 
(“Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” 1953). Other critics argue that economists as old 
as Adam Smith (Thaler, 2012) were aware of the decision-making biases that everyday 
consumers suffer from. While there is surely some value in being reminded of common 
decision-making biases, their extent and importance remains empirically difficult to 
measure in everyday life. In policymaking, one could argue that the extent of the 
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decision-making bias does not matter so long as the nudge proposed to remedy it meets 
the standard of libertarian paternalism. 
While this may be true in theory, others argue that we should not be too confident 
in the ability of policy to correct behavioral biases. Researchers in public choice 
(Berggren, 2012, Schnellenbach & Schubert, 2014) have responded by pointing to the 
inherent difficulties which are likely to arise when these nudges are the outcome of a 
political process—so-called behavioral political economy. While consumers may suffer 
from decision-making biases, the actors involved in the political process are subject to 
their own biases when they attempt to design policies intended to improve the decisions 
of consumers. Public choice scholarship further suggests that stakeholders in a given area 
of policy have an incentive to convey confidence in the efficacy of their proposed 
intervention. 
More specific applications of behavioral economics to obesity research are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Habit Formation and Credence Goods 
Up to this point, I have focused upon the positive, efficiency-enhancing role that 
institutions can, and often do, play in reducing the uncertainty that consumers would 
otherwise face in the marketplace. By providing useful information, they may tend to 
bring about improved habits among consumers in the long-run, consistent with 
microeconomic theory.  However, there is also a strain of literature in economics which 
stresses the inefficiencies that may arise in situations where typical assumptions do not 
hold. 
Horner (2002) presents a competitive model in which consumers positively 
associate the relative price of a good (versus its rivals) with the reputational effort of the 
selling firm. Importantly, since consumers can always defect to competitors in this 
setting, firms have an incentive to always devote high effort to protecting and enhancing 
their reputations in order to prevent loss of revenue. Consumers, meanwhile, are unlikely 
to switch to a firm that is lowering its prices because they associate doing so with low 
effort. In Horner’s model, consumers are aware of the reputation of competitors and their 
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respective customer bases, which may prevent firms from raising prices in order to 
appear more “upmarket” because consumers will see through the attempt and buy the 
(now) cheaper version. Firms that maintain their high reputation will enjoy loyal 
customers and their reputations increase with age.  
Horner’s model is meant to illustrate the conditions under which such healthy 
competition is likely to take place and weed out disreputable firms. In contrast, the 
market for medical services is characterized by an information asymmetry between 
consumer and expert, and far less information being shared among the customer bases. In 
this case, experts also have an incentive to be as credible as possible, because they are 
supplying a credence good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 2006)—i.e., one with qualities that 
consumers cannot easily ascertain before purchasing. Doctors, for example, join 
organizations like the American Medical Association (AMA), at least in part, to shore up 
their credibility with patients.  
But such efforts do not preclude the existence of “quacks” (“Experts and 
Quacks”, Sandford 2010), who represent one variety of “fraudulent expert” (“Credence 
Goods and Fraudulent Experts”, Emons 1997).  In Sandford’s model, consumers cannot 
reliably distinguish between experts and “quacks” without repeated interaction. A firm’s 
incentive to invest in improving its reputation will depend on how tolerant its customers 
are of bad outcomes. A customer’s tolerance for bad outcomes depends on the costs of 
switching firms and her opinion of available alternatives. In his model, already-reputable 
firms have an incentive to coast on their reputation, but the presence of quacks in the 
market compels the experts to invest in customer relationships, bringing incentives back 
into proper alignment. According to Sandford, an equilibrium of all quacks is always 
possible but an equilibrium of only experts is not because of the information asymmetry 
that will always persist between experts and customers. Finally, he finds that the 
equilibrium proportion of experts will decrease as switching costs rise and as the relative 
costs of expertise over quackery rise.  
Sandford echoes much of what Wolinsky in “Competition in a Market for 
Informed Experts' Services” (1993) claims about the importance of switching costs in 
determining the organization of such markets. Wolinsky goes further by relaxing the 
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assumption that experts can diagnose customer’s problems with perfect accuracy, which 
may give rise to a negative search externality. Wolinsky models a situation in which 
experts are obligated to fix a problem at their originally quoted price. Because firms 
cannot perfectly diagnose their customers’ problems, low-cost experts may suffer the 
“winner’s curse” (p. 395) as customers opportunistically seek out their best option.  In 
order to prevent this possibility, the equilibrium price level increases relative to what it 
would be in the absence of search and reputation costs. 
Where food is concerned, Grolleau and BenAbid (2001) discuss the positive role 
that “public authorities” (p. 208) can play in providing mechanisms which allow 
consumers to monitor “credence characteristics” (p.208). In that paper, the authors refer 
to recent food safety scares in Europe and the increased attention paid to genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) as examples of characteristics consumers might deem 
relevant to their food purchasing decision.  
To the extent that these characteristics are, indeed, relevant to consumers, the 
authors contend that (well-designed) monitoring mechanisms can improve consumer 
habits more quickly than in their absence—a public good. In economics, the public-ness 
of a good is frequently used as a potential justification for its provision by the 
government. Above, I discussed the role that social institutions can play in enhancing 
consumer decision-making by improving their stock of information. Information is often 
treated as a public good when it is unlikely to be provided by producers. Ergo, 
government may be able to improve the efficiency of the market by making relevant 
information more available to all consumers. Alternative, non-government entities could 
play a similar role but the authority and reputation of the government could speed up the 
process of widespread adaptation to new information, all else equal.  
The parallels and differences between the above scenarios and the study of 
obesity are worth noting. Fifteen years after Grolleau and BenAbid’s article (2001), 
Compared to food, consumers seeking medical care have little opportunity to assess the 
efficacy of the services they purchase beforehand and must rely on their physician’s 
reputation. After the fact, they may still need to heal or otherwise wait before they know 
the ‘true’ value of their purchase. As such, not unlike in Horner’s model, the consumer is 
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faced with the task of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ doctors without much 
direct information at all and with a potential delay in feedback received compared to a 
competitive context. Sick consumers have little-to-no ‘appetite’ for ‘bad’ doctors, and 
avoid them to the extent that they can. 
On the other hand, with reliable labelling, GMO containing foods are easily 
distinguishable from their non-GMO counterparts. Moreover, to the extent that improved 
taste is associated with non-GMO status, consumers can assess their purchases much 
more quickly and cheaply than in the medical care example. They can easily observe 
their compatriots’ purchases as well. Consumers who do not care about GMO content are 
left unharmed by the label itself. In fact, there appears to be little downside to anyone 
(buyer or seller) from simply adding a (truthful) label as long as compliance costs (i.e., 
the cost of acquiring an anti-GMO ‘reputation’) are low, in stark contrast to the costs and 
risks that come with reputation-building in the medical profession. 
Consumers who are concerned about GMOs presumably avoid them whenever a 
non-GMO version is close in price. More ‘sophisticated’ or price-sensitive consumers 
may make trade-offs based on the benefits of non-GMO status for a particular food or 
food characteristic—the marginal (health or taste) benefit of non-GMO meat or poultry 
versus those of non-GMO fruits and vegetables, for example. Consumers who switch to 
non-GMO foods on the basis of perceived health benefits may (rightly or wrongly) 
attribute improved health outcomes to their new habits and come to expect further 
improvements in their long-term health. To the extent that these expectations are more or 
less met, consumers will continue to buy from “good” firms, bolstering those firms’ 
reputations over time, as Horner (2002) might predict.  
Since obesity is commonly associated with increased calorie content, a 
characteristic that is both universal and unique to food (a necessity), in the obesity 
literature it is common to assume that the association between calorie content and actual 
satiation is a weak one. This is in keeping with the standard economic assumption of non-
satiation with respect to goods, all else equal. This reasoning is backed-up by the 
previously mentioned USDA Guidelines. To the extent that consumers consider obesity 
an economic “bad”, economic theory suggests they should make tradeoffs in order to 
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avoid it, including eating less. The fact that obesity’s prevalence has steadily increased 
over the past several decades is generally taken as evidence for Americans’ inability to 
change their poor eating habits sufficiently, in spite of the personal benefits that are 
supposed to follow. 
Compared to the GMO example, the expected benefits of dieting to lose weight 
are much higher but, at least in dollar terms, the marginal cost of a weight-loss diet is low 
because it technically requires the consumer to buy less. More realistically, consumers 
may choose to spend the same amount of money on fewer, higher quality calories or may 
decide to allot a larger portion of their budget to higher quality food because of a re-
ordering of preferences.  
Given that much of the obesity problem seems to come back to the issue of 
consumer habits, there is a clear role for institutional economics to play (Hodgson, 2004) 
in understanding their social evolution. Economists in that field are well-versed in 
analyzing the significant effects (positive and negative) social institutions can have on the 
evolution of a given society, even if the source of their influence is nebulous or hidden 
(Hodgson, 2003). Regardless of their benefits, there is no economic or social ‘law’ of 
which I am aware that claims credible institutions are necessarily infallible. 
While the market tends to punish irrational behavior, including actors who peddle 
bad information, irrational rules made in non-competitive (e.g., political) contexts may 
endure if those institutions remain socially credible and their rules continue to guide 
consumer behavior. If irrational institutional rules are made over the wrong set of 
characteristics (among many), revealed preferences in the market will be neither a 
reliable guide for consumer preference nor a promising source for behavioral insights 
(Lancaster, 1971).  
That is, the credibility of the information provided by a given institution may be 
based on a reputation-effect that has little to do with the quality of the information itself. 
Its actual quality will likely depend on the competitiveness and incentives that obtain in 
the institutional environment that led to its creation and provision. Scientists, for 
example, operate in a non-market setting but compete in other ways in order to encourage 
higher quality output. But that setting is affected by the behavior of various other 
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institutions—government, academia, business, etc.—all of which may affect the 
trajectory of scientific research and discovery over time. Nor are scientists themselves 
immune to the reputation effects of their peers. 
In Lancaster’s analysis, an efficient equilibrium is easily obtained because there is 
no real uncertainty in the consumption technology, just a failure of consumers to make 
full use of it. This is how typical nutrition advice is regarded today. In contrast, if there is 
real, unacknowledged uncertainty, an efficient equilibrium may be prevented altogether, 
particularly if the choice of institutional rules is made politically rather than 
competitively (Olson, 1971). If the credibility of those rules “sticks”, Horner’s (2002) 
analysis suggests that their credibility will tend to rise over time, all else equal. 
Moreover, the persistence of inefficient rules increases the probability of a path-
dependent process developing (Liebowitz & Margolis, 2000). A path-dependent 
equilibrium is antithetical to a stochastic, rational equilibrium because when most actors 
are unaware of efficient courses of action, they cannot form complete, rational 
expectations and will fail to learn or discover the most efficient, obesity-reducing course 
of action. Persistently bad rules may set society on an inefficient “path” that no one 
would have chosen had they known about other paths at the beginning of the “journey”, 
so to speak. Once on the inefficient path, other paths may not be known if they are not 
considered credible, particularly the longer one remains on a given path. When choice is 
not so restricted, a more efficient equilibrium can evolve in the medium to long-run 
because the ‘market for rules’ would be more competitive. 
Shackle’s surprise function is useful for understanding the situation from the 
consumer’s perspective. As Figure 1 shows, there is an inverse relationship between the 
consumer’s belief function and her surprise function. Consumers who have high levels of 
nutrition information or are otherwise motivated to follow credible advice will tend to 
have stronger beliefs about the ‘correct’ quantity of various nutrients to consume in order 
to lose weight or maximize their health. They also have an incentive to inform 
themselves further about the characteristics of a healthy diet. 
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Figure 1. Surprise and Belief Functions 
 
*Based on (Dodd, L., (2011)  
In Figure 1, N* represents the quantity or proportion of a particular nutrient that 
the government recommends as part of healthy diet. Obese consumers are likely to be 
most concerned about calories but the government makes recommendations for a litany 
of nutrients, including the macronutrients: fat, carbohydrate, and protein. As I will 
discuss, fat has received the most attention from nutrition authorities since the 1970s or 
so. This may explain why the American diet is relatively close to recommendations when 
it comes to the proportion of calories from the three macronutrients (though fat 
consumption remains higher than authorities would prefer).  
Rational consumers are unlikely to venture far to the left or right of N* along the 
belief curve because they do not believe such courses of action will lead to their preferred 
future outcome. Conversely, the further one moves from the corresponding point on the 
surprise curve below, the more surprised the consumer would be to experience an 
outcome as good as what he expects to experience from N*. Consumers who wish to lose 
weight probably recognize the long-term value of cultivating healthy habits (as opposed 
to short-term dieting) and will be particularly unlikely to venture far from N*. Given 
multiple N*’s, consumers might find the complexity of the problem difficult at first. Over 
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time, however, the market appears to provide enough opportunity for experimentation 
and low-cost learning, reducing complexity over time as new habits take hold. 
Another complicating factor in this domain is the fact that weight-loss requires 
some patience from the consumer. The time investment of undertaking a new, less-
preferred diet further encourages consumers to choose credible options (close to N*) so 
that they do not need to repeat the process. But, according to critics, there is an array of 
bundles of dietary characteristics which are unnecessarily excluded from nearly all 
consumers’ “consideration sets” (Shocker, 1991), ultimately because they are not 
considered credible by nutrition experts or authorities. These options are likely to lie so 
far from N* that they will not be attempted, particularly for any length of time, because 
of the high costs of change and low, or negative, expected return.  
It may be the case, however, that a large proportion of obese consumers would be 
better served if they aimed for a point far to the left or right of N* and allowed 
themselves to be ‘surprised’ by the outcome that follows from the ‘incredible’ option. If 
consumers are discouraged from trying such options even in the short-term, the need for 
patience in the absence of immediate results rises the further one ventures from N* 
because the ‘incredible’ option will lose credibility over time, depending on the 
consumer’s experience—the opposite of the situation for a competitor with a long-
standing, good reputation (Horner, 2002)—while the credibility of options close to N* 
stays level. 
In his article, “Public Decisions as Public Goods” (1971) Tullock points out an 
obvious flaw in the chain of reasoning often used to justify government provision of so-
called public goods (p. 917): 
The public decision-making process is a procedure for generating a public good; 
and the persons involved in it, whether they are the voters, judges, legislators or 
civil servants, all can be expected to treat it as any other public good. Hence, we 
can anticipate that they will invest less in the “private costs” of considering that 
public decision than is optimal. 
 
 
 
24 
 
In theory, relaying valuable information to the populace is a prime example of a 
public good. In practice, however, proper justification for such actions requires that the 
information promulgated be accurate and useful to the intended audience.  
A proper investigation into the origins of American eating habits and the obesity 
epidemic requires a long-run analysis of the interactions between government, nutrition-
related institutions and American consumers because habits tend to change slowly and 
interact in subtle ways with these institutions. Relatedly, I think it is important to review 
the long history of policy in this area in order to understand how government, as an 
institution, has tended to interpret and address societal nutrition issues. In the next 
section, I attempt to summarize these interactions over the preceding decades in order to 
explain the narrative that now informs most discussions of obesity, nutrition policy, and 
the relevant microeconomic factors at play.  
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Origins of the Current Narrative 
Long before obesity became widespread, human societies had to overcome big, 
nutrition-related shortfalls that threatened their very existence. Thanks to Robert Fogel 
(2004), among others, economists are well-aware of the fairly recent and remarkable, 
“techno-physio” evolution (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
Food and Rural Economics Division, 1999, p. ii) of agriculture and the food market.  The 
relatively recent boom in agricultural technology and productivity has led to a better-fed 
world population than would have otherwise been possible in a world without both 
technology and trade. The innovations Fogel recounts are also pre-conditions for an 
obesity epidemic because they allow for “overconsumption” to happen in the first place. 
More obscure is the diet-related work of Irving Fisher. As an economist, Fisher is 
best known for his contributions to econometrics, but for a short time he also attempted to 
educate everyday consumers about how to live healthy lives, based on the latest science 
at his disposal. I do not know the extent to which the book influenced economists’ or the 
public’s thinking on such matters, but, on the whole, the advice is remarkably similar to 
the dietary advice published today and not particularly at odds with most of the other 
perspectives recounted below. 
In How to Live: Rules for Healthful Living Based on Modern Science (Authorized 
by and Prepared in Collaboration with the Hygiene Reference Board of the Life 
Extension Institute, Inc., 1917) Fisher and co-author Eugene Lyman Fisk cover many 
dimensions of health and hygiene over the course of the volume’s 345 pages, made up of 
5 chapters and a series of supplemental notes. It is obvious from the beginning of chapter 
2 (“Food” p. 28) that Fisher and Fisk subscribe to the caloric view of obesity. The advice 
is familiar: 
“Meals should be light and frequent, rather than hearty and infrequent. A little 
 fruit may be taken on rising and a glass of hot water. A light breakfast is 
 advisable; one or two  poached eggs, no sugar, bread and butter in small quantity. 
 For dinner, choice may be made of chicken, game, lean meat, fish not cooked in 
 fat, in moderate portions, and of such vegetables as celery, spinach, […],  bulky 
 vegetables of low food [caloric] value. Tapioca or similar pudding  may be used 
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 for desserts, and melon, and other cooked unsweetened fruits…Foods to avoid, in 
 cases of overweight, are sugar, fats, milk as a beverage, salmon, lobster, crabs, 
 sardines, herring mackerel, pork and goose, fat meats, nuts, butter, cream, olive 
 oil, pastry and sweets, water at meals…” (Fisher, 1917, p.215-216) 
As this passage indicates, Fisher believes that one of the keys to a healthy, 
weight-reducing diet was moderation in total calories consumed and a general avoidance 
of nutrients from which Americans derived utility —namely sugar and fat. This should 
come as no surprise given that Fisher was a vegetarian (“Irving Fisher” 2008), but his 
advice also had the scientific backing of his Institute’s Hygiene Board, made up of 
physicians, professors, and various members of state boards of public health, all of whom 
appear to have been credible in their respective fields at the time. How to Live… was 
meant for a popular audience, not an academic one, and was apparently rather 
commercially successful—going through 15 editions between October, 1915 and March, 
1921.  
Fisher stresses the importance of proper mastication (chewing) and “slow eating” 
(p.51-54) both of which lead to “food instincts” that “are far more keen and correct…than 
if he bolts his food [eats quickly]” (p. 54). On the topic of overweight and obesity, Fisher 
stresses the importance of establishing healthy habits early on if overweight runs in the 
family, encourages obese consumers to avoid sugary high-fat foods, and claims that 
hunger is “largely dependent upon the contractions of the empty stomach, and not upon a 
general bodily craving for food” (p. 261), a claim which is now considered untrue. 
Fisher’s primary explanation for the onset of overweight is consumers’ failure to count 
their calories completely and properly (p. 32-33), though they should choose the proper 
level for themselves, using changes in their weight as a guide in their decision-making (p. 
34).  
Anthropologist Margaret Mead is another figure worth discussing in order to 
arrive at a clear understanding of how social scientists and policymakers have typically 
viewed Americans’ habits vis-à-vis healthy diets. Mead served on the Committee on 
Food Habits, which first met in January, 1941and was assigned to the Division of 
Anthropology and Psychology of the NRC. The Committee on Food Habits was meant to 
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work in tandem with the Committee on Food and Nutrition (later renamed the Food and 
Nutrition Board), it being assigned to the Division of Biology and Agriculture, all under 
the auspices of the National Research Council (NRC, 1943). 
The NRC is one of many government agencies that began involving itself in 
matters of national nutrition in the 1940s. The NRC and National Academy of Sciences 
were the “parent organizations” of the Food and Nutrition Board, which was “born in a 
period of war emergency.” (Board, p.3) Russell M. Wilder served as the first chairman of 
the board, which had 21 initial members; nine more were added a year later. These 
included 13 biochemists, nine physicians, three home economists, two agricultural 
economists, one food industry executive, one food technologist, and one physiologist 
(Board p.4). Dr. Wilder’s “charge” to the members captures the committee’s broad 
directive: 
It is no longer a question of a few experts in our colleges and research 
centers talking about vitamins and minerals. What we must do now is 
make people understand that nutrition is not an academic matter but a 
thoroughly practical consideration, concerning every person in the 
country—producers, processors, marketers, consumers, nutritional 
experts—everyone! (Board, p.5) 
In other words, the Food and Nutrition board’s purpose was to provide 
information about nutrition science in order to influence individual American’s tastes in a 
healthier direction. The difficult task before the members of the committee (and its 
various sub-committees) was to quantify the meaning of the word “healthy” in terms of 
nutrient content in an individual’s diet.   
The reasoning behind the two-committee setup was clarified shortly after the first 
meeting of The Committee on Food Habits:  
…the National Research Council has acted on the assumption that, while the first 
step toward achieving an adequate national nutritional level is the securing of 
scientific information on what constitutes proper diets, there remains the second 
step, requiring an equally scientific approach, of finding the most effective ways 
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and means of adjusting the habits to needs, of getting people to what they need. 
This Committee, in undertaking its assignment, agrees wholeheartedly with this 
point of view and feels that governmental agencies as well have a similar twofold 
responsibility. (Mead, 1943, p.10)  
Not surprisingly, given the time period in question, there is considerable attention 
paid to how various war-time measures should be best handled to avoid the inculcation of 
detrimental habits once the war ended (p. 21). 
Mead, like most of her fellow committee members, was an anthropologist and 
 they used the tools of cultural anthropology to approach the issue of food habits, 
 which are defined as “the culturally standardized set of behaviors in regard to 
 food manifested by individuals who have been reared within a given cultural 
 tradition” (p.21). She notes that “[W]hile cultural factors are expected to account 
 in very large degree for the food habits of mankind, there is also the possibility 
 that combinations of foods may exert a certain degree of coercion upon 
 physiological responses, so that the constitution of foods themselves must also be 
 taken into account.” (p.21) 
Mead goes on to identify other cultural, psychological characteristics of American 
food habits that are less talked about today but may still be relevant to the discussion of 
pervasive obesity:  
European peasant conception of status which have given an importance to white 
bread, much sugar, meat every day; the Puritan tradition of a connection between 
food which is healthful and food which is disliked and the tendency in 
communities with a Puritan tradition to use food for purposes of reward and 
punishment and to handle delicious food as the reward for eating healthful, but 
disliked food; the equally definite Southeastern food pattern in which the 
emphasis is not upon health and duty but upon personal taste and a personal 
relationship between the eater and his food. (Mead, 1943, p.23) 
She also notes an increasing emphasis on the appearance of food in the 
marketplace and a growing preference for “refined, purified, highly processed foods.” 
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 Almost contemporaneously, economist George Stigler wrote on the more applied 
problem of “subsistence diets” in his 1945 article (“The Cost of Subsistence”). Stigler 
was more interested in the consumer problem of supplying an “adequate” diet at the least 
cost. In order to define “adequate” Stigler could not rely on his training an economist but, 
rather, facts and figures from the NRC, admitting that: “[t]he science of nutrition is much 
too young to have attained even an approximate measurement of the "health" function for 
representative individuals, or to determine the extent of individual variation.” The NRC 
figures did provide him with daily “allowances” “(a term used to indicate their 
preliminary nature)” (304-305) quantities for nine nutrients, including calories, protein, 
calcium, iron and various vitamins. From here, based on the prices for the various foods 
which contain these nutrients, it is at least theoretically possible to compute the least-cost 
option for a subsistence diet.  
 However, Stigler notes at least six areas over which “a larger margin of 
uncertainty” still remain in the solving of this particular problem:  
1. Many nutritive values have not been established 
2. Most foods are not even approximately homogenous with respect to 
nutrient content 
3. The maturity, and length and conditions of storage are important. 
4. The way in which food is prepared also affects nutrient content, even if it 
is known. 
5. Food waste is difficult to measure 
6. Many nutrients in foods may not be fully extracted for biological reasons. 
Stigler proceeds with his analysis and finds that “the content of a diet can be 
altered substantially without affecting its cost appreciably” (p. 311).  Moreover, he finds 
that his diet is of lower cost than several other diets then marketed as low-cost. Stigler 
reasons this is because “dieticians [sic] take account of the palatability of foods, variety 
of diet, prestige of various foods, and other cultural facets of consumption. Primarily on 
such grounds can one explain their emphasis on meat and the inclusion of sugar”.  In 
other words, Stigler’s diet is cheaper and less palatable while still meeting the minimum 
requirements specified by the NRC. He reasons that his diet would serve as a better 
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recommended minimum diet for two reasons: these non-nutritive recommendations are 
“highly personal” and “non-scientific” and because it would be difficult to adapt such 
minimum requirements to the diverse tastes of the American population. 
The origins and validity of Stigler’s attitudes toward dietitians, nutritional science 
and the allowances provided by the NRC are unclear. If they reflected popular opinion at 
the time, those opinions must have shifted rather rapidly following this initial period of 
government interest in the science of nutrition. The RDAs were revised every five years 
following their initial publication in 1943, at least up until 1963, “so that new information 
might be incorporated as it became available.” (Board, p.13) 
 Included in an NRC Retrospective piece (The Food and Nutrition Board: 1940-
1965: Twenty-five Years in Retrospect, 1966) is a 1958 article reprinted from Journal of 
the American Dietetic Association by Lydia Roberts, who served as chairman of the first 
committee to publish the Recommend Daily Allowances. According to Roberts, “the 
members worked hard and long for more than a year and enlisted the efforts of scores of 
other nutrition specialists” in formulating the allowances.  
 The tentative allowances were opened up to comment from other members of the 
Board and, as part of a “democratic approach”, disseminated to “nutrition workers” (p. 
34) throughout the country in search of criticism and suggestions. After receiving 
feedback, the allowances were revised and sent out again and, finally, modifications were 
made by the Board. The allowances were then presented to members of the American 
Institute of Nutrition at their annual meeting. Roberts was somewhat surprised to find that 
there were no “serious disagreements or attacks” to the allowances and attributes the 
favorable response to the process itself (most stakeholders had already had a say) and the 
quality of the science at the time. 
 Roberts has many positive things to say about the allowances 16 years after the 
first version was published, “For the first time in history, all groups working for 
nutritional betterment have used a common allowance instead of the varied and 
conflicting ones which previously obtained.”(p.36) She explains the wide acceptance and 
use of the allowances in terms of the credibility of the NRC, “whose reputation for 
scientific caution and dependability is outstanding” and the “democratic procedure” that 
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birthed them, concluding, “All have realized that the consensus of judgment of nutrition 
authorities should prevail and have therefore been willing to accept allowances so derived 
until further evidence should justify changes.” 
 Jordynn Jack (2009) argues that what Roberts refers to as a “democratic 
approach” to science is, to some extent, a rhetorical strategy that she, personally, used 
throughout her career to “forge consensus among experts, shoring up her own authority 
and that of the NRC.” Jack notes that “using “democratic” approaches mainly to increase 
one’s own credibility or that of other elites can be problematic, especially if it occludes 
the interests and perspectives of the publics who might contribute scientific knowledge.” 
(p.126) 
 This is not to imply that the Roberts’s findings, or those of any committee under 
the auspices of the Food and Nutrition Board were necessarily wrong or inaccurate. The 
nature of relying on experts and large institutions, including science and government, 
requires some degree of trust in those institutions and the actors within them. Roberts 
demonstrated a clear ability to win that trust from her peers and used it to spread her 
vision of the common good via the NRC. Stigler, whatever his misgivings, had little 
choice but to rely on the initial allowances in formulating his subsistence diet.  
Twenty years after Stigler’s diet problem, Arrow wrote on the topic of uncertainty 
in medical care (“Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care”, 1963). In 
the second paragraph of that paper Arrow says that, compared to medical care, at low 
levels of income basic “commodities”, among them nutrition, are likely to be more 
important in terms of their impact on health. Presumably Arrow is referring to 
consumers’ ability to afford a diet that meets basic survival needs. As the title suggests, 
the focus of the paper is “the complex of services that center about the physician, private 
and group practice, hospitals, and public health” (p. 941). Today, of course, many 
consumers interact with the medical-care industry due to an excess of one nutrient or 
another. 
Arrow goes on to compare and contrast the market for medical care with the more 
familiar competitive model. One of his key insights, for my purposes, is that 
“information, in the form of skilled care, is precisely what is being bought from most 
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physicians and, indeed, most professionals” (p. 946) before concluding that virtually all 
of the special features of this market stem from uncertainty.  Though imperfect in terms 
of risk-bearing and information transmission, Arrow points out that “in some 
circumstances other social institutions will step into the optimality gap, and that the 
medical-care industry, with its variety of special institutions, some ancient some modern 
exemplifies this tendency [to substitute other institutions for the market’s failure]” (p. 
947). 
Writing on uncertainty, Arrow gets to the heart of the informational and 
reputational problem when a consumer seeks dietary advice from a physician or 
Registered Dietitian (RD): 
Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the 
 physician as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very 
 much greater than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties. 
 Further, both parties are aware of this information inequality, and their relation is 
 colored by this knowledge.  (Arrow, 1963, p. 951) 
 While the Food and Nutrition Board was active in shaping government policy and 
beliefs about nutrition science between 1940 and 1965, a new body took the helm eight 
years later: The United States Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs 
or the McGovern Committee for short, after George McGovern, its sole chairperson. 
Though the Food and Nutrition Board first began studying the importance of dietary fat 
and its relation to disease in the 1950s, by the late 1970s there was widespread agreement 
among many scientists, including nutritionists and dietitians, and physicians that 
Americans were eating too much fat and increasing their risk of chronic disease, 
particularly atherosclerosis, in the process.  
 Not unlike the policy response four decades earlier, these committee meetings 
eventually lead to the creation of a committee to study American eating habits, their 
consequences, and potential remedies which culminated in the publication of the Dietary 
Goals for the United States, which would soon after become the basis for the USDA’s 
Dietary Guidelines (Select Committee…1977). Among the members of the McGovern 
Committee, there was at least one dissenting viewpoint present during the formulation of 
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the Goals, Senator Charles H. Percy. According to a committee print of excerpts from the 
committee’s meetings, Percy said “…science cannot at this time insure that an altered 
diet will provide protection from certain killer diseases such as heart disease and cancer”. 
Surely this is not Percy’s professional opinion as a Senator but, rather, based on his own 
sources. In the same document, Dr. C. Samuel West calls this statement “unwise” and 
“foolish”.  
 In 1980, the USDA began publishing its Dietary Guidelines, later partnering with 
the Department of Health and Human Services HHS) in their creation. Much like the 
RDAs, these Guidelines are revised every five years.  The latest version was published in 
2015 (USDA, ERS, Food and Rural Economics Division., AIB 750.) 
The Economics of Obesity Today 
Recent work on economic issues related to obesity and nutrition has lost virtually 
all of the skepticism that runs through Stigler’s early article or Arrow’s article on medical 
care. One exception is The Food Police, by economist Jayson Lusk. In it, he discusses the 
pitfalls in rhetoric and reasoning that characterize much of the popular food policy 
discussion. It serves as a much-needed counter to books like Marion Nestle’s Food 
Politics (2008), required reading for my university’s public health course on the topic of 
food systems, in which obesity figured prominently. Nestle places most of the blame for 
Americans’ poor eating habits (i.e., relative to the Guidelines) and diet-related health 
outcomes squarely on the shoulders of the food industry and its efforts at “lobbying, 
marketing, [and] engaging the services of nutrition experts” (ix).  
In Nestle’s version of recent history, obese consumers are essentially the 
unwitting victims of manipulation by food companies seeking to maximize their profits. 
She devotes little to no attention to consumer preferences per se nor to consumer theory 
and concludes her condemnation of the food industry with a series of policies intended to 
further promote the “eat less, move more” message. In order to improve the “social 
environment”, and thus decision-making, Nestle suggests better labelling, food 
advertising disclaimers and prohibitions, education campaigns, better school lunches and 
bans on selling junk foods in schools. She also supports increased healthcare training in 
nutrition, more research on the “environmental determinants of food choice”. Finally, she 
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recommends subsidies for fruits and vegetables and taxes on soft drinks and other junk 
foods to both curtail demand and fund the aforementioned education campaigns (p. 367). 
Lusk, on the other hand, devotes a chapter (4) to a discussion of why it is 
frequently assumed, without much basis in theory or fact, by the “food police” that 
Americans need a government authority to tell them how to eat in the first place. Lusk 
also directs criticism at findings from behavioral economics, which are increasingly 
mustered as evidence in support of more direct market interventions—e.g., food taxes. He 
discusses three myths that are perpetuated in such discussions—that the findings are 
“really important”, that “paternalism is different from elitism”, and perhaps most 
relevantly, that “experts can make better decisions than layfolk”. As these headings 
imply, Lusk is skeptical of the effectiveness of policies inspired by insights from 
behavioral economics, politicians, and experts alike to reduce obesity’s impact. 
In the chapter on fat taxes (and obesity in general), Lusk debunks several other 
arguments that are used to justify government interventions meant to improve national 
nutrition. Most pertinent to the present discussion, he points to the apparent 
ineffectiveness of government education campaigns regarding proper diet, discussed 
earlier. Turning conventional thinking in this area on its head, he asks “[I]f the billion-
dollar weight-loss industry cannot, with all its marketing expertise, persuade people to 
lose more weight, what makes the government think it can?” (p. 150). After briefly 
noting that the USDA’s early Food Pyramid “did not stem the rising tide of obesity (and 
according to low-carb advocates, it actually contributed to it)”, Lusk then quotes another 
economist, Steve Sexton, “The causal-chain from mandatory information consumption to 
improved health outcomes is so weak that one wonders whether it is worth making 
people feel bad about themselves” (p. 151). Quite the departure from Nestle’s assessment 
of the situation. 
Although Lusk’s extended debunking of common myths surrounding food, 
nutrition, behavior and politics is welcome, he does not dig quite deep enough to 
understand the role that information and uncertainty might play in the etiology of today’s 
obesity epidemic (granted, that is not the purpose of his book). More favorably, Lusk 
assumes far less than others about the validity of our existing knowledge with respect to 
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obesity—a skepticism he rightly extends to possible policy interventions. However, in so 
doing, Lusk mostly ignores the possibility that policy, credible institutions, and market-
provided commitment devices have already shaped, and continue to shape, consumer 
preferences and habits in ways that are counter-productive to the weight-loss and overall 
improved health that many Americans are seeking.  
To the extent that citizens find their government credible, its decision to endorse 
and promote certain beliefs would increase the credibility of those beliefs, all else equal. 
Though consumers will likely never be perfect in implementing their dietary plans, and 
producers are not angelic in their marketing practices, such ‘inefficiencies’ do not 
naturally lead to a confident prediction of an obesity epidemic.  
Since obesity is, by all accounts, a disease of overconsumption (of one nutrient or 
another) economics is one discipline that could provide insights into its origins. Many 
economists now rely upon a model of obesity wherein the consumer lacks the self-control 
or knowledge required to follow the diet they would ideally prefer. Self-control (Thaler 
and Shefrin, 1981) and willpower are concepts used in the more traditional economics 
literature to explain tempting (Ozdenoren and Salant, 2012) behaviors, and economists 
have increasingly used them to explain diet-related behaviors, including obesity. As is 
their wont, behavioral economists point to the cognitive biases that may lead consumers 
to miscalculate the healthfulness of their diet. Consumers may mis-estimate portion sizes 
or nutrient content of particular foods, for example, as a result of environmental cues.  
Present-biased preferences, visceral factors, and status quo bias are other concepts used to 
explain sub-par decision-making in eating contexts (Liu, et al., 2014). 
The behavioral health literature has also yielded some interesting results, but it is 
not always obvious how such analyses are substantively different from traditional 
economic analyses because the tools for analysis are often the same (Galizzi, 2014). Fan 
and Jin (2014) found that, despite a stronger intention to lose weight, overweight and 
obese individuals were less likely to meet recommended nutrient or physical activity 
levels. The authors attribute the finding to a lack of self-control compared to individuals 
of normal weight, and conclude by saying, “knowledge-based anti-obesity intervention 
policies are likely to have limited effects.” 
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This narrative appears plausible because, like almost everyone else, social 
scientists have long believed that they know, with certainty, at least a few hard facts 
about diet, health and obesity. John Cawley’s model of obesity and physical activity is 
among the better-known general treatments of the microeconomics of obesity (“A 
Framework for Understanding Eating and Physical Activity”, 2004). In that article, 
calories are counted as health “costs” (because of their contribution to obesity) but 
economic “benefits” (because they increase short-run utility) while exercise is an 
economic “cost” (because it cuts into leisure time) but a health “benefit” (because it 
consumes energy). Cawley also includes a term, δ, to account for differences in 
individuals’ metabolic rates as a function of their genes, G. Consumers may not know the 
precise value of δ, but their family history should provide some guidance, especially over 
time. Cawley is careful to note that his SLOTH model is meant only as an approximation, 
and should be judged according to its usefulness. The consumer’s problem is to balance 
these competing goals, behaviors and incentives as best she can over the course of her 
day. 
These classifications conform to everyday experience (and may be useful enough 
for a preliminary model) but, in reality, they clearly do not apply homogenously across 
calories, activities, situations or people. It is important to acknowledge, particularly in 
this domain, that tastes are not, in practice, constant, fixed and identical across time or 
individuals (Stigler and Becker, 1977) (Cowen, 1988). Individual tastes will, quite 
literally, dictate the diminishing marginal returns of any particular food. Likewise, the 
appeal of any form of physical exertion depends on its type, circumstance, as well as the 
goals and past experiences of the individual. The existence of a large market for diet and 
exercise-related goods and the apparent success of at least some consumers in avoiding or 
remedying their own obesity constitutes further evidence against the fixity of preferences, 
healthy or unhealthy. In fact, absent a significant change in overall consumer preferences, 
it is hard to imagine a significant, sustained reduction or increase in obesity rates over the 
period during which such a change might occur, and indeed has occurred since the 
middle of the last century (“America’s Eating Habits: Changes and Consequences”, 
USDA, 1999).  
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 Cawley (2004) goes on to discuss possible rationales for obesity-related 
interventions. He rightly notes that there is no economic rationale for intervention in the 
absence of a market failure. One form of market failure is externality, in which one 
market actor imposes costs upon another who is not party to the original trade. In such 
situations, government policy can act to coordinate action or rearrange property rights to 
bring about an efficient allocation of resources.  
  In their piece “Who pays for Obesity?” (2011) Jay Bhattacharya and Neeraj Sood 
show that the answer is, for the most part, “the obese”. Thus, the externality argument for 
intervening via public policy is limited because the obese are already paying the vast 
majority of the costs associated with their consumption. In theory, such incentives might 
be sufficient to bring about behavior that is desirable for individual and society alike—a 
Pareto improvement. The authors do not deny that there is a clear personal incentive to 
worry about obesity due to its link to other chronic illnesses but absent an externality 
justification, they reason that another potential justification for government intervention 
is on the “basis of helping people to address problems of ignorance or self-control that 
lead to obesity” (p. 141). 
Cawley (2004) goes on to explain that another rationale for policy intervention is 
to provide information, a public good which the government already has a fairly long 
history of providing and regulating in the form of the Guidelines. Cawley notes that this 
information may be ignored or drowned out by advertising, and that consumers may need 
still easier-to-use forms of information in order to bring about sustained reductions in the 
prevalence of obesity. 
A third possible rationale for policy intervention is described under the heading 
“Consumer Protection”. Cawley notes that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) closely regulate the provision of information on 
nutrition labels and advertising, respectively. Such labels can provide useful information 
but they may also mislead consumers—Cawley’s example is that of a “cholesterol-free” 
label on vegetable oil (an inherently cholesterol-free food), which conveys useful, true 
information but may also give consumers the false perception that the so-labelled oil 
confers additional health benefits relative to its unlabeled competitors. Cawley also notes 
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that there is a beneficial role for government to play in preventing deceptive advertising 
by the weight-loss industry. In addition to the obvious financial and time costs, deceived 
consumers also pay the opportunity costs of not pursuing an effective weight-loss method 
and if “repeatedly fooled by deceptive advertising may become discouraged and abandon 
attempts at weight loss or exercise” (p. 121).  
The final possible economic rationale for policy intervention Cawley discusses 
applies to situations in which “Individuals are not Rational”, to be judged by “whether 
the individual is capable of acting in his own interest” (p. 122). Time-inconsistent 
preferences, i.e., “succumbing to the temptation to accept immediate gratification at the 
expense of long-run best interest” (p. 122), is suggested as a possible rationale for a tax 
because it would force consumers’ to account for the long-run costs of their actions to a 
greater degree than they presently do.  Finally, in this section, Cawley discusses some 
relatively early findings from behavioral economics that relate to nutrition, including the 
positive association between portion sizes and calorie consumption. 
 More recently, many other researchers have explored insights from behavioral 
economics and their potential applications to understanding obesity’s recent rise. In her 
dissertation, Economic Aspects and Implications of Obesity (2009), Elise Hefti 
incorporates several assumptions, alone and together, about this market that deviate from 
standard, rational consumer theory. Among these are hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic 
discount functions, both of which incorporate consumers’ dynamically inconsistent 
behavior. Arguing in support of a hyperbolic discount function, Hefti proposes that there 
are four patterns observed in reality that cannot be accounted for by an exponential (i.e., 
time-consistent) discounting model:  
1. Violation of the stationary property or the common difference effect, 
“characterized by lower implicit temporal discounting for long delays than 
for short delays” (Chapman and Weber 2006 p. 590) 
2. The absolute magnitude effect (“less discounting of large outcomes than 
of small outcomes” (p. 590)) 
3. Gain-loss asymmetry (“losses are discounted at a lower rate than gains” 
(Hefti 2009 p. 117) ) 
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4. Delay-speedup asymmetry, an asymmetry between speeding up and 
delaying consumption in which agents demand far more to delay receiving 
a reward than they demand to consumer it sooner (Loewenstein and Prelic 
1992).  
Ultimately, Hefti concludes that a quasi-hyperbolic discount function is most 
appropriate because of its tractability, results from studies which showed measured 
differences in how obese individuals brains’ reacted to food versus their lean 
counterparts, and because food’s action in the brain is similar to that of drugs (p. 120). 
Referring to Gruber and Koszegi (2001, p.121), she distinguishes between “naïve” 
hyperbolic discounters and “sophisticated” ones. Naïve agents are unaware that they face 
a self-control problem and ignore preference reversals whereas sophisticated agents are 
aware of their self-control problem and plan accordingly.  
In one version of her model, Hefti incorporates an addictive good in the form of 
carbohydrate as a way to account for cycles of overeating in spite of time-consistent 
maximization of a standard utility function. The possibility of addiction raises the 
question: can consumption of addictive goods be modelled “rationally”, as some 
economists have argued (“The Family and the State”, Becker and Murphy, 1988)? 
According to the model of Gruber and Koszegi (2001), given time-inconsistent behavior, 
which ignores naïve agents, both exponential discounters and hyperbolic discounters 
decrease consumption of an addictive good when faced with a price increase so long as 
the degree of addiction is sufficiently low.  Their model also makes virtually the same 
behavioral predictions as a model based on rational addiction.  
Although the models’ predictions are the same, as Gruber and Koszegi point out, 
the optimal government policy depends on which is a more accurate depiction of reality. 
If obesity is the result of a rational addiction, there is no market-failure to correct and 
thus no reason for government intervention. In contrast, if consumers’ preferences are not 
time-consistent, then the revealed preferences observed in the market may be a poor 
guide for what consumers would actually prefer (p. 1285-1286) and there is a potential 
argument for policy intervention.  
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Richards and Hamilton (2012) find experimental evidence for a statistically 
significant positive correlation between consumers’ quasi-hyperbolic discount rates, 
BMI, and drinking behavior. While there may be an externality argument for policy 
intervention in the case of rational addiction (with time-consistent preferences), under 
time-inconsistent preferences the purpose of the intervention is to correct an internality—
behavior in the present which has negative spillovers on a future self or selves. Based on 
their results, Richards and Hamilton suggest that anti-obesity policy should target “more 
general behaviors associated with impatience and immediate gratification” (p. 193). 
Policy efforts should not focus on more of the same diet and exercise messages and 
“would be best directed to informing individuals as to the long-term implications of 
short-term gratification, rather than taxing foods directly” (p. 181) because the future cost 
of the taxes will be discounted by the hyperbolic discounter relative to an exponential 
discounter (p. 193).  
Gruber and Koszegi (whose article focuses on smoking) are dismissive of the 
potential effectiveness of market-tested self-control mechanisms (i.e., commitment 
devices) even for sophisticated agents because “they are probably undercut by the market 
mechanism itself” (p.1286) and because there will always be an incentive for future 
selves to revert to old habits. Weight-loss diets are commitment devices (goods) which 
are consumed in order to bring about more time-consistent behavior between the present 
self who wants to enjoy a meal for its short-term utility and the future self who wants to 
live a long, healthy life (Strotz, 1956, Bryan, 2010). The need for commitment devices 
comes about when there is conflict between the agent as “farsighted planner” and 
“myopic doer” (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981 p. 392).  
Regardless of which discounting model is more useful (exponential or 
hyperbolic), even sophisticated consumers might “allow” themselves to become 
overweight or even obese for a period of time before they reach some threshold (perhaps 
when the scale finally reads X) at which point they will either implement a known diet, in 
the case of exponential discounters or sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, or educate 
themselves about healthy diets and the relationship between various foods or nutrients 
and health outcomes and strategies for achieving them in the case of naïve hyperbolic 
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discounters. Some consumers may decide to trade eating poorly and enjoying it in their 
early years in exchange for a healthy (less enjoyable) diet once they decide they are “too 
fat”. Empirically, that scenario is indiscernible from one in which a previously obese 
individual has a “burst” of self-control, receives a life-changing piece of advice, or 
experiences some diet-related “wake-up call”. Nor are these four scenarios mutually 
exclusive.  
Clearly this point, the “obesity-preference threshold”, will vary between 
consumers but, less obviously, even relatively informed consumers probably will not 
know the exact weight that will actually spur a change in behavior. In this sense, 
overweight and obesity are “experiential bads” because the costs associated with eating a 
particular way accrue gradually over time and are not fully known until after eating habits 
are established. In contrast, among chronically obese individuals, leanness may be, for all 
intents and purposes, an experiential good.  
Even consumers who rationally allow themselves to gain weight and plan to lose 
it later do not necessarily know the true behavioral costs of doing so until that moment 
comes—i.e., the value of X is not known in advance. Consumers may find old habits 
harder to change or new habits harder to implement than previously anticipated. Or, they 
may settle into an acceptable weight or eating pattern combination before X is reached. 
Consumers who have a history of alternating between a healthy and an unhealthy weight 
have particularly sensitive discount functions, reflecting their discouragement.  
Although the case for policy interventions is not cut and dry (Bhattacharya, J. and 
N. Sood 2011), the microeconomic incentives to attempt to change one’s behavior are 
self-evident and becoming more so over time if only due to consumers’ increased 
awareness of the problem in their everyday lives. Moreover, to the extent that a given diet 
“works” in the short term, in practice, as judged by the consumer, one might expect that 
consumers’ new, health-promoting behaviors would eventually evolve into truly healthy, 
long-term habits. It seems somewhat damning to microeconomic theory that this has not 
happened yet.  
 According to the latest research, the decision-making problem that faces the obese 
consumer is basically known and understood to both her and the researchers studying the 
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problem. The practical difficulty lies in solving it. Kenkel (1991) discusses the folly in 
assuming that more public health information will necessarily lead to improved behavior, 
though he focuses on smoking and drinking. Consumers must have a personal incentive 
to follow information for it to have the intended effect. Incentive incompatibility may 
help explain why, despite the long history of efforts by the US government and state 
education systems to convey information about diet and health to consumers, obesity and 
other diet-related maladies are stable or increasing in prevalence. Kenkel’s point that we 
should not expect miracles from more information is well-taken but, then, how should 
one view obesity in this context? Would it be even worse with no public information 
campaigns at all? 
In their analysis of the past and future benefits of the federal government’s anti-
smoking policies, Jin, Kenkel, Liu, and Wang (“Retrospective and prospective benefit-
cost analyses of US anti-smoking policies”, 2015) estimate that they reduced the 
prevalence of smoking by 28% resulted in a consumer benefits of $573 billion (2010 
dollars) between 1964 and 2010 based on a 3% discount rate. The authors were unable to 
compute the costs of those policies but discuss evidence suggesting the net benefits were 
substantial. They go on to project the consumer benefits of a simulated, future anti-
smoking regulation arriving at a figure of $100 billion between 2010 and 2040 but are 
less certain that such a regulation represents a net benefit because it imposes costs upon 
some consumers.  
Cutler, Jessup, Kenkel and Starr (“Valuing Regulations Affecting Addictive or 
Habitual Goods”, 2015) also performed a benefit-cost analysis of smoking regulations 
and also find that the net benefits of anti-smoking regulations are still positive, even 
amongst smokers who experience withdrawal or ongoing losses from smoking cessation. 
They compute these losses as only 20-25 percent of health gains. Marginal smokers, on 
the other hand, will be induced to quit by the regulation and are unlikely to experience 
significant losses. Interestingly enough, this is far lower than the offset that the FDA has 
assumed in similar articles. Compared to anti-obesity policies, anti-smoking policies have 
been much more effective, perhaps because there are important differences between the 
demand for smoking and unhealthy foods.  
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As mentioned, various time discounting rules and time-inconsistent preferences 
are the most accepted tools with which to explain the development of obesity in 
individuals in spite of the various personal and public efforts to remedy it. And dieting is 
an obvious real-world example of time-inconsistent behavior (Frederick, et al. 2002, 
Laibson 1997). Changing any preference is difficult, especially one as habitual, familiar, 
and personal as those for food (Todd & Morrison 2014).  
Healthy habits may have been easier to maintain in the past, when food was 
simply less available. Prior to the “techno-physio” evolution of the food environment 
(Fogel 2004), our species had far, far less choice in terms of the quantity or quality of 
food—they were in some sense “given” by nature and had to be extracted by humans via 
the costly processes of hunting and gathering for comparatively immediate personal 
consumption. The far more pressing issue then was starvation and diseases of deficiency. 
Although evolution of the food environment was surely the result of human-directed, 
purposive action, it is plausible that, in dealing with new, rapidly spreading agricultural 
technology, we could end up with a food environment that no one is particularly happy 
with, one that makes food choices which lead to obesity less immediately costly than in 
the past (Cutler, et al. 2003).  
On the other hand, the degree of choice provided by the modern food environment 
is a remarkably large and positive innovation because of both the quantity and variety of 
foods to which consumers now have easy access. Obese and lean individuals shop in the 
same supermarkets, so it is not as though the two populations live in completely separate 
physical environments. No one is forced to consume the unhealthy foods sold in the 
market in excess any more than they are forced to eat kale at every meal. Likewise, it is 
not as though this market has moved uniformly in the direction of supplying only 
unhealthy food. The rising tide of obesity itself lends itself to profit-making opportunities 
and, indeed, various market-provided diets, foods, exercise equipment, etc. are also 
available to assist consumers in controlling their willpower in pursuit of their health goals 
(Bryan 2010).  
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Based on my reading, the economics of obesity literature distinguishes itself 
somewhat from other disciplines that study the subject by how it treats the following 
aspects of behavior in obese consumers: 
1. Self-control: It is common to refer to obesity primarily as a problem of 
self-control, often modelled as a conflict between present and future 
selves, (Fan & Jin, 2014, Legg, Puri, & Thomas, 2000, Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981).  
2. Rational obesity Related to the first point, obesity itself is technically not 
a problem in and of itself unless the consumer deems it so. To some 
extent, consumers are likely to trade-off their preferences for health with 
those for palatability and other preferences surrounding food. 
3. Stable preferences Individuals have stable, and hard-to-change 
preferences for their particular unhealthy diet, which may be treated as 
endogenous to the economic and social system (Palacios-Huerta and 
Santos, 2004). 
4. Non-satiation Calories of food enter consumers’ demand functions as 
normal, homogenous goods which do not, by themselves, convey 
sufficient feedback to prevent consumption past the point where obesity is 
maintained. 
In order for Cawley, Hefti, Fisher and others to model obesity as a social 
phenomenon, they must trust that the dominant literature coming from an unrelated 
discipline captures the salient dimensions of the problem reasonably well. Cawley’s 
model of economic behavior is necessarily built upon a model of the relationship between 
diet, physical activity and obesity—such a model or an absence thereof seems a necessary 
part of the foundation for any economic or behavioral framework in this area.  
 As such, Cawley’s model pre-supposes that obese individuals became that way 
because they failed to undertake certain behaviors—namely, reduced calorie consumption 
or increased exercise. He simultaneously assumes that this would be the consumers’ 
preferred allocation of resources given complete knowledge of the alternatives. As a 
result, his, and nearly every other explanation for obesity ultimately reduces to differing 
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individual preferences (p 120). Unlike “those working in public health” (p 120), Cawley 
argues, economists are more likely to assume that individuals are acting in their best 
interest whereas the former are quick to assume the opposite.  
Synopsis and Critique of Obesity Literature 
  To sum up, most social scientists seem to agree that the causes of obesity are 
common knowledge (Geanakoplos, 1992), meaning everyone, including the afflicted, 
basically knows how obesity works. But solutions, in the form of changed habits, have 
proven difficult for obese individuals to implement because they lack the necessary self-
control or, less convincingly, information. On the policy side, 70-plus years of federal 
efforts in the form of Dietary Allowances, Goals, and Guidelines were implemented to 
prevent precisely this sort of situation. Paradoxically, because so few researchers wishing 
to address the issue question the underlying wisdom of the Guidelines themselves, they 
spend little time on normative models of consumer behavior and instead try to refine 
descriptive models (Quiggin, 1993, p. 5), which up to this point can explain only a 
fraction of obesity’s meteoric rise (Baum & Chou, 2015).  
The preceding pages show that, despite much research and writing on the topic, 
there is still considerable uncertainty about the best choice of policy or policies to combat 
obesity and its associated health problems, mostly because few policies have proven 
particularly effective so far. Nevertheless, researchers seem sure that they know which 
side of the market is most in need of change: the demand side.  
For the remainder of this chapter I will review literature and evidence suggesting 
that the apparent ineffectiveness of past and present nutrition policies may be the end 
result of long-unacknowledged or unknown uncertainty at more fundamental levels of 
analysis than is commonly understood by the stakeholders and policymakers in this 
domain--that is, uncertainty about the fundamental causes of, and cures for, obesity. The 
USDA continues to publish Dietary Guidelines, including advice related to obesity, 
which are broadly similar to the original Goals in 1980 (Sollid 2015). According to 
government nutrition policy at least, there is no uncertainty regarding the causes and 
cures for obesity nor the basic requirements of an otherwise healthy diet. 
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 Assuming I knew nothing about obesity trends in the past several decades (but 
everything else about society), imperfect preferences are a reasonable and defensible 
explanation for the onset of obesity in an individual or even large group in the short to 
medium-term. There is no a priori reason to assume consumers’ preferences for food, 
health and the actual environment will quickly and harmoniously align with the social 
goal of optimal long-run health, a perspective I share with economists in this area. Those 
who suffer from food allergies probably understand this point well when eating out. 
However, the current predicament is that more and more individuals are becoming obese 
and remaining that way or worsening. That is how a country, and the world (Caballero, 
2005, Prentice, 2005), develops obesity on such a large scale. At some point, basic 
microeconomic theory suggests that obesity rates might stabilize, settling into a “natural” 
rate of obesity. 
 Like the natural rate of unemployment, the causes of a “natural” rate of obesity 
may have frictional and structural components. The shape of a consumer’s discount 
function may lead her to change her habits only after becoming obese, analogous to 
frictional unemployment, which comes about by choice. “Structural” obesity could be 
explained by the time it actually takes to change habits or lose weight—behavioral 
factors, traditionally considered.  
 Even considering the difficulties that come with dieting and habit change, it is still 
rather hard to understand exactly why so many consumers would continue to make the 
same chronic mistakes day-in and day-out. Contrary to the traditional narrative, one 
might think this is precisely the sort of inefficiency a market system with functioning 
institutions would correct or prevent. Unlike, say, cars or appliances purchased in the 
United States, which have improved in quality over time, obesity statistics show that 
American diets have not followed suit. 
  According to the latest empirical research (Baum &Chou, 2015) behavioral 
economists are as yet unable to explain the vast majority of the increase in obesity’s 
prevalence—at most 6.5% of the 15% increase in the past decade. It seems even with the 
incorporation of behavioral factors in economic models, there is a large component of 
obesity’s causes which remains unexplained.  
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Unfortunately, in order to determine precisely why one consumer is more or less 
obese than another, a researcher would need complete knowledge of consumer 
preferences, motivations, metabolism and precise nutrient consumption. Since this 
empirical requirement is impossible to meet, mainstream theories for obesity’s rise 
technically cannot be falsified so long as American diets do not meet USDA 
requirements. That is, so long as the average American diet and diet-related health status 
deviates from the ideal, Americans will always appear to lack some self-control. 
Moreover, well-known measurement and self-reporting issues (Fave, et al., 2009) that 
accompany observational nutrition research render the task of interpreting empirical 
results with precision all the more difficult.  
Both behavioral and more traditional economists consistently direct the focus of 
their analyses toward the impediments (be they mental, physical, or environmental) that 
prevent individuals from following a healthy diet, as defined by the nutrition authority 
embodied in various federal agencies. In so doing, they are often, in effect and perhaps 
without realizing it, analyzing two sorts of questions at once: 1) microeconomic questions 
about changing preferences and habits to meet long-term goals and 2) the more “macro” 
question of how or the degree to which preferences are shaped by social institutions, 
including government policies. Researchers of all stripes seem to have assumed that 
preference change, by and large, remains too difficult for obese consumers to achieve, in 
spite of the microeconomic incentives, policy efforts, and market-tested commitment 
devices. Despite the lack of evidence for nutrition policy’s effectiveness up to this point, 
research in this area often, though not always, argues or at least implies that further 
policy interventions in pursuit of the same behavioral goal may bring about a reduction in 
the prevalence of obesity. Baum and Cho (2015) suggest behavioral interventions can 
play, at best, only a minor role. 
There are two corollaries to the mainstream point of view that I wish to consider. 
One is that the obesity epidemic would be as bad or worse under most alternative policy 
regimes—e.g., if the government had never endorsed any Guidelines at all, one could 
only assume that the situation would be worse. Exceedingly few researchers in this area 
argue that the solution to the obesity problem is for consumers to follow advice which 
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differs substantively from USDA advice so I assume that they believe it to be mostly 
correct or among the best available alternatives. I say “most” alternative regimes rather 
than “all” because in a counterfactual world that lacks a government-endorsed diet, other 
institutions and the same sorts of experts and professionals we have today might operate 
much as they do now. It is entirely possible that things would have turned out much the 
same as they have (for better or worse) in the absence of any government action at all.  
Secondly, if hyperbolic discounting or other self-control based theory is a useful 
way to explain obesity’s onset and persistence, we still do not know whether the costs 
associated with obesity’s persistence are, on average, high enough to bring about the 
significant, long-term changes in consumer habits that policymakers, nutritionists and the 
public-at-large would like.   
Though hyperbolic discounting models are frequently used to explain myopic 
behavior, part of their appeal lies in their prediction that, at some point, the myopic 
consumer will choose the more rational option because it pays, in the moment, to do so. 
Put differently, an obese individual’s incentive to change her heretofore fixed, poor 
eating habits should increase with time (i.e., the duration of her obesity) as long as she 
experiences negative (health) consequences associated with obesity and, also, because of 
the reduction in expected utility due to the reduced quality of life or premature death. But 
the evidence (rising obesity rates) suggests that sustained preference reversals are more 
than outnumbered by people who fail to heed sensible eating advice. 
Similar to the issues involved in falsifying a widespread self-control problem, 
there is no way to know if continued efforts to affect consumer behavior in the same 
basic ways will ever have the intended effect. We do not have the requisite information 
about the parameters of consumers’ discount functions that would allow for such a 
prediction. Two questions that may be important to the future of nutrition policy come to 
mind: Do obese consumers need to experience higher costs in order to change their eating 
habits? And if so, should this be interpreted as evidence in support of some form of tax 
on food or specific nutrients? My reading of the literature suggests that, as long as current 
trends in the field continue, researchers and stakeholders in this domain are increasingly 
likely to answer “yes” to both questions.  
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 I have identified two significant, interrelated shortcomings in the obesity literature 
which relate to the obesity epidemic itself and nutrition-related policy efforts past and 
present. The first is that at least some prominent voices were ignored in the early 
formation of nutrition policy, when the science was weak and uncertainty arguably was 
high. The possibility for this to occur in the policy process is raised by Jack in his critique 
of “democratic” approaches to science and, specifically nutrition science policy (“Lydia 
J. Roberts's nutrition research and the rhetoric of" democratic" science” 2009). That is, it 
is possible that some voices will be ignored in a deliberation process dominated by 
experts directed at reaching some consensus. Minority, dissenting, opinions may be 
ignored, glossed over and explained away by a majority of experts in ideological 
agreement, in pursuit of some policy-prescribed goal. In the case of nutrition science, this 
means a failure by other disciplines, including public policy and economics, to wade into 
the science of nutrition itself for clues as to why obesity has proven such a vexing public 
health problem.  
 Second, by ignoring this real uncertainty (between “rival hypotheses” (Shackle, 
1972, p. 19), credible institutions may be reinforcing a suboptimal equilibrium of their 
own creation without even realizing it. 
 In the obesity literature, economists have ignored the possibility that consumers’ 
preference formation is the dysfunctional result of interaction with nutrition institutions 
and policy. If useful scientific input has been ignored both politically and institutionally, 
it raises the possibility that consumers’ habits alone are poor guides for how best to 
understand and combat obesity. The extent to which such uncertainty can explain 
obesity’s rise, then, depends on two important questions: 1) the substantive differences 
between relatively credible rival hypotheses regarding the causes and remedies for 
obesity, and 2) the extent to which consumer habits’ and beliefs are already informed by 
or “adapted to” credible institutions. 
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The Case for Uncertainty in the Scientific Literature 
 Since the purpose of this dissertation is to counter current and extant theories of 
widespread obesity, which frequently rely on explanations in terms of individual lack of 
self-control, I will now explore the scientific roots of this, the dominant narrative 
regarding the obesity problem in the United States. 
 Gary Taubes, a science journalist and author, who eventually became interested in 
the science related to diet, health and obesity, has done as good a job as anyone in 
critically reviewing the long-lived and often poorly-understood field of nutrition. In his 
book, Good Calories, Bad Calories: Fats, Carbs, and the Controversial Science of Diet 
and Health (2007), Taubes argues that much of what we believe to be true about the 
causes of obesity and, importantly, other diet-related illnesses may, in fact, be mistaken. 
In order to make his case, Taubes reviews the study of obesity in great detail, focusing on 
the history of scientific and popular thought regarding the causes and cures for obesity. 
He traces the modern study of obesity to the 19th century, when the first weight-reducing 
diets began to appear. The first of these diets was popularized by William Banting in 
1863 in his pamphlet, Letter on Corpulence, Addressed to the Public. Medical authorities 
at the time were quick to criticize Banting and his diet as nothing new, which Banting 
willingly acknowledged (Taubes, x-xi), as his only wish was to help others like him. 
 According to Taubes, our failure to keep widespread obesity at bay may have its 
roots in the public’s (or its’ trusted authorities’) failure to heed Banting, and his 
intellectual predecessors—Claude Bernard (French physiologist), Jean Anthelme Brillat-
Savarin (French lawyer, politician, and gastronome), and Jean-Francois Dancel (French 
physician and military surgeon), all of whom had written favorably on the topic of 
Banting-like diets. That is because Banting’s diet is the first popular example of a 
seemingly effective low-carbohydrate diet. A low carbohydrate diet is, proportionally, 
low in the macronutrient carbohydrate, constituting 20-30% of calories consumed. Under 
such diets, fat makes up another 50-60% of calories while protein, the third of the three 
macronutrients, makes up the remainder. Unlike traditional low-fat, low-calorie diets, 
calories are not the variable of primary concern for weight loss, whether that means 
reducing consumption or “burning” them through exercise. According to Taubes, our 
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current understanding of the relationship between diet and obesity is actually one of two 
schools of thought which have competed with one another since Banting’s original 
pamphlet was published (Banting 1993).  
 In contrast, since it began publishing the Guidelines in the 1980s, the USDA has 
promoted a low-fat, low-calorie diet, along with exercise, as a healthy approach to losing 
weight and avoiding chronic disease. Low-carbohydrate diets claim to offer the same set 
of benefits even though they are starkly different from what has long been considered 
healthy by most Americans. Such diets were re-popularized in the 1970s by Dr. Robert 
Atkins and his own eponymous diet has waxed and waned in popularity since. 
Randomized control trials comparing low-carbohydrate, high-fat, ad-libitum (i.e., without 
caloric-restriction) diets and low-fat, low-calorie diets for weight loss did not begin to 
appear until 2003 (Foster, et al., 2003). Today, the so-called low-carb “fad” is enjoying 
another resurgence in popularity among consumers and scientists alike, as I will 
demonstrate. 
  Compared to a low-fat, reduced-calorie diet, a low-carbohydrate diet has a much 
higher percentage of fat (around 50 percent of calories), much of it saturated fat, a 
nutrient long-vilified for its role in heart disease though meta-analysis and clinical trials 
indicate that the risk of developing Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) or Cardiovascular 
Disease (CVD) is unaffected by saturated fat intake (Siri-Tarino, et al., 2010).  
Meanwhile, low-carbohydrate diets are much more restrictive when it comes to eating 
sugar, starch and grains, including whole grains, compared to their low-fat counterparts. 
Part of the reason for their high saturated fat content comes from their opposing views on 
which fats are “good” and “bad”. In direct contradiction of longstanding USDA advice, 
low-carbohydrate diets typically encourage the consumption of saturated, animal fats 
instead of polyunsaturated vegetable oils that are generally considered healthier.  
Vegetables and fruits, for the most part, remain healthy, but relatively small, parts of both 
diets 
  It is difficult to properly stress just how at odds these two approaches to curing 
obesity are—i.e., the extent to which they are rivalrous in consumption strictly because of 
the different consumption patterns they recommend. In the event that one dieting 
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approach were to be scientifically verified as the proper approach, there would be a clear 
case for some regulation or provision of information about the quality of the foods and 
the proper role within said diet (Beales, et al, 1981) This might not present a problem in 
some contexts but, according to Taubes, it has long been the case in nutrition that “[T]he 
urge to simplify a complex scientific situation so that physicians can apply it and their 
patients and the public embrace it has taken precedence over the scientific obligation of 
presenting the evidence with relentless honesty” (Good Calories, Bad Calories 451).  
 In the opening chapter of the book, Taubes quotes Hilde Bruch, a psychoanalyst 
specializing in eating disorders, as saying “The great progress in dietary control of 
obesity was the recognition that meat…was not fat producing; but that it was the innocent 
foodstuffs, such as bread and sweets, which lead to obesity.” That was in 1957, around 
the time when excessive fat and saturated fat intake were emerging as potential public 
health problems. According to Taubes and his ilk, there is no obvious, scientific reason 
why low-carbohydrate diets should have ever gone out of fashion as methods for weight-
reduction. At the time, the scientific evidence in support of low-fat diets was not 
sufficiently clear nor convincing for a scientific consensus to be enshrined in policy. 
Several fundamental questions surrounding diet and health were far from settled, and 
arguably remain unanswered. 
 Few argue that low carbohydrate diets are appropriate for everybody but, for 
some time at least, they were viewed as the go-to method for weight loss. More recently, 
however, weight-reducing diets which focus on reducing the raw food-energy consumed 
and increasing the energy exerted through exercise have competed with low-carbohydrate 
diets--and mostly won (U.S. News & World Report 2016). Taubes goes to great, and 
effective, lengths to show that these two views of obesity are not compatible with one 
another. To illustrate, if, in addition to being low in carbohydrates an individual’s diet is 
supposed to be low in fat (for example, to avoid some other perceived health risk), 
following a low-carbohydrate diet becomes incoherent—holding protein intake constant 
(the US average is 15%), a diet cannot really be “low” in both carbohydrate (~25% of 
calories) and fat (~30%) without adding some fourth, non-existent macronutrient to make 
up the remaining 30% of calories. 
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 While Good Calories, Bad Calories serves as a brilliant and thorough historical 
summary of the obesity literature, Taubes was not the last to question the conventional 
wisdom surrounding diet and health. Nina Teicholz, another science journalist, echoed 
much of Taubes’s research and sentiments in her book The Big Fat Surprise: Why Butter, 
Meat and Cheese Belong in a Healthy Diet (2014). William Davis, a practicing physician, 
published the best-selling book Wheat Belly: Lose the Wheat, Lose the Weight, and Find 
Your Path Back to Health (2011) after successfully treating his patients with a wheat-free 
diet. Grain Brain: The Surprising Truth about Wheat, Carbs, and Sugar--Your Brain's 
Silent Killers (2013) by David Perlmutter and Kristin Loberg is another popular example 
of recent books on the subject. These books are part of an extant and growing popular 
literature that questions the scientific basis, and some fundamental beliefs, of 
conventional nutrition advice. These authors tend to conclude two things: 
1. That fat, saturated fat, and cholesterol are not the problems they are made out to 
be with respect to cardiovascular health and may, in fact, make up a large part of 
a healthy diet. 
2. Grains, especially refined grains (particularly white flour and sugar), may be 
more problematic and linked to more health problems, including obesity, than is 
commonly believed (Cordain, 1999). 
 Since 2003, after several decades of public policy advocating the use of low-
calorie, low-fat diets, many clinical studies have been conducted to test efficacy and 
healthfulness of low-carbohydrate, “paleo”, or high-protein diets. The results indicate that 
individuals placed on a low-carbohydrate diet often lose at least as much weight, on 
average, as subjects placed on low-calorie, low-fat diets. Furthermore, their cholesterol 
readings, and other measures of cardiovascular health tend to improve or at least not 
worsen (Boden et al., 2005, Brehm et al., 2003, Brehm et al., 2005, Brinkworth, et al., 
2009, Foster et al., 2010, Gardner et al., 2007, Guldbrand, H. et al., 2014, Lindeberg et 
al., 2007, Samaha et al., 2003, Shai et al., 2008, Shea et al., 2011, Siri-Tarino, Sun, Hu, & 
Krauss, 2010, Stern et al., 2004, Volek et al., 2004, Yancy et al., 2004).  Based on my 
reading of the evidence, low-carbohydrate diets are at least worth considering for 
individuals looking to lose weight and otherwise improve their health. On the other hand, 
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I cannot credibly refute the experiences of those who have successfully lost weight on a 
low-calorie or low-fat diet.  
 Other researchers have stressed the negative health consequences associated with 
even moderate grain consumption (Davis, 2011, Perlmutter and Loberg, 2013). Still 
others suggest that more specific nutrients, such as fructose, may be to blame for some 
individuals’ metabolic dysregulation (Arora & McFarlane, 2005, Basciano, Federico, & 
Adeli, 2005, Elliot, 2002). Fructose represents about half the caloric content of the sugar 
found in most foods.  
What all of the above suggests is that obesity, as a biological, metabolic, or medical, 
problem, is far more complex than is commonly understood today. Confusingly enough, 
an article entitled “Is a calorie a calorie?” appeared in the American Journal of Clinical 
Nutrition in 2004 (Buchholz and Schoeller), which answers the titular question in the 
affirmative while simultaneously admitting that “units of dietary energy are 
metabolizable energy and not gross energy” (what is eaten is not the same as what is 
“burned” by the body) and that the macronutrient composition affects energy 
expenditure. This is a particularly relevant finding if the scope of macronutrient 
composition has been unnecessarily restricted. 
That same year, in another journal, Feinman and Fine (“"A Calorie is a Calorie" 
Violates the Second Law of Thermodynamics”, 2004) reached the opposite conclusion 
when it comes to weight-loss and obesity. In 2008, Feinman, et al. published an article 
(“Analysis of dietary interventions: A Simple Payoff Matrix for Display of Comparative 
Dietary Trials) containing a “payoff matrix” comparing the efficacy of different diets 
used to lose weight. Carbohydrate-restricted diets emerged as the winner. Critics of the 
mainstream view emphasize the point that the metabolism of the obese is important in 
attempting to understand the emergence of the obesity epidemic, as metabolic processes 
may have a significant impact on both preferences and satiety (Gerstein et al., 2004, 
Fiszman et al., 2014, Rolls, et al., 1988). 
Because this scientific controversy has been largely ignored, in present-day parlance 
a “healthy” diet invariably refers to one that is relatively low in calories (<2,000), low in 
fat (<30% of total calories), low in sugar (variable), low in salt (<2400 mg), focused on 
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lean meats and high in fruits and vegetables. My finding is that this is the case with many 
popular diets—they are either roughly similar to existing recommendations or amenable 
to them with a few minor changes (U.S. News & World Report 2016). This is consistent 
with economic theory given that the tenets of healthy eating are well-understood and 
believed—more credible goods tend to have larger markets. As such, vegetarian diets, for 
example, are not far afield of these basic tenets even if they are not technically equivalent 
to the USDA endorsed diet. 
That is, a vegetarian diet is not inherently rivalrous with a USDA style diet and could 
easily be considered a first or second best option for some consumers. A low-
carbohydrate diet is highly rivalrous because it embodies an entirely different set of 
beliefs, some of which do overlap with mainstream advice. Consumers also have some 
room for latitude in their choices and may choose to combine approaches that do not 
conflict practically or theoretically. 
The exception to the rule that differences between diets or foods marketed as 
healthy will be relatively minor is found in low-carbohydrate diets. Although researchers 
interested in low carbohydrate dieting are part of a growing minority in the nutrition 
field, few of their insights have penetrated the fields of economics or public policy. One 
exception is economist Zoë Harcombe, PhD whose book (“The Obesity Epidemic…”, 
2010) calls attention to the poor science that underlies nutrition policy and everyday 
advice, as well as the potential promise of low-carbohydrate dieting. Using her 
economics training, she tests a model of obesity using data from clinical studies and is 
able to show that subjects’ success or failure to lose weight can be better explained, 
statistically, by differences in carbohydrate consumption, as opposed to the differences in 
calorie consumption, as was generally argued by the original authors.  
 This is not to argue that one diet or another should or should not be recommended 
to any particular person. As I have shown, recent clinical evidence suggests that many 
approaches can bring about weight loss. There are a multitude of diets on the market and 
in the media from which to choose. However, on the matter of policy, according to 
Taubes (2007) and other like-minded critics, the government acted prematurely in 
endorsing one interpretation of the evidence, and that interpretation has been with us ever 
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since, embodied in the Dietary Guidelines for Americans. These represent not only the 
government’s opinion on what constitutes a healthy diet but, today, that of thousands of 
professionally licensed individuals, including Registered Dietitians (RD) and physicians 
who then relay that information to their clients (Center for Nutrition Advocacy, 2015).  
 As the prevalence of obesity has increased, media attention to the issue has as 
well. It, too, reflects the commonly-held belief that obese Americans are some 
combination of ignorant of proper nutrition or lacking in self-control—that their 
underlying, fixed habits are inherently unhealthy and apparently incredibly durable. The 
healthiness of any given diet is framed in terms of its resemblance to a low-fat or low-
calorie diet, particularly if the individual in question is known to be obese or to suffer 
from diet-related illness (U.S. News & World Report, 2016). 
Policy, Institutions, and Habits 
 The second shortcoming in the literature, facilitated by the aforementioned 
knowledge gap, relates to the interactions among nutrition policy, information, 
institutions, consumer preferences, and habits. The literature in this area, written at a time 
when obesity rates are at an all-time high, naturally seeks to explain obesity as a failure 
of self-control, in some broad sense, to the extent that it assumes that obesity-reduction is 
on-net utility-enhancing. The personal incentives appear to be in place, information is 
plentiful but the four previously mentioned modelling conventions (p.20) lead researchers 
to focus on the impediments to losing weight or remaining lean. In so doing, they do not 
consider the extent to which consumer preferences and habits have changed and 
interacted with important social institutions and public policy over time. 
 Taubes (2007) argues that current, popular explanations for obesity’s prevalence 
essentially blame obese individuals for being “gluttonous” and “slothful”.  Experts and 
professionals seek to correct their behavior by recommending what were once called 
“semi-starvation” diets along with increased exercise, methods bound to fail. Meanwhile, 
healthy, viable alternatives are warned against based on years of weak evidence and 
popular misconceptions. The observational studies that dominate the nutrition literature 
are little help in discerning which of these rival hypotheses is correct. 
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 The federal government has been actively interested and involved in shaping 
American eating habits by promoting, directing and funding nutrition research for over 
70 years. The goals of these policies and their makers were, and continue to be, well-
meaning, and earnest. One has to assume that these efforts have affected consumer 
preferences and resulting habits in innumerable ways which may be relevant to the study 
of widespread obesity.  According to the USDA, in 1999, Americans were “slowly 
adopting more healthful diets--the share of calories from fat is declining, people are 
eating more fruit than 10 years ago, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Healthy 
Eating Index has shown some improvement in recent years,” (USDA ERS, 1999).  What 
has failed to emerge, however, is a decline in the obesity epidemic. 
 According to Taubes (2007), the McGovern Committee’s decision, to reduce the 
“complexity” of dietary decision-making back in 1980 has amounted to a decades-long, 
nationwide experiment, testing one of at least two available hypotheses of diet and health, 
including obesity. If other, plausible hypotheses were available or have emerged since the 
publication of the Guidelines, this suggests a breakdown in the interaction between 
science and government.  
 I know of no theory of the ideal use of science in policy which has the 
government deciding to “test” a medical theory on the entire population. Rather, in the 
treatments I am aware of, sound science is assumed as an input—it is hard enough to 
design efficient policies even then. If, instead, untested science was used as an input, then 
bad policy, in the form of bad information, is not necessarily a surprising result. The 
long-run effects of bad information could be negligible or significant, depending on the 
situation. 
 Based on my review of the literature, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
McGovern Committee’s seemingly benign policy intervention set in motion an 
institutional environment which reinforces suboptimal eating habits. That is, widespread 
obesity may have come about because of a dysfunctional, path-dependent policy process 
that prevents efficient consumer decision-making from the outset, eventually leading to 
the United States’ present predicament. If that is the case, the origins of American eating 
habits deserve some attention. 
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Nutrition Institutions and the Microeconomics of Habits 
 It is central to my argument that researchers and consumers alike use credible 
social institutions in their everyday decision-making in order to form expectations about 
their future health. The extent to which economists, for example, can know whether or 
not a particular food, nutrient or behavior is relevant to the study of obesity is, itself, 
determined by outside experts on the subject. In this case, obesity’s severity is typically 
modelled in terms of one variable: calories. Thus, the task of any economic or policy 
analysis has been to use the tools of social science to describe or explain why calories 
have become so easy to “overconsume” despite the costs of doing so. Though certainly 
not the first, Margaret Meade referred to obesity as a problem of “overnutrition” (1964, p. 
24). It has been conceptualized and enshrined in policy as such ever since. If, however, 
there are gaps in our knowledge regarding the causes of obesity then calories per se may 
be the wrong consumption characteristic to focus upon in analyzing obesity. The case for 
public policy interventions intended to prevent nutritional maladies is severely limited, if 
not nullified, if the nutrition authority in charge is sufficiently uncertain about the basic 
causes of, and solutions to, the problem.  
While the Guidelines are supposed to respond to new evidence, the extent to 
which new evidence is useful or relevant is determined by a small group of individuals 
who are now professionally invested in a particular set of beliefs (Hite, et al., 2010, Hite 
& Schoefield, 2015) and protected by licensing laws (Center for Nutrition Advocacy, 
2015). Those beliefs, in turn, reinforce widespread, decades-old beliefs about nutrition in 
society. They may have also inadvertently led to institutional and political structures that 
are neither thorough enough nor responsive enough to objectively present the most useful 
and accurate findings about the relationships between diet and health to consumers.   
If so, this weakens a narrative in which “positive” institutions (science, medicine, 
government) are unable to overcome consumers’ more ‘primitive’ urges, preyed upon by 
institutions and actors possessing more ambivalent motivations—the market, agriculture 
policy, food-related firms, marketing, and advertising. Instead, obese consumers’ 
excessive trust in those more positively regarded institutions may be the very source of 
their problem. 
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The mainstream perspective does not fully consider the fact that our preferences 
are hidden or unknown, even to ourselves, thanks to the subtle influence of institutions 
(Hodgson, 2003).  Of course, food companies may not necessarily have our best long-
term interests in mind when marketing their products, either. Nevertheless, they do have 
an incentive to make their products appear as healthy as is profitable, which can include 
changes in production decisions, including ingredients.  
It is sometimes argued, particularly by nutritionists, that food companies send 
possibly misleading signals via their labels in order to entice consumers (Nestle 2007). 
These positive health signals are generally sent on the front of the package without 
mention of any other changes to the ingredients, which are listed on the back of the 
product. For example, a product labelled low-fat may, simultaneously, have more sugar 
than its higher-fat competitor. In terms of useful information, it is not clear that the 
consumer is better or worse off with the “low-fat” label on the front—simply turning the 
food package around or repeated experience with the product ought to reveal whether the 
health signal is reliable or useful. As long as consumers are aware of what is going on, 
overall efficiency is hardly affected, particularly as consumers learn and are able to 
generate expectations in accordance with their own preferences. The salient point, 
however, is that the health signal on the front and the “Nutrition Facts” label on the back 
of the package both derive their credibility or lack thereof from basically the same set of 
institutions and organizations.  
These institutions shape the way consumers think and, in turn, the marketing 
behavior of food companies in subtle ways. For example, although low-carbohydrate 
versions of popular foods are increasingly available, I have yet to see one that markets 
itself as high in fat even though the two characteristics are complementary under a true 
low-carbohydrate diet. Nor have I observed labels on bacon or other pre-existing fatty 
foods extolling the same virtue. In theory, such labels would appeal to a small segment of 
consumers who value those characteristics. The downside to this approach is that the 
label would likely reduce demand for the final product among a much larger segment of 
consumers—those who believe that additional fat will increase their risk of health 
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problems.  Those seeking higher fat might be expected to choose bacon and other such 
foods on their own, without a label.  
Instead, marketers of low carbohydrate foods use their labels, which are also 
regulated by the FDA, to draw attention their products’ lack of carbohydrates, including 
sugar, wheat, gluten, etc. Presumably, this is a way to attract either group (low-fat or low-
carb) because carbohydrates make up the majority of almost all consumers’ calorie intake 
(as the Guidelines suggest) and so are likely the easiest to give up at the margin. 
 Meanwhile, foods which are low in both carbohydrates and fat are free to use 
both the low carbohydrate and low fat labels, which will predictably lead to sub-optimal 
decision-making if high-fat diets do not actually increase the consumer’s risk of heart 
disease and the consumer has a taste for fat. Like mainstream nutritionists, low-
carbohydrate diet proponents are quick to point out that one should be careful relying too 
heavily on packaged foods that advertise their lack of characteristics because they may 
still be relatively high in carbohydrate or sugar.  
What the above examples suggest is that the role of food companies in causing 
obesity is not purely negative, at least partly due to government regulation. Sophisticated 
or motivated consumers could, and probably do, educate themselves on how to use labels 
effectively and on which pitfalls to avoid in order to cultivate healthier habits. As 
mentioned above, the USDA had evidence suggesting that Americans were adopting 
modestly healthier habits at least as far back as 1999.  
If the credibility of many commonly-held beliefs about nutrition is as dubious as I 
have argued, then an alternative hypothesis for a significant portion of America’s obesity 
epidemic is possible. Americans have only one, inferior consumption technology 
available to them in pursuit of weight-loss. They might have been better served by a 
market of competing commitment devices, and professionals that would allow for more 
personalization and individualized learning. Since only one approach to weight loss is 
widely considered credible, the market for such credence goods (Dulleck & 
Kerschbamer, 2006) has been narrowed relative to what it would have been without any 
official endorsement of a particular set of beliefs about nutrition and health.  
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 In short, government policy both set the stage for, and encouraged the creation of, 
the credible nutrition institutions which, for better or worse, have shaped nearly 
everyone’s understanding of obesity at all levels of analysis. Obese consumers’ habits, 
rather than being biased, may reflect their best adaptation to credible, but bad, 
information. Those same institutions remain in a position to address the obesity epidemic.  
To the extent that the true causes of obesity are unknown—e.g., to the extent that calories 
are the wrong characteristic upon which to base obesity models, economists and most 
others working in service of credible nutrition institutions will incorrectly model 
individual behavior and habits. This includes self-control’s supposed central role in the 
obesity epidemic 
Concluding Remarks 
 In this section I emphasized the extent of heretofore mostly unacknowledged real 
uncertainty in the nutrition literature. While it is convenient to separate uncertainty into 
various categories, reality is far more complicated. John Stuart Mill (On Liberty, 1859) 
recognized the difficulty of categorizing conflicting opinions   
"Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or 
never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, 
sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths 
by which they ought to be accompanied and limited.” (On Liberty, 1859 (ch.3, 
paragraph 34)) 
 If few opinions can be assumed to be 100% true, then there is considerable value 
in allowing dissent and debate within society so that better truths can be substituted for 
worse ones. Likewise, excessively confident beliefs in untrue opinions would delay such 
substitutions. To the extent that federal pronouncements are considered credible, they 
inspire confidence in the beliefs they espouse, including consumer confidence in 
everyday decision-making. Therefore, the possibility for improved decision-making must 
be weighed against the possibility that such pronouncements will inefficiently restrict the 
range of options available in the market—i.e., the range of competing hypotheses that are 
treated as credible beliefs. As Tullock (1971) points out, it is rather unlikely that 
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policymakers will devote the requisite effort to this task because they lack the incentives 
needed (and perhaps the ability) to do so. 
This is not to imply that the government endorsed information that was 
considered incredible at the time—if anything, the information embodied in the 
Guidelines was becoming more accepted and more mainstream among the general public 
and medical professionals alike. In the intervening years, experts, professionals, and 
various levels of government, through their funding decisions and regulations, have 
further reduced any competitive pressure this viewpoint might otherwise face.  
But, according to critics of the Guidelines, there were still experts within the 
nutrition community who questioned the beliefs embodied therein. That is, the 
competitive pressure within the scientific community had not been allowed to play out 
completely prior to the publication of the Dietary Goals. Those same critics argue that 
there is still reason to believe (because the science remains unsettled) that the Guidelines 
continue to emphasize the wrong nutritional characteristics altogether, for at least some 
portion of the obese population. Moreover, stakeholders’ emphasis on calories, may be 
discouraging Americans from consuming diets that are both lower in calories and more 
satiating than their present diets—diets that would be strictly preferred to their current 
options. 
In the next section, I present a theory of policy, institutions and individual 
behavior that could help to explain the discrepancy between the American public’s desire 
to lose weight and their actual eating habits. Though the insights from the obesity 
literature discussed above are surely relevant to the discussion, those hurdles to eating 
well seem like small potatoes compared to the billions of dollars per year that obesity has 
cost the American economy in recent times, particularly if those costs mostly accrue to 
the obese. 
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Chapter 3. Theory 
Introduction 
 The theory of individual behavior which forms the basis for my model of 
widespread obesity is more rational than is commonly assumed in the obesity literature. 
That is, I hypothesize that most consumers’ current buying behavior already mostly 
reflects their motivated attempts to adjust their preferences in ways that are consistent 
with institutionally credible advice from nutrition and health authorities. 
 Consumers’ preferences are therefore consistent with accepted economic theories 
of preference formation and purposive, self-interested behavior. Based on this basic 
model, my aim is to provide a possible explanation for why the long-term health 
outcomes associated with these adjustments have been disappointing, at best. Obesity’s 
recent, meteoric rise remains difficult for economists and other analysts to precisely 
explain, even when models include a variety of behavioral modifications to agents’ 
behavior (Baum & Chou, 2015). To some, more direct market interventions may appear 
to be the only solution left which is likely to lead to improved consumer habits—
government information and labelling, professionals, and the market have all failed to 
bring about a desirable outcome after several decades of efforts.  
 My hypothesis for this discrepancy between observed behavior (improved, if 
imperfect, consumer habits) and observed results (widespread obesity) is unique in that it 
includes a significant role for non-Bayesian uncertainty, as discussed by Shackle 
throughout his career (Cantillo, 2010). According to Shackle, the probabilistic view of 
uncertainty which had already come to dominate most economists’ thinking in his time, 
embodied in more recent authors like Herschleiffer (The Analytics of Uncertainty and 
Information, 1992), is not always the best guide for understanding how decisions are 
actually made. His most pertinent point to the current discussion is that Bayesian 
reasoning [italics in original] “stands for a language for expressing judgements as to the 
weight that the individual in choosing his conduct ought to give to each of a variety of 
rival hypotheses concerning the outcome of some one course of conduct...It assumes, 
implicitly, that the hypotheses that have been enumerated, specified and presented for the 
assignment of weights are the only relevant ones”.  Social scientists, including 
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economists, have long assumed that one hypothesis should be considered relevant to 
weight-conscious, obese consumers. It is the one which has been endorsed by 
government nutrition policy, credible institutions and respected professionals for over 35 
years.  
 In other domains, consumers’ trust in respected social institutions, including the 
government and market, could theoretically enhance their certainty as to the proper 
course of action, and they subsequently would realize an outcome that approaches their 
expected results. Although there are informational and behavioral hurdles to any dietary 
change, they are not obviously onerous to the degree that the current obesity epidemic 
would suggest.  I argue above that there is ample scientific evidence which undermines 
the trust placed in the major nutrition institutions considered relevant by consumers, 
government officials, and most researchers. As a result, potentially relevant options may 
be quickly or altogether excluded from the vast majority of obese consumers’ menu of 
options when they otherwise would not be. On the research side, the long-term influence 
of political interests and institutions has been misinterpreted, and counterfactual scenarios 
left unconsidered.  
 The highest-quality evidence that many accepted dietary restrictions are 
unnecessary comes from recent clinical results on the efficacy and safety of low-
carbohydrate diets. The evidence is compelling because it contradicts years of credible 
advice regarding the proper mix and quantity of macronutrients for weight-loss and good 
health. The evidence is not definitive, but the stark difference between low-carbohydrate 
diets and credible low-fat, low-calorie alternatives suggests there may be a wide range of 
viable relevant options in the region between these two approaches which have been 
outside of consumers’ consideration set (Shocker, 1991) for some time now. Other lines 
of research raise the possibility that other restrictions on micronutrients (e.g., sodium) are 
unnecessary for most consumers. Others suggest the role of other commonly consumed 
micronutrients and specific foods (fructose, flour, wheat, sugar, etc.) in obesity is under-
stressed, and that exercise is, at-best, a weak substitute for dietary changes aimed at 
weight-loss. 
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 To the extent that viable behavior changes are simply not known to obese 
consumers, Americans’ apparent widespread self-control problems may be more 
appropriately treated as a longstanding knowledge problem, facilitated by public policy, 
and ultimately manifested in consumer habits. Self-control theories begin by assuming 
the consumer has an appropriate plan in mind to realize a future goal but finds it difficult 
to implement when the time comes. For example, a spendthrift who cannot stay within a 
reasonable budget may need a more binding commitment device like a savings account or 
Certificate of Deposit (Strotz, 1956). Likewise, consumers have for some time had many 
commitment devices, i.e. diets, (U.S. News & World Report, 2016) available to them.  
 If, however, consumers have been mostly dissuaded from otherwise viable diets 
by credible institutions, the explanatory power of self-control centered models is severely 
weakened. This is because one of the fundamental assumptions that accompanies theories 
of quasi rational behavior is violated from the outset i.e., a complete knowledge of 
alternative courses of action and their consequences. If relevant knowledge is widely 
considered incredible or is absent from the market, the odds of an inefficient equilibrium 
developing increase. My theory traces the source of this knowledge deficiency to 
institutional dysfunction in the nutrition policy domain. My model attempts to explain 
widespread obesity based on a theory of demand wherein this dysfunction is unknown to 
credible stakeholders, leading rational consumers to act under a false sense of certainty.  
Theory 
 I assume that a representative obese consumer does, at some non-extreme point, 
reach a threshold at which she will make some attempt at behavior change in order to 
increase long-term expected utility. Further, I assume that the consumer forms her 
expectations and adjusts her behavior in a way roughly consistent with the dietary 
component of the “SLOTH” model advanced by Cawley (2004). For simplicity, I ignore 
the tradeoff between consumers’ demand for exercise, leisure and time—I assume her 
preferences for behavior change between diet and exercise are separable and that diet is 
strictly preferred to exercise, at least in early stages of the “dieting game”.  
 Instead I focus on the tradeoffs between satisfying known, existing dietary 
preferences and adjusting behavior, and ultimately habits, in pursuit of long-term weight-
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loss. Preference formation is a not a popular topic in economics but given that the 
ultimate goal (and to some extent the result) of nutrition policy is to change society’s 
preferences—i.e., its dietary habits, I believe a discussion of the relationship between 
preferences and rational, diet-related behavior is more than appropriate.  
 I make no positive theory as to how the consumer arrives at her ‘obesity 
threshold’ because both exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting strike me as 
plausible stories and it is empirically difficult to distinguish between them. I am less 
interested in explaining obesity’s onset because it is easily explained by existing theories, 
rational or not. I am far more interested in explaining why a consumer might cross this 
threshold but not cross back, long-term, in spite of the microeconomic incentives and 
opportunities to do so. Though I am most concerned with obesity, I do not assume that 
the threshold point necessarily coincides with a BMI greater than 30—it may arrive when 
the consumer is merely overweight (BMI of 25-29.9) or at higher levels—but I assume its 
probability of arriving is positively correlated with BMI and time, given fixed habits. 
BMI is positively associated with fixed habits if those habits were positively associated 
with BMI in the past.  
 For simplicity, I assume that the consumer has not, prior to the threshold, engaged 
in sustained dieting behavior and that she is mostly uncertain about the value of δ, her 
genes’ effect on her metabolism. She is therefore aware that some uncertainty 
accompanies her choice over the proper level and proportions of calories and exercise. To 
be clear, this is the traditional version of uncertainty where the range of possible values 
for calories and exercise which will lead to weight loss is known, in this case based on 
USDA guidance. The consumer has little problem determining which characteristics are 
relevant to his decision to lose weight. In the face of this probabilistic uncertainty, the 
consumer attempts to ‘satisfice’ (Simon, 1987) as best she can, given her existing 
preferences, expectations and results.  
 More economically, in my model consumers rely on credible institutions like the 
USDA for guidance as to the characteristics of food and behavior (primarily, calories, fat 
and exercise) that they should consider salient in their plans to lose weight and live long 
lives (Lancaster, 1971). That is, consumers will tend to develop beliefs about these 
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particular characteristics’ role in their own health. These beliefs may not immediately 
manifest themselves in individual behavior because of differing perceptions of risk or 
differing preferences for healthy weight, among other reasons, in line with most theories 
of subjective, rational decision-making. 
 Given what consumers know about themselves, including their own weight, past 
habits, and preferences, as they approach their own threshold points they are more likely 
to devote increased mental attention to their calorie intake and exercise habits. They may 
begin to make plans and form new expectations about their dieting and health. Depending 
on their temperament, they may be confident in their probability of success. In any event, 
if and when the individual arrives at her threshold, she will embark on an iterative, 
experimental, and procedurally rational process of behavior change.  
 Figure 2, below, depicts the dynamic manner in which a consumer plans to 
‘reform’ her preferences in a way more consistent with her long-term health goals. 
Importantly, and rather obviously, in order for good habits to become fixed, the consumer 
has to experience some positive improvements, i.e., feedback, in perceived health status 
within a reasonable time frame. By construction, I assume that the vast majority of 
consumers will make a change to their diet consistent with a belief in the efficacy of a 
low-calorie, low-fat diet for at least the first iteration of this process. That is, consumers 
will make at least marginal reductions in their daily calorie intake, fat intake or sodium 
intake. Even without precise knowledge on one’s own past intake, this is a relatively safe 
and seemingly painless strategy for anyone wishing to lose weight, given the typical 
American diet exceeds recommended official recommendations for all three.  
 As Figure 1 shows, the representative obese consumer’s decision to iterate or 
continue with a new dietary change depends on whether she experiences improvements in 
her health. Quick results following minor changes predict continued behavioral 
convergence to USDA norms. A lack of results need not imply the consumer gives up 
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Figure 2. Food Market Schematic 
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because there are plausible explanations and sources of optimism. The consumer might 
believe she mis-measured her calories, did not exercise enough, or needs to try some new 
strategy to aid in her compliance.  
 It is here, where short-term results differ from short-to-medium-term 
expectations, that “self-control” becomes most important in predicting the consumer’s 
future choices. Higher levels of patience and self-control predict further or more creative 
iterations while less self-control predicts a faster reversion to old habits in the absence of 
results. Regardless of the consumer’s patience, she is relatively unlikely to attempt 
dietary changes that she believes to be risky to her long-term health. 
 In his paper, Cawley (2004) refers to the costs that are experienced by a consumer 
who falls for deceptive dieting claims. In such cases, the most damaging aspect of these 
claims may be the discouraging effect it has on the consumer’s future attempts to diet.  
Figure 1 helps to show just how costly this adjustment process can be, and 
discouragement would increase with repeated iterations. At some point, the consumer 
may reach another threshold: the discouraged dieter threshold, where it becomes unclear 
whether further dietary changes are worth pursuing relative to a reversion to old habits. 
 To the extent that Shacklean uncertainty regarding the relevant nutritional 
characteristics is applicable to significant portions of the obese population, Cawley’s 
discussion anticipates my theory’s major prediction: that a significant proportion of the 
obese population has already ‘rationally’ given up on changing their diets because their 
new diets failed them and they remain ignorant of viable alternatives. That is, USDA 
advice could be considered deceptive for at least some consumers if it could predictably 
lead them to ignore viable, obesity-reducing consumption habits that they might 
otherwise prefer. It is worth reiterating that a USDA-style diet requires typical consumers 
to give up several food characteristics which they enjoy for a bundle of less-preferred 
characteristics, all in exchange for their ultimate goal of better expected long-term health.  
 Low-carbohydrate dieting also requires the reduction in a characteristic which 
consumers enjoy (carbohydrates, particularly sugar and flour) but it also allows them to 
safely increase their consumption of at least some forms of fat and, further, to ignore 
foods’ calorie-content. Moreover, exercise is mostly ignored for weight loss purposes, 
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though certainly not discouraged. In microeconomic terms, the marginal rates of 
substitution between the low-carbohydrate and low-fat diets as compared to a typical 
American diet are vastly different. While no approach is guaranteed to be “easy” to adjust 
to, based on typical American eating patterns, there is reason to believe that some 
consumers might prefer such an approach, all else equal. It also represents one point near 
the end of a long spectrum of options that contradict credible advice. 
 Earlier, I modelled the uncertainty of this situation using Shackle’s “surprise 
function”. The surprise function measures the amount of surprise the consumer would 
feel if she were to experience a particular, unexpected outcome. Bayesian versions of 
uncertainty will not suffice because she may be ignorant of the possibility of the 
surprising outcome altogether. For all intents and purposes, the surprising outcome’s 
probability of occurring is zero—the consumer is certain it will not occur, until it does.  
 The relevance of surprise to the present topic is demonstrated with a simple 
thought experiment: Suppose, after years without seeing each other, you run into a 
longtime friend who was obese the previous time you met. Over the course of your 
friendship, he was not always fat but he was not always a healthy eater, either. Now, you 
see him and he is in the best shape you have ever seen him. Eventually, you ask him what 
he did to get into such good shape, what lifestyle changes he made. What answers would 
most people anticipate? Which answers would surprise them? More to the point, which 
answers would surprise a doctor or nutritionist? 
 In order for the widespread uncertainty I have discussed to result in the drastic 
uptick in obesity rates observed in the United States, some method of comparing these 
two diets (and, for that matter, the range of alternatives between them) is needed in order 
to investigate their behavioral implications with clarity. The application of Bayesian 
decision theory is further complicated by the fact that the two approaches are derived 
from rival hypotheses which promise the same outcome to consumers by stressing the 
relevance of several, overlapping nutritional characteristics. Because of these differing 
emphases and assumptions, another standard assumption in consumer theory must be 
relaxed: that of non-satiation. 
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 Satiation is an important concept in this domain because the disparity between 
consumer habits and credible advice suggests that many consumers are unwilling to make 
the tradeoff between the utility they associate with their current diets and the health 
outcomes they expect from a “healthier” diet.  Economists typically assume that 
consumers exhibit non-satiation in consumption—more of a good is always better, all 
else equal. In this domain, however, the obese consumer is relentlessly counseled to treat 
the marginal value of the ~2,001st calorie as negative.  
 The microeconomics of day-to-day demand for meals is somewhat unusual in that 
the consumer’s overall utility is highly dependent, if not contingent, on finding goods 
(meals) that routinely satiate her demand. No organism functions optimally on a poor diet 
and, as such, can hardly be assumed to optimize optimally in such a state. Our relatively 
recent ancestors would be envious of how easy it is to routinely cure our hunger in the 
modern world, even were they to ignore the vast improvement in the quality and variety 
of foods available within it. According to many commentators, it is obvious that our 
species is not adapted to such easy access to food, and that this is a major contributor to 
consumers’ chronic overeating, to the point of widespread obesity (Prentice & Jebb, 
2003).  
 Perhaps this is why satiation is commonly associated with the calorie content of a 
given food or diet. But satiation clearly depends on other dietary characteristics and is not 
solely dependent on individual metabolism—individual preferences still matter. 
Everyday experience suggests that some consumers do ‘naturally’ find a USDA-style diet 
satiating. Whether because of their metabolism or preferences, eating well is not difficult 
for them. But following a USDA diet would, evidently, require the typical consumer to 
make macronutrient cross-substitutions and to reduce the overall quantity of food 
demanded, either of which would lead to a less-satiating, lower utility diet in the short-
term, i.e., prior to any observable changes in health status. Based on the advice she has 
received, the consumer expects an intertemporal utility tradeoff to take place in the 
medium-term—after expected weight loss has commenced she expects her metabolism 
and preferences to adjust to the diet and she may expect to optimize the diet to her 
preferences. Long-term compliance depends positively on whether results match 
 
 
72 
 
expectations.  The probability of healthier habits actually taking hold depends on whether 
the consumer can successfully satisfice and form new habits. 
 There is no telling whether the mix of macronutrients recommended by a low-
carbohydrate diet would be preferred, taste-wise, to that of its low-fat counterpart because 
the nutrient cross-substitutions it requires are so drastic relative to both the typical 
American diet and the Guidelines. Consumers who have not already tried such diets do 
not really have the required knowledge needed to evaluate them because a novel diet is 
an experiential good (Kolb, 1984, Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982). Asking the typical 
American to decide if she prefers a low-carb diet to her current one is likely akin to 
asking if she prefers food from a country she’s only passingly familiar with to her current 
diet. Given its high fat content, I expect rational consumers (who rely on credible 
institutions) to be highly skeptical of the low-carbohydrate diets or any others that are 
starkly different from the norm. 
 Regardless, advocates of low-carbohydrate diets are likely to argue that if 
consumers do follow advice to limit carbohydrates, they need not worry about overall 
calories consumed because excessive calorie intake, per se, does not cause obesity. 
Further, because low-carbohydrate diets are supposedly inherently more satiating, calorie 
intake tends to drop ‘naturally’ (without conscious effort) though the drop itself is not the 
cause of the weight loss. The lack of a calorie restriction seems to be a feature of such 
diets relative to low-fat competitors, which inevitably include a calorie limit (Taubes, 
2010) because such diets lack this satiating effect. 
 My aim is not to evaluate the accuracy of these claims but, rather, to provide a 
framework for analyzing consumer behavior that allows for either theory of obesity to be 
true. To that end, I go out of my way not to assume any particular mechanism of action 
for either theory of obesity. Mainstream researchers tend to argue that low-carb diets 
work, to the extent that they do, because calorie intake decreases by necessity 
simultaneously when the proportion of calories derived from carbohydrates is reduced. 
Low-carb advocates, on the other hand, contend that any attempted dietary change is 
likely to be lower in carbohydrates (particularly sugar or flour) than whatever was 
previously eaten. By this logic, their approach should be the most effective overall, all 
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else equal. This is one of several avenues of disagreement between various camps. 
Neither side’s set of arguments definitively refutes the recent evidence suggesting both 
approaches are associated with a decent probability of success, when followed. 
 For the purposes of my argument, it is sufficient to take the position that for any 
given consumer there is a roughly equal probability of a significant predicted average 
treatment-effect for either dieting approach, consistent with recent observational studies.  
That is, there is no a priori reason to assume that either approach will prove more 
effective, behaviorally, in the long run, whether because of the consumers’ metabolism, 
preferences or other factors. Since I do not assume either approach is technically 
superior, I cannot dismiss the possibility that either approach would work if access to 
food were strictly controlled. However, I allow for the possibility that one approach will 
be strictly preferred on the basis of some combination of the characteristics it allows and 
the consumer’s actual weight-loss experience with alternatives.  
 In Modern Consumer Theory (1972), Lancaster analyzes the issue of demand 
satiation, as it relates to diet and food. In line with Lancaster, I hypothesize that the 
degree of satiation a particular diet confers at various intake levels (the shape of its 
satiation curve) depend on that diet’s characteristics and those of the consumer. In 
Lancaster’s analysis the characteristic that determines the shape of the indifference curve 
is “flavour”. He hypothesizes that there may be regions on the satiation curve where the 
consumer is indifferent between consuming more or less of a given characteristic, in this 
case calories are used to measure the quantity of flavor. At low levels, calories exhibit 
non-satiation, followed by a neutral zone, and finally by a segment in which additional 
calories have a negative effect on utility because the consumer is assumed to be weight-
conscious.  
 It is notable that Lancaster uses this sort of satiation as an illustrative example 
when this apparent lack of consciousness forms the cornerstone for most theories of 
obesity. Today, researchers are more likely to remark on the apparent weak correlation 
between calorie content and consumers’ decisions to cease eating. Since all consumers 
do, eventually, stop eating for a while, these two examples suggest that there are two 
types of satiety— psychological and metabolic—which operate somewhat independently.     
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That is, one consumer’s metabolism may require her to impose an ‘artificial’ 
psychological calorie or nutrient constraint upon her existing diet in order to hit a certain 
target while another may feel satiated, metabolically, prior to reaching her calorie target, 
in which case the psychological constraint is unnecessary. Both constraints will affect the 
shape of consumers’ satiation curves, discussed below. 
 With some modifications, Lancaster’s framework can be adapted to compare the 
relative merits of many diets vis-à-vis existing consumer preferences. First, it is not 
obvious that the flavor profile of either diet will be preferred by any consumer. Therefore, 
flavor is too ambiguous of a dimension along which to compare these diets. Second, I 
cannot compare the satiety of these diets purely in terms of their calorie content because 
the low-carbohydrate diet does not have an upper limit on calories and because advocates 
claim that such diets are inherently more satiating than low-fat diets, calorie-for-calorie. 
However, for the purposes of this analysis, I will assume that a 2,000 calorie, low-
carbohydrate diet is at least as satiating as a 2,000 calorie low-fat diet (if anything, 
favorable to the low-fat diet). By the same token, I assume a 2,000 calorie or less low-
carb diet will, in fact, bring about weight-loss in at least some consumers.  The value of 
2,000 calories is used for convenience and an initial calorie target but 𝛿 will determine 
the consumer’s efficient calorie target.  
 Finally, for the sake of tractability and visualization, I simplify the 
recommendations of both the low-carbohydrate and low-fat diets such that neither diet 
requires consumers to change their protein intake. This is not far from reality because 
Americans’ average protein intake (15% of calories=300 calories= 75 grams, in a 2,000 
calorie diet) is currently at the upper-bound of what is recommended by the USDA and is 
close to the lower-bound of what some low-carbohydrate diets suggest. The two diets 
differ far more significantly in their recommended proportion of calories from fat and 
carbohydrates: the USDA recommends at most 30% of calories from fat and around 55% 
from carbohydrate whereas low-carbohydrate recommendations translate to less than 
30% carbohydrate and at least 55% fat.  Thus, regardless of which diet is settled upon, 
intake of some variety of fat or carbohydrate is more likely to be adjusted because of 
those two macronutrients’ relative importance.  
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 With protein intake safely ignored, I use grams of carbohydrate and grams of fat 
as the axes of the graphs in Figures 3 and 4. As in Lancaster’s article, the satiation curves 
in Figure 3 are more “C”-shaped than indifference curves exhibiting non-satiation. 
Vertical segments signify “open satiation”, meaning the consumer is indifferent to more 
of the y-good. The positively sloped portions represent “negative satiation”, the segment 
where additional units of the x-good are regarded negatively. 
 Most attempts to model eating behavior, including Lancaster’s, treat calories as 
the most salient variable with regard to both weight-loss and satiety, preventing finer-
grained analysis. This application allows me to compare two or more diets whose 
macronutrient composition differs substantially along the same indifference curve, as 
though the consumer’s range of possible alternative diets is being chosen. The ideal diet 
is the one which is the most satiating, a judgment which depends mostly on the relative 
weights the consumer attaches to her two types of satiety, metabolic (a feeling of 
fullness) or psychological (consistent with a plan of action).  Diets located away from this 
most preferred point are higher in calories as a tradeoff for that diet’s lack of overall 
satiety. The inherent difficulty of precise calorie-counting indicates that this tradeoff may 
occur without inexperienced consumers immediately knowing it. 
 The curves in Figures 3 and 4 (next two pages) represent the obese consumer’s 
complete preference schedule for various diets (i.e., combinations of carbohydrate and 
fat). The slope of the curve at each point measures a mix of fat and carbohydrate. All the 
mixes on the curve represent potential choices in the short-term, but preferences are still 
subject to updating based on actual experience. The nature of habitual consumption is 
such that consumers are unlikely to jump around on the curve without some compelling 
reason for doing so. 
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Figure 3. Indifference Curve for Typical Consumer 
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Figure 4. Indifference Curve for Atypical Consumer 
 
 The proposed framework allows for a comparison of disparate diets in terms of 
the different constraints they place upon the consumer. This is analogous to studying the 
likely effects of budget constraints in traditional demand analysis, but more flexible. 
Food represents a relatively small proportion of the budget share for most Americans, 
which means the budget line is more a matter of choice than a binding constraint 
compared to most demand analysis.  
 Traditionally, the main “price” obese consumers have worried about is the calorie 
content of their diet.  The 2,000 calorie budget line is shown connecting the X and Y axes 
in Figures 3 and 4. Diets can now be compared in terms of their satiety by moving along 
an indifference curve. Given a calorie constraint and schedule of indifference curves, one 
can also determine which mixture of macronutrients is likely to be preferred at the 
constraint, according to which appears on the higher indifference curve. 
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  Any insights one wishes to draw from such an analysis depend heavily on the 
shape of the indifference curves proposed for the representative consumer or, ideally, 
various sets of consumers. It has been my contention throughout that consumers mostly 
do not have full knowledge of the range of viable weight-loss diets and, as a result, their 
preferences are technically incomplete and distorted in favor of methods (bundles of 
characteristics) which may be inefficient or ineffectual. As a result, consumers are 
unlikely to prefer options which lie a considerable ‘distance’ from the credible, USDA 
option. In fact, if one visualizes the consumer standing on the point represented by her 
existing habits and planning for future changes, all of her attention is likely to be in that 
direction, to the exclusion of others, ultimately affecting the shape of the indifference 
curves in Figure 3. 
 The actual shape of the consumer’s indifference curves will hinge to a great 
extent on the information, beliefs and experiences she brings to her decision-making 
problem. The apex of the curve in Figure 3 represents an obese consumer who plans to 
follow USDA advice because she expects to lose weight and for her long-term utility to 
increase. Though her current diet is satiating in the metabolic sense, she believes her 
overall satiety would improve if her diet more closely resembled credible advice. It is 
expected be more psychologically satiating in the short-term and to move the obese 
consumer to a higher overall indifference curve over time, as positive health outcomes 
accrue. She may think her metabolism will adjust, too. Low-carbohydrate diets are 
dismissed or not considered viable and so do not appear on the consumer’s indifference 
curves because she has either zero information or experience upon which to base her 
expected utility or has been actively discouraged from learning about them. 
 Although the shape of the indifference curves in Figures 3 and 4 are speculative, 
the exercise lends itself to some rather intuitive insights. For one, isocaloric diets (i.e., 
those which contain an equivalent number of calories) need not be equally satiating. This 
is self-evident if, as an extreme example, one considers the satiating effect of 1,000 
calories of white sugar versus 1,000 calories of protein or fat. This point is often 
neglected, perhaps because the carbohydrate content of the USDA diet and the typical 
American diet is not so different. Rational consumers may tolerate a diet that is 
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significantly less satiating in the short term in exchange for an expected an increase in 
long-term utility. A more satiating diet predicts improved long-term compliance, all else 
equal.  
  In Figure 4, the obese consumer is indifferent between a 2,000 calorie low-
carbohydrate diet and a 2,000 calorie low-fat diet—they are considered equally satiating. 
This represents an atypical consumer, one who is ambivalent toward both approaches but 
nevertheless wishes to lose weight and is flexible enough to try most things. By 
construction, the shape of the atypical consumer’s indifference curve is somewhat 
provisional because she has not undertaken any sort of diet, but considers it safe to 
assume that either diet might work, enough to try either for a while anyway. She is 
analogous to a consumer in the “Open Mind” region of the graph in Figure 1 (p. 20). The 
large difference in shape or area of the two sets of curves illustrates just how different 
this atypical consumer is from the norm.  
 To understand the source of this difference, consider the marginal American 
consumer who knows the basic tenets of a USDA diet but mostly ignores them for 
whatever reason (e.g., her health is otherwise fine) and mostly eats the typical American 
diet. While she is unlikely to accidentally end up eating a truly low-fat, low-calorie diet 
prior to reaching her threshold, she might still make marginal changes here and there. 
However, she is altogether unlikely to follow a low-carbohydrate diet for any reason both 
because it differs so starkly from her existing habits and because she would perceive 
doing so as unnecessarily risky. Therefore, I assume that the expected diet of an obese 
consumer will generally lie in the region between the standard American diet and the 
USDA diet as long as procedural rationality holds.  
 In Figure 3, the typical obese consumers who has a plan to change her diet will try 
to make iterative substitutions in goods space to arrive at point E(N*). The more 
sophisticated among these consumers are more likely to be aware of their biases in the 
marketplace and will act rationally to avoid them, bringing them close to point E(N*), all 
else equal, i.e., independent of short-term results. Discouraged dieters are the exception 
to the typical-atypical distinction because they no longer believe in the merits of any diet 
and, all else equal, their diets would revert to their old habits, close to point A. 
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 E(N*) is the point that the consumer expects to bring about weight loss, and its 
location is unknown to the consumer at the time of crossing her threshold but assumed to 
be interior to the calorie constraint. Its value depends on the underlying, unknown 
metabolism of the individual, which dictates the technical utility of different 
macronutrient mixes with respect to weight loss, leading to dietary uncertainty—
uncertainty regarding the technically superior diet.  
 Under dietary uncertainty, either a low-carbohydrate or low-fat diet may be a 
strictly preferred weight loss method because of a combination of the consumer’s 
underlying preferences and metabolism. The consumer has some knowledge of her 
preferences but does not know which diet is best suited to her metabolism, so she does 
not know with certainty which diet her future self will prefer, contributing to the 
uncertainty about the true value of N* prior to any dieting behavior 
 When rationality holds, obese consumers who cross their thresholds and attempt 
to change their habits will almost always choose a strategy meant to bring about some 
combination of calorie reduction and a decrease in the proportion of calories from fat. In 
cases where the consumer’s experience approximates their expected weight loss after 
changing their diet, rational expected utility models hold (e.g.., Cawley, 2004). Those 
consumers will remain on the weight-reducing regimen or refine their strategies, in line 
with Figure 3, losing weight and increasing expected long-term utility over time until 
some new equilibrium near point E(N*) is reached. 
 Ideally, typical consumers who do not experience weight-loss or other positive 
health outcomes in the medium-term would update their beliefs to correct for metabolic 
differences and embark on a different path of dietary change. But if consumers are 
procedurally rational, they will not be aware of the full range of alternatives available to 
them because the credible option is at the level of common knowledge (Geanakoplos, 
1992). 
 It is tempting to argue, even assuming USDA advice is sorely mistaken, that the 
existence of a variety of market-based diet alternatives would be sufficient to at least 
avoid an obesity epidemic. That is, the fact that USDA advice is the most accepted does 
not preclude consumers from trying other options with more proven results, nor does it 
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preclude market-based dietary innovations, which have indeed emerged, though the most 
popular, credible options are indeed quite similar to USDA advice (U.S. News & World 
Report, 2016). 
 In reality, the fact that low-fat, calorie restricted diets have long-been the most 
credible alternative, aided by government policy and occupational licensing laws, 
narrows the boundaries of competition, limiting the variety and scope of credible options 
which might otherwise find market success (Commission on Dietetic Credentialing, 
2016, Young, 1993). Competition from rival hypotheses will be particularly negatively 
affected because credibility cannot be shared with the government-sanctioned option. 
Credibility among certain diets is therefore a rivalrous characteristic in consumption 
which forces most consumers to choose the one credible option.  
 The most well-known low-carbohydrate diet, Atkins, enjoyed notable popularity 
at a time before the federal government had taken an official position on dietary fat and 
heart disease. It was notable precisely because it contradicted the advice of low-fat diets, 
which were already gaining in popularity at the time. Widespread interest in Atkins’s diet 
quickly faded, though never completely, and Atkins remains synonymous with the low-
carbohydrate diet although he was only modestly successful in bringing about a dietary 
‘Revolution’, I suspect, consistent with my theory, that he would have had even less 
success had his book come a decade later, after the Goals/Guidelines were published.  
 Figure 4 depicts the preferences of a consumer who is indifferent between low-fat 
and low-carb methods of weight loss. This consumer has a widened consideration set 
relative to the status quo consumer, she has more options to choose from but a more 
difficult, uncertain choice to make. It is reminiscent of the fable of Buridian’s Ass, in 
which a hungry donkey has a choice between two equally attractive piles of hay and dies 
of starvation because of his indecision. The story inspired Pareto and Edgeworth to come 
up with the methodology of utilitarian indifference curves that are now so common in 
microeconomic analyses. Normally, the logical extension of rational choice is to arrive at 
an indifference curve like the one in Figure 3, in which preferences are single-peaked and 
a best choice is easily made by the agent. 
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 In a way, Figure 4 depicts a scenario that is more consistent with a theory of 
obesity based on an obese consumer’s lack of self-control compared to Figure 3. Self-
control theories implicitly assume the full-range of options for action are known to the 
consumer. In Figure 3 the consumer ‘knows’ what she is supposed to choose and is 
assumed to fail in the choosing. If consumers’ have complete knowledge of their range of 
alternatives and still remain obese, self-control, rather than lack of knowledge, is a 
defensible hypothesis because the basic requirements for rational behavior are already 
met. In the absence of such knowledge, assuming that consumers lack self-control is 
premature. 
 Figures 3 and 4 both depict the difficulty of choosing to follow an unpopular diet. 
Economists typically assume preferences are fixed because they rarely change drastically 
and the sources of change are difficult to detect empirically. A radical change in 
preferences may require changes in beliefs, and a willingness to ignore trusted 
institutions, authorities, and even friends, all of which are psychologically costly.  Even if 
the results of such a change are initially positive, remaining on such a diet still requires 
patience, self-control and continued confidence in one’s results. As a result, the size of 
the region between the two curves, though large, may still understate the difficulty of 
changing one’s preferences. The consumer has to, in effect, ‘bend’ her preferences while 
various credible institutions try to bend them the other way. 
 Therefore, I hypothesize that only in rare cases will consumers actively choose to 
contravene the rules given by nutrition or health authorities precisely because those same 
authorities have long-emphasized the supposed risks of violating their advice. Figure 3 
depicts satiation curves with shapes that seem consistent with a reality where consumers 
believe there is a strong, negative association between saturated fat intake and 
cardiovascular health. Their failure to stay at the locus of the curve is the result of 
satisficing behavior based on incomplete information. At the margin, behavioral biases 
are relevant but remediable.  In comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4, one gets a sense of how 
much consumer preferences would need to change in order for consumers to credibly 
consider weight-loss options that differ substantially from USDA advice, especially 
regarding fat intake. 
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 I further hypothesize that the discrepancy in preferences between Figure 3 and 4 
is a rough measure of the unwarranted certainty that permeates policy, the market and the 
obesity literature. That is, Figure 3 is a depiction of preferences based on a false sense of 
nutritional certainty which has led to preferences which bear some resemblance to 
credible advice. In Figure 4, the consumer knows she is uncertain about the best course of 
action, so she is not out of the woods, but she has a rough map of them—a range of 
options. In the scenario depicted in Figure 3, she has a segment of that map with a 
theoretical way out that she nevertheless believes to be the whole thing, possibly 
preventing an efficient escape. 
 While surprise functions are theoretically appealing, they are difficult to apply in 
this context because there is, by definition, little room for surprising results following 
habitual behavior. Neither low-carbohydrate nor low-fat diets promise immediate weight-
loss so even short-term weight-loss requires some patience and consistency. Since 
feedback is not immediate and is subject to interpretation, the possibility of true surprise 
is exceedingly low. Few consumers who decide to undertake a dietary change would do 
so if they did not think there was some probability of success.  
The concept may be salvaged using a thought experiment similar to an earlier 
one: If a consumer were told by an omniscient individual that she (the consumer) lost 
weight in the future by following an unspecified diet, how surprised would her current 
self be if a given diet worked, either in theory or in practice? That is, the consumer might 
be surprised by her ability to conform to the diet (e.g., due to unfamiliarity) or by the fact 
that the advice was actually reliable in the first place, because of her current beliefs.  
The Role of Uncertainty in the Institutional Food Environment 
 If uncertainty is indeed a ‘real’ problem in this domain, the satiation curves 
(preferences) in Figure 3 are the result of a path-dependent learning process whose 
boundaries were unnecessarily and inefficiently restricted decades ago because relevant, 
credible, stakeholders in the nutrition domain, including policymakers, prematurely 
adopted a universal nutrition standard (Stack & Gartland, 2003, p. 487) and continue to 
ignore contradictory evidence and dissenting viewpoints (Hite, 2011). There is little 
argument about the lack of meaningful changes to the USDA Guidelines since they were 
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first adopted in 1980 but this alone is not sufficient evidence from which to conclude that 
that they, or any other single government policy, have “misshapen” preferences in the 
hypothesized way.  
 According to critics, the McGovern Committee’s decision to endorse one 
approach to healthy eating for all Americans and discourage most others was enough to 
settle or stifle most remaining scientific debate about important diet-related, and often 
inter-related, health issues such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and obesity. 
According to Taubes (2007), passage of the Guidelines set in motion what amounts to a 
now decades-long experiment, testing the “calories in/calories out” hypothesis of obesity 
on the American public.  
 Although this may appear to be an extraordinary claim, it should be less-so to 
economists and policy analysts. According to Tullock (1971) there is a degree of public-
ness to any government decision in the sense that the government will underprovide the 
care needed to insure that its decisions are, indeed, correct and not overly burdensome. 
There is a similar insight out of the emerging field of behavioral political economy which 
says that even if policymakers recognize an opportunity to incorporate behavioral 
economics into policy, should it be assumed that they will not fall prey to similar 
behavioral shortcomings, among others, in trying to design those corrective policies?  
 Among the other behavioral shortcomings of policymakers, the outsized influence 
of “pressure groups” (Olson 1971) is under-explored in this policy area. If it is the case 
that, by passing the Guidelines, the government inefficiently redistributed credibility in 
favor of one viewpoint (thereby reducing the credibility of contradictory or otherwise 
competitive viewpoints), then any pressure groups associated with the credible viewpoint 
would likely increase in stature and attempt to further their agenda by attracting research 
dollars and erecting barriers to competition. 
 According to Hite (2011) this is more or less how the situation has played out. 
Consistent with the economic literature on occupational licensing, 45 states, the District 
of Columbia and Puerto Rico, now have regulations regarding, or laws prohibiting, the 
practice of dietetics without proper certification (Commission on Dietetic Credentialing, 
2016). Certification is handled by the Committee on Dietetic Registration, the 
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credentialing agency for the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, which certifies 
university programs in nutrition education. RDs make up the majority of the Dietary 
Guidelines Advisory Committee. RDs are also the professionals to whom obese patients 
are likely to be referred by their doctors. Not surprisingly, up until relatively recently, the 
majority of government-sponsored observational, interventional and clinical nutrition 
research was devoted to testing or measuring the efficacy of low-fat, low-calorie diets.  
 Earlier, I discussed the well-known perverse effects that occupational licensing 
can have on economic efficiency due to reduced competition and innovation. 
Nevertheless, in the economics of obesity literature most researchers have implicitly 
assumed that the role of nutritionists in shaping policy has been benign, a view more 
consistent with old political science theories and older institutionalists like J.R. Commons 
on the proper role of pressure groups in shaping social outcomes. By implicitly assuming 
the government endorsed the ‘correct’ viewpoint, as Cawley (2004), for example, does, 
economists ignore the ways in which nutritionists and other authorities have acted to 
shape the policy debate, as well as the economic and institutional landscape, in their own 
favor (Olson, 1971). 
 Theoretically, once an RD or other nutrition professional endorses a particular 
viewpoint she has an economic and reputational interest in seeing that it is not 
contradicted, whether she is making policy or advising a patient. If word were to get out 
that patients seeing a competitor had drastically better outcomes while following wholly 
different advice, the RD’s career would be short-lived. Reputational incentives may help 
to explain why USDA advice has remained so consistent despite its apparent lack of 
efficacy. This tendency is further encouraged by the difficulty of even assessing a 
patient’s actual compliance with advice. 
 In addition to government and nutrition professionals, the popular media have 
also acted to shape how consumers think about nutrition issues. They report the results of 
nutrition studies, often without proper clarification or beneath sensational headlines. The 
studies themselves are almost always observational or on animals other than humans. 
Until recently, most nutrition research was directed at confirming the recommendations 
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within the Guidelines rather than subjecting them to rigorous testing, much less testing of 
alternative theories.   
 Compared to the above-mentioned institutions and their associated actors, the role 
played by firms has been more reactionary. No doubt firms act to influence policies 
demarcating which foods are deemed healthy and unhealthy, how foods are labelled, and 
so on. But firms are at least somewhat constrained in their actions by widespread, 
credible opinions on proper nutrition. This may be why old food advertising extolling the 
health benefits of foods like lard, vegetable shortening, and white sugar are considered 
comical today, now supplanted by others earnestly extolling the virtues of olive oil, 
coconut oil and artificial sweeteners.  
 At this juncture, it is not as though food firms could credibly embark upon their 
own nutrition research because any worthwhile research is likely to prove their product 
“safe and effective” but even honest reporting of the results (particularly if they differ 
from credible advice) is likely to be met with skepticism, undermining the predicted 
efficiency of the initial research investment. This is over and above the public good 
problems inherent to funding research that is likely to benefit competitors, of course. 
Policy and Research Implications 
 In the previous chapter, I summarized some of the research suggesting that 
nutritionists have been pursuing an unfertile area of obesity research and that a diversity 
of viewpoints regarding the causes of obesity have been stifled for a long time. Past 
economic research on obesity has treated nutrition science itself as a sort of “black box” 
whose output can be used to understand consumers and design policy. Though I am far 
from an expert on nutrition or obesity, my reading of that literature (along with my own 
experience) suggests that more social scientists interested in obesity would do well to 
study the inner-workings of this black box. Outsiders are likely not in a position to 
correct disciplinary issues but, if groupthink is a relevant concern, they may be the only 
ones able to “see” the problem and point it out in the first place.  
When it comes to America’s obesity epidemic, the relevant policy question is: 
Was the government’s decision to monopolize the credibility of one consumption 
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technology (and market it to the general public) utility-enhancing, on net, compared to 
plausible alternative arrangements, including no endorsement at all?  
 My model allows for the possibility that the federal government acted 
prematurely in advocating an unproven theory of diet and health. If true, the most 
obvious policy implication is that the government should never have done so and should 
have instead waited for more evidence to accrue before re-considering such actions. If 
uncertainty remains a real but unacknowledged problem in obesity research, the policy 
response would ideally be to fund research reassessing the scientific evidence objectively, 
including outsider viewpoints. If necessary, new research explicitly testing these rival 
hypotheses should be funded. Not long after writing Good Calories, Bad Calories, 
Taubes founded a non-profit with the purpose of funding research doing exactly that.  
 If uncertainty is of real concern, another possible policy response might be to 
intentionally reduce the credibility attached to conventional dietary wisdom, thereby 
expanding consumers’ range of choice over both commitment devices and food 
characteristics. The latest version of the Guidelines does not inspire confidence that the 
federal government will change course any time soon. Public health, economic and policy 
researchers have been preoccupied with incorporating behavioral anomalies into their 
models of eating behavior for some time now, but even in combination, they are 
incapable of explaining more than a fraction of the dramatic increase in obesity’s 
prevalence. So long as certainty regarding the proper consumption technology is 
assumed, there are few other obvious avenues of research in this area. 
 This is not an optimistic outlook but it is consistent with accepted theories of how 
institutions, government, and policy tend to interact (North, 1991). Economists tend to 
stress the positive value in most institutions other than government, perhaps because the 
negative aspects of various social institutions including markets often stand out and 
receive more emphasis elsewhere in society. All else equal, voluntary institutions are 
preferred to government as sources for rulemaking authority, particularly regarding the 
proper way to live one’s life. 
 The model above assumes that the interaction between government and credible 
nutrition institutions has been rather dysfunctional for at least 36 years. Although public 
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policy may not have been necessary for the present situation to occur, government action 
probably made it more likely. When the Guidelines were passed, some uncertainty 
arguably remained regarding various relationships between diet and health—there was 
some room for disagreement among credible professionals. By passing the Guidelines, 
the credibility of a subset of those experts became associated with that government 
advice and the credibility of the field as a whole. This agreement signals to consumers 
that the advice being offered on federally mandated nutrition labels and by licensed RDs 
is basically the same and should be considered credible while rivals are considered 
incredible. Since licensed RDs enjoy a competitive edge, would-be nutritionists are 
funneled into RD programs that teach them to think in a way consistent with federal 
advice.  
 In a counterfactual world in which the McGovern Committee chose not to weigh 
in at all on what constitutes healthy dietary advice, the field of nutrition may or may not 
have taken a different path. Scientists who disagreed with the low-fat consensus may 
have felt more confident in questioning a status quo that was not endorsed and funded by 
the government. Consumers and would-be nutritionists might have experimented with a 
wider variety of remedies. Over the course of 35 years, it is impossible to predict what 
direction nutrition research, nutrition policy or society would have taken. Of course, I 
cannot reject the possibility that the same institutional rules would have come about 
through means other than official government endorsement. 
 So long as public policy continues to grant monopoly privileges to one nutrition 
paradigm, it is hard to imagine how competing paradigms could possibly carve out a 
sizeable “market-share”. This designation has meant that, up until relatively recently, 
most nutrition research has tended to study the precise benefits of eating in a way 
consistent with USDA advice or the costs of not doing so. As a result, proponents of 
typical nutrition advice have a much larger body of research to refer to when trying to 
attract clients. Critics will argue that these studies do not prove anything definitive, but 
the nature of reputation, experts, and credence goods means that consumers are unlikely 
to know the difference between “good” and “bad” research, just as they cannot 
distinguish between experts and quacks in other contexts (Sandford, 2010). 
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 Furthermore, Horner (2002) points out that consumers can observe other 
consumers in order to determine whether a given firm is as high in quality as it appears—
i.e., to determine whether the firm’s reputation is deserved or not. Since low-calorie, low-
fat diets remain the most credible option by far (U.S. News & World Report, 2016), 
consumers interested in losing weight would need to take something of a ‘leap of faith’ in 
order to determine whether the promises made by other diet peddlers are reputable, 
making incredible options unlikely to be among the highest ranked options. 
 A further complication in the study of obesity is the evolution of the American 
healthcare system, which is likely to continue to encourage more of the same thinking 
and advice. As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), many chain restaurants are, or 
will be, required to print nutrition information along with their menu items, in order to 
comply with Section 4205 of the ACA, which also requires restaurants to register with 
the FDA so that it may monitor compliance. The FDA estimated that the total costs of the 
final requirements for the rule would be between $311 and $481 million initially and 
between $28 and $81 million per year.  
 In their assessment of the costs and benefits of the rule, the FDA notes, “Abaluck 
(2011) is the only study that translates the potential effect of increasing nutrition 
information on consumption into estimates of welfare gains using willingness-to-pay 
based on revealed preferences” (FDA, 2014, p. 64).  He estimates that extending nutrition 
labels to restaurants will result in an average of $116 (2011 dollars) per year per label 
user. The FDA argues that Abaluck’s estimate for consumer’s willingness to pay for 
additional labeling is too low because the new rule covers more than just restaurant 
menus and adjust their model accordingly. It will be interesting to observe whether the 
new rule leads to the between $5.8 billion (7% discount rate) and $8.1 billion (3% 
discount rate) in net benefits of the next 20 years (p. 78). 
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Chapter 4. Empirical Estimation 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I investigate the ways in which American food and dietary 
preferences may have changed over time. In the first section, I perform a content analysis 
of historical American cookbooks to determine whether Americans preferred a different 
array of food items between the post-colonial period and the early 20th century versus the 
period from the middle of the 20th century to the present. In the second section, unrelated 
to obesity, I replicate Butler (1982), modelling the relationship between the social stigma 
of food stamp participation and food expenditure.  
I employ two approaches to analyze the preferences and behavior of the American 
public, based on data from the Dietary Health and Knowledge Survey (DHKS) phone 
survey conducted by the USDA from 1994 to 1996. First, I use standard regression 
analysis to model the association between consumer beliefs about diet and health and 
their consumption behavior, based on their individual characteristics. The results indicate 
that consumers were relatively well-informed about the tenets of eating in a healthy 
manner at that time and that their consumption behavior was roughly consistent with 
those beliefs. The implications of these findings, in light of the obesity epidemic that has 
emerged in the interim, are discussed.  
Finally, I use a finite mixture modelling (FMM) procedure to investigate whether 
American consumers might be better modelled as belonging to one of various 
subpopulations, rather than being treated as a homogenous group with respect to their 
food and health preferences. I construct models of the demand for five different nutrients 
(calories, total fat, carbohydrate, cholesterol, and protein) which are similar to the earlier 
regression model. My results show that American consumers can be appropriately 
modelled as though they belong to one of three subpopulations for all nutrients but 
protein, which appears to have two. I show that behavioral predictions are highly 
sensitive to the parameters that are used to model a given subpopulation because both the 
value and statistical significance of the variables in the model differ substantially between 
subpopulations. 
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Section 1. 
Introduction 
 The prevailing narrative used to explain and understand obesity often emphasizes 
the ways in which consumers’ consumption plans fall short of their long-term health 
preferences. The relatively rapid and steady rise in obesity’s prevalence suggests that 
there may be a larger issue with how American preferences have evolved. As discussed 
above, the mainstream view holds that changes to the modern food environment make it 
exceedingly difficult for Americans to cultivate habits that lead to weight loss.  
 The source and reason for widespread changes in social habits is theoretically and 
empirically different to explain (Hodgson 2003). Most economists theorize that economic 
growth and change are, ultimately, demand-driven phenonena. Therefore, the modern 
food environment itself may have come about because of an earlier change to the overall 
environment, such as changes in society’s beliefs about the safety of consuming certain 
foods or food characteristics. In order to determine the extent to which this is true, data 
on preferences in the pre-modern era is required. Below, I use content analysis to arrive 
at a rough picture of what Americans preferred to eat long before obesity became a 
widespread public health problem. 
Content Analysis of American Cookbooks 
 Content analysis “describes a family of analytic approaches ranging from 
impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, strict textual analyses” 
(Hsieh 2005, p. 1277) and “qualitative  content  analysis  is defined as a research method 
for the subjective interpretation of the content of textdata through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh 2005, p. 
1278). Here, I peform a qualitative content analysis of 874 American cookbooks written 
between 1814 and 1939. 
 The data come from the website Archive.org, which publishes books and other 
documents that have entered the public domain. All cookbooks were categorized under 
the subject heading “American Cookery”, which initially included over 1,000 books. Not 
all results included a text document for analysis and not all books were strictly or mainly 
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about cooking or food, and were therefore discarded from the sample. Others were 
published since the 1950s and are too recent to be considered in my sample, leading to 
my sample size of 874. 
 My theoretical motivation for using this sample is that cookbooks should convey 
some information about the preferences of the consumers for whom they are intended. 
Further, authors must convince publishers to print their work so they, in turn, must have 
had some economic rationale for agreeing to do so. It stands to reason that books 
appearing on Archive.org were more popular or at least more widely published than their 
counterparts who do not appear. This could introduce some bias if unpopular cookbooks 
are included in the sample because they would not reflect broad social preferences. 
However, it seems more likely that the most popular cookbooks are the ones that 
survived and were eventually uploaded to the internet. 
 I used the software program RStudio and the R programming language (R Core 
Team, 2016) to compile and “clean” the texts of punctuation and extraneous, common 
words. The output of this exercise was a matrix of term frequencies and their associated 
documents. Many of the remaining terms had nothing to do with food and were 
discarded. 
 My aim was to detect broad trends in American preferences so it was important to 
remove food-related words whose meanings are ambiguous with respect to nutrient 
content, which required some judgement. Most adjectives had to be removed for this 
reason. For example, the word “creamy” might refer to a dish with heavy cream in it or to 
the texture of a dish that contains little dairy or fat. “Cream”, on the other hand, is more 
likely to refer to the actual ingredient.  
 Some terms that did refer to food had to be removed because the range of 
characteristics associated with them was too varied. “Salad” and its variations was one of 
the most frequently used words but, particularly during this period, includes various meat 
salads and other mayonaisse heavy dishes—a far cry from the image the word conjures 
up today. 
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 More practically, some words were similar enough nutritionally and qualitatively 
that they can be treated as equivalent. Spelling variations are the most obvious example: 
sweets, sweet, and sweeten all become “sweet”.  I collapsed the word “sugar” into this 
term as well. Similarly “Jam” and “Jelly” were converted to the single term “jamjelly” 
and “poultry” “chicken” and “birds” were combined into the made-up term 
“poultchickbird”, and so on. The total number of terms is a manageable 284. 
 Mine is what Hsieh and Shannon (2005) call a summative content analysis 
because I am subjectively identifying keywords in the texts under study. It is therefore 
rather rudimentary. Future work could take up the task of comparing this corpus of texts 
to a modern equivalent in order to get a clearer understanding of changes over time. 
Unfortunately, I did not have access to a comparison body of texts in the public domain. 
 The word cloud below depicts the 50% of terms that were used most frequently 
over the sample populatoin. The larger a word is, the more frequently it occurs in the 
sample.There are many familiar food items but some appear more prominent than they 
might in cookbooks printed today, such as eggs, cream or butter. These are more likely to 
take the form of foods that contain less saturated fat, such as olive oil or half and half. 
Words like flour, bake, and bread are quite familiar and likely have not changed as much 
in prominence over time.  It is unclear whether terms like “meat” or “poultchickbird” 
(i.e., all poultry) would have risen or fallen in popularity, given the increased popularity 
of lean meats and vegetable-based diets. 
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Figure 5. Word Cloud of Top Half of Terms 
 
 To get some sense of how consumer tastes developed over the 125-year period, I 
decided to try the same exercise on separate halves of the data, cookbooks from1814-
1877 and 1878-1932. In the remainder of this section, I refer to them as the “early” and 
“late” periods. No clear, visual trends emerge but this may simply reflect the lack of 
detail that this method allows for. 
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Figure 6. Word Cloud of Top Half of Early Terms 
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Figure 7. Word Cloud of Top Half of Late Terms
 
 
For a clearer picture of which of  these terms was most popular over the three 
intervals, I produced a word cloud plotting the 100 most popular terms for each. This is 
only a slight refinement over the word clouds above since the dataset contains only 284 
terms to begin with. There are not many changes but the words “fried”, “cake”, “cream”, 
“bake”, “sweet”, and “eggs” all appear to have increased in size, an indication of their 
relative frequency within the cloud. 
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Figure 8. Word Cloud of Top 100 Terms
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Figure 9. Word Cloud of Top 100 Early Terms 
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Figure 10. Word Cloud of Top 100 Late Terms 
 
Below, I plot the 25 most used terms from each period on its own bar graph. 
Again, there is little evidence for significant change over the period considering the seven 
highest-ranked terms are sweet, butter, eggs, flour, milk, bake, and cream in that same 
order. A lack of change in popularity should not be too surprising when many of these 
same terms are likely to be prominent in modern cookbooks. Exceptions that are pertinent 
to the present study might include ‘sweet’, given increased worry about the dangers of 
sugar, ‘butter’, ‘eggs’, ‘cream’, ‘yolks’, ‘fried’, and ‘meat’, because of increased worry 
about the dangers of cholesterol and fat, particularly saturated fat. 
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Table 1. Frequency of 25 Most Used Terms 
 
Table 2. Frequency of 25 Most Used Early Terms 
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Table 3. Frequency of 25 Most Used Late Terms 
 
While the results in this section do not reveal anything groundbreaking about the 
evolution of American food preferences over the time period, the advent of nutrition 
advice and common experience suggest that some of these ingredients have probably 
fallen in popularity since these cookbooks were published. Butter probably ceded some 
market share to margarine in the middle of the 20th century, which has since given way to 
olive oil or coconut oil as the preferred, healthy cooking fats in some circles. Sugar may 
have lost some of its market to artificial sweeteners for similar reasons. The same logic 
could apply to eggs, cream and meat, none of which are necessarily easy to fit into a 
USDA-style diet. 
The reason for the rise or fall in consumption of any of these items is open to 
considerable interpretation and speculation but would be difficult to test for empirically 
without much better data. Have Americans shied away from eggs and butter because they 
have become more health-conscious, because sugar and starch have gotten cheaper, or 
because their basic tastes have or have not changed over time? Further research is needed 
to answer such questions, particularly research comparing this period to the present day. 
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The nature of preferences, habits, and institutions mean that precise, reliable relationships 
will be hard to measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Section 2. 
Measuring the Effect of Stigma on Food Stamp Participation and Spending 
 Here, I replicate Butler’s (1982) work by measuring the effect of social stigma on 
Americans’ decision to enroll in what was then called the Food Stamp program, and is 
now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). I do so using a 
dataset published by the USDA derived from the Dietary Health and Knowledge Survey, 
conducted between 1994 and 1996, comprising over 5,000 respondents. Fortunately, the 
survey respondents answered many similar questions to those asked in Butler’s study, 
which was more directly related to the Food Stamp Program. 
 The equations I test are based on the variables included in Butler’s “Preferred 
Model” (p.122) for food stamp expenditures, reproduced below. In several cases, I was 
forced to use a different variable to measure a similar concept. The DHKS did not ask 
respondents for their state of residence but their region was coded. There is no “cashout 
site” because these were specific to the study upon which Butler’s data was based.  The 
categorization “rural” was not used but, rather, the respondent’s relation to a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) so I coded respondents outside of MSAs as rural 
even though this may not be strictly true. Respondents were not asked how often they get 
out but were asked how often they go food shopping, variables which could plausibly be 
positively correlated so I use it instead. Positive and negative health effects were also not 
measured but individuals were asked about their health status, which I used to create 
dummy variables dividing them into positive and negative affect. Subjects were not asked 
whether they had a car available so I cannot include that variable.  
In order to control for differences in prices, I consulted the Department of Labor’s 
(DOL) Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). In Butler’s paper, he uses their figures for 
elderly, single-member households to construct regional price indices. I was unable to 
find these exact figures and, instead, constructed my own regional price index for food 
and non-food items based on average expenditures for similar households between 1994 
and 1996. The DOL did have national average expenditures for the elderly (65 and over) 
and single-member households. I first took the average of these two figures from 1994-
1996. In order to control for regional differences in prices, I used the DOL’s figures on 
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the average regional food and total expenditures per household, which was not broken-
down by household size. Taking the mean of the 4 regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, 
and West) and dividing each region’s average total expenditures by that number produced 
an appropriate adjustment factor. Fortunately, the DHKS did ask for fairly specific 
income and food expenditure information. The DOL numbers are shown in Tables 4 and 
5, below. Table 6 (next page) provides a comparison of Butler’s original model and the 
one I was able to create using the DHKS data set. 
Table 4. Average Food Expenditures 
Food >65 Avg. 
Single 
Avg. Mean Region 
Price 
Adjustment Final 
NE 3339 2520.67 2929.83 4839 1.056 3094.01 
S 3339 2520.67 2929.83 4318 0.942 2761.08 
W 3339 2520.67 2929.83 4761 1.039 3044.35 
MW 3339 2520.67 2929.83 4410 0.962 2819.90 
 
Table 5. Average Non-Food Expenditures 
Non-
Food 
>65 Avg. 
Single 
Avg. 
Mean Region 
Price 
Adjustment 
Final 
NE 22935 19604.7 21269.8 33240.3 1.011 21504.2 
S 22935 19604.7 21269.8 31077.0 0.945 20104.9 
W 22935 19604.7 21269.8 35439.7 1.078 22927.0 
MW 22935 19604.7 21269.8 31755.0 0.967 20543.3 
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Table 6. Butler Model Comparison 
Butler Variable DHKS Explanation 
participation fs_rcv12 
Anyone receive food stamps in last 
year? 
black black 1 if race is black 
Age 70-74 age70 1 if age between 70 and 74 
Age>75 age75 1 if age is 75 or more 
Two or more in household hhtwo 1 if household is 2 or more people 
Negative affect (0-5) neghealth 1 if health rating is 1 or 2 
Positive affect (0-5) poshealth 1 if health rating is 3, 4 or 5 
Male head of household headman 1 if head of household is a man 
Female head of household headwom  1 if head of household is a woman 
Log-income logincome  Natural log of income 
Getting SSI minc_s2 Any member of hh receiving SSI 
New York, South Carolina 
region 
dummies 
Northwest, Midwest, South, West 
Hispanic hispanic 
1 if of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
or other Hispanic descent 
Education 8-11 yrs grade8 1 if highest grade level is 8-11  
Education ≥12 yrs grade12 1 if highest grade level is 12 or greater 
Rural rural 1 if outside MSA 
Out daily shp_alot 1 = More than once a week 
Out often shp_often 2 = Once a week 
Out some Shp_some 3 = Once every two weeks 
Food budget annufoodexp Total Food Budget1 
Log-price non-food lognonfood Log of DOL nonfood budget 
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Continued From Table 6. 
N/A shp_groc 
Expenditures on groceries last 3 
months 
N/A shp_grou Unit of Time 
N/A shp_nonf 
Non-food grocery expenditures past 3 
months 
N/A shp_nonu Unit of Time 
N/A shp_spec 
Expenditures on specialty foods past 3 
months 
N/A shp_speu Unit of Time 
N/A shp_fast Expenditures on fast food 
N/A shp_fasu Unit of Time 
N/A shp_away 
 Other Food expenditures away from 
home 
N/A shp_awau Unit of Time 
1=[shp_groc*shp_grou][shp_nonf*shp_nonu]+[shp_spec*shp_speu]+[shp_fast*shpfasu]
+[shp_away*shpawau]*4 
Table 7 (next page) reports the results of estimating my food expenditure model.  
In the original regression, northeast, west, south, grade8, grade12, rural, and neghealth 
were omitted due to collinearity and so the estimation was performed again without them. 
The model has an adjust R-squared of 0.1712. Variables that were significant at the 5% 
level are double-starred. 
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Table 7.  Stigma Model Estimation Results 
annufoodexp Coef. Std. Err. t p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
fs_rcv12 -164.46 37.70 -4.36 <0.001 -238.37 -90.55 
b_race 41.57 67.39 0.62 0.537 -90.54 173.69 
headman** -124.05 51.10 -2.43 0.015 -224.23 -23.86 
headwom 3.32 111.48 0.03 0.976 -215.22 221.87 
Logincome** 371.63 27.70 13.42 <0.001 317.33 425.94 
minc_s2 20.47 24.50 0.84 0.404 -27.57 68.51 
age70** -336.92 87.82 -3.84 <0.001 -509.08 -164.76 
age75** -315.51 78.24 -4.03 <0.001 -468.90 -162.12 
onemanhh -228.52 162.78 -1.40 0.160 -547.64 90.59 
Malehhh -37.62 78.35 -0.48 0.631 -191.23 115.98 
Hhtwo** 465.08 128.26 3.63 <0.001 213.63 716.53 
Hispanic -9.27 80.95 -0.11 0.909 -167.95 149.42 
Midwest 6.70 48.89 0.14 0.891 -89.15 102.56 
shp_alot** -866.32 72.22 -12.00 <0.001 -1007.91 -724.74 
shp_often** -914.81 59.26 -15.44 <0.001 -1030.98 -798.65 
shp_some -79.59 63.46 -1.25 0.210 -204.01 44.82 
Lognonfood** 5044.25 833.98 6.05 <0.001 3409.27 6679.22 
Logrefbudget** -2855.99 862.42 -3.31 0.001 -4546.71 -1165.26 
Poshealth -47.95 42.14 -1.14 0.255 -130.57 34.67 
constant** -29142.37 4357.85 -6.69 <0.001 -37685.64 -20599.09 
These results mirror much of what Butler found: income is significant, as is 
household size, the price of food and non-food items, old age, living in a household of 
one male. The negative coefficient on the food stamp participation may serve as a rough 
measure of stigma in this model. More generally, the above results show that decisions 
relating to food expenditure can be quite complex and difficult to model. 
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Section 3. 
Introduction 
 My purpose in this section is to test whether there is a relationship between 
individuals’ knowledge, beliefs, and priorities regarding a healthy diet, their eating 
decisions and, ultimately, eating habits. It is an attempt to measure individuals’ actual 
preferences for a healthy diet, relative to their own claimed beliefs, knowledge, and 
priorities as well as to that of a “healthy” diet defined by a nutrition authority, in this case 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), the agencies that have released the Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans every five years since 1985, as mandated by Section 301 of the National 
Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 5341). HHS’s Office 
of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (ODPH) had the administrative leadership 
for the 2015 edition of the Guidelines, with support from the USDA’s Center for 
Nutrition Policy and Promotion in Committee.  HHS and USDA also appoint a panel of 
experts in the field of nutrition, the Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC), 
“consisting of nationally recognized experts in the field of nutrition and health” (Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans, 2015).   
Economic theory argues that Americans will make consumption choices in 
accordance with their preferences, based on the information they have at their disposal 
(Allen, 2001, Beales et al., 1981, Stigler, 1961). Americans who face uncertainty with 
respect to losing weight or eating an otherwise healthy diet have ready access to 
information that should allow for them to remedy this problem, assuming they find it 
utility-enhancing to do so in the first place.  
 In this paper, I assume individuals have a preference for maintaining a healthy, 
normal weight, all else equal. I also assume that they may be endowed with food 
preferences that lead to the gradual onset of obesity. Given their personal incentive to 
avoid or alleviate their condition, economic theory suggests that obese individuals seek 
out information and, if feasible, go about aligning their short-term preferences to their 
long-term goals. 
 
 
109 
 
Data 
 I rely on the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Dietary Health 
and Knowledge Survey (DHKS) 1994-1996, a sub-survey of their Continuing Survey on 
Individual Intake (CSFII). The DHKS was ultimately administered to 5,765 respondents 
who answered a battery of questions about the foods they ate, their individual health 
characteristics and demographics, and their knowledge and beliefs surrounding food, 
nutrients, vitamins, and minerals. Respondents were asked for their food intake on two 
separate days, which I averaged to proxy their average meal (i.e., what the individual eats 
habitually).  
 My hypotheses are that consumers who claim to have more knowledge, better 
beliefs, and who place a higher priority on nutrition in their buying decisions will act 
accordingly—they will eat healthier compared to a similar individual without those 
characteristics. Again, “health” is defined and assessed by a nutrition authority in the 
form of the USDA, whose questions go into some detail about what respondents think 
about particular macronutrients, foods and their associated health problems. I also 
hypothesize that respondents who engage in other healthy behaviors (such as exercise and 
not smoking) will eat more healthily, all else equal. 
 I further hypothesize that consumers with diet-related health problems and other 
demographic characteristics will be more likely to know about and follow the healthy 
diet. Individuals with higher body-mass indexes (BMIs) have an incentive to seek out 
information and use it to lose weight. I predict that older individuals will eat more 
healthily since they are more likely to know about and have direct or indirect experience 
with diet-related illnesses making the incentives associated with eating well more 
temporally relevant. I am unsure of what the effect of education, income, or other 
demographic variables will be because food represents a relatively small expenditure in 
American households and these other considerations may override pure income or 
education effects. 
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Summary Statistics 
 Summarizing the data, the average woman in the survey population is age 46, 5'4" 
tall, weighs 177 pounds and has BMI of 28.6. The average man in the survey population 
is age 44, 5' 10" tall, weighs 187 pounds and has a BMI of 27.0, putting both in the 
“overweight” categorization. The USDA Guidelines recommend that the average 
American consume 2,000 calories per day, 55% coming from carbohydrate, 15% from 
protein and 30% of energy from fat, including less than 10% from saturated fat. The table 
and summary statistics below and on the following page seem to indicate that Americans 
were not too far from these recommendations at the time of the survey. 
      Table 8. Mean Macronutrient Intake of Survey Population 
Macronutrient (g) W M %Cal(W) %Cal(M) 
Carbohydrate 209.13 294.86 51.46 48.41 
Protein 62.51 95.91 15.38 15.75 
Total fat 59.97 92.44 33.21 34.15 
Calories 1625.29 2436.44 
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      Table 9. Summary Statistics, All variables 
Nutrient Mean 
 
Linearized Std. 
Error 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
calories 2014.12 21.75 1970.26 2057.98 
grade 14.09 0.20 13.68 14.49 
height 67.17 0.09 66.98 67.36 
foodstamp 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.16 
age 45.22 0.43 44.36 46.08 
sex 0.52 0.01 0.50 0.54 
race 1.37 0.04 1.29 1.44 
bmi_sp 27.84 0.26 27.32 28.36 
exercise 3.84 0.05 3.75 3.93 
health 2.37 0.02 2.33 2.42 
knowledge 3.44 0.02 3.41 3.48 
priosafe 3.86 0.01 3.83 3.88 
prionutr 3.62 0.02 3.59 3.66 
priopric 3.28 0.02 3.23 3.33 
priokeep 3.50 0.02 3.45 3.54 
prioease 3.14 0.02 3.10 3.18 
priotast 3.84 0.01 3.82 3.87 
lcdiet 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.08 
smk_100 0.50 0.01 0.48 0.52 
smk_now 0.25 0.01 0.24 0.27 
urb 1.89 0.02 1.84 1.94 
income 42055.59 951.08 40137.55 43973.63 
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The THANKS Model of Dietary Decision-Making 
 To measure the extent to which demand for different nutrients is a function of the 
consumers’ personal characteristics, I focus on predicting consumption quantities of 
calories. I expect that individuals who are more health-minded, in that they know more or 
place a higher priority on nutrition in their purchasing decisions, will eat fewer calories. 
Those who derive greater utility from other considerations (e.g., taste) are hypothesized 
to eat more calories, all else equal. The federal government has been consistent in 
recommending low-calorie, low-fat diets for individuals suffering from overweight or 
obesity and healthy individuals wishing to avoid chronic disease since the original 
publication of the Guidelines in 1980. 
 The Guidelines, along with other health authorities, provide consumers with a set 
of acts for consumers in various states, which are themselves a function of past actions 
and nature. Nutrition information also provides a simple consequence function for 
individuals wishing to lose weight wherein calories consumed and expended are the 
primary variables. Because dietary advice is a credence good (Dulleck, Kerschbamer, 
2006), a rational consumer presumably attaches a high probability to the belief that the 
advice they receive correctly maps acts to their corresponding states. Consumers also 
have a utility function which measures the utility derived from the various possible 
consequences of their acts (Hirshleifer, 1992). 
 In the language of uncertainty (since consumers are not assumed to be nutrition 
experts), the Guidelines are one tool (among many, similar, market-provided ones) 
available to weight-conscious consumers (i.e., those who rank the utility of losing weight 
highly) which enjoys a credible consequence function that will allow said consumers to 
navigate the market for food, improve their diets, and lose weight. 
The DHKS asked a long list of potentially pertinent questions to ascertain 
respondents’ nutritional knowledge. To refine my model, I performed a linear regression, 
with the correct survey probability weights attached and a long list of potentially relevant 
questions about different foods and nutrients. A factor analysis revealed five factors with 
Eigen Values greater than 1, each corresponding to a much smaller subset (2-6 questions) 
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of the dozens of knowledge questions. These were readily collapsed into 5 individual 
variables which I initially labelled: knowledge, sugar, priority, labeluse, and labelme.  
Likert scales 
The series of questions that make up the ‘knowledge’ variable ask if consumers 
personally believe in the importance of maintaining a healthy weight, of eating a diet 
with moderate amounts of sugar, foods low in saturated fat, low in overall fat, a diet low 
in cholesterol and one with plenty of carbohydrate-containing foods on a 1 (not at all 
important) to 4 (very important). Since a higher number corresponds to better knowledge 
for each question, the average of those six responses should give some indication of how 
knowledgeable the respondent is about the tenets of USDA advice. 
 The six priority questions ask for the importance respondents’ attach to: safety, 
nutrition, price, food keeping well, ease of preparation and taste in their buying decisions, 
again on a 1 (not important) to 4 (very important) Likert scale. Since my intention with 
this study is to test the effect of nutrition priorities on consumption, independently of 
other priorities, treating the ‘priority’ variable as representing a single effect would mask 
the effects of a consumer placing a priority on nutrition itself. As a result, I found it more 
theoretically appealing to leave these questions as separate variables in the final model. 
The other questions did not suffer from this issue. 
The two sugar-related questions included ask if the respondent is or is not aware 
of the link between sugar consumption and diabetes, and sugar consumption and heart 
disease (yes or no). The four ‘labeluse’ questions ask what parts of nutrition labels 
consumers pay the most attention to and what parts they find easiest to understand: 
calories, grams or milligrams of nutrients per serving, and percent of daily values (1=very 
easy, 2=somewhat easy, 3=not too easy, 4=never seen) and a question on whether labels 
are hard to interpret, on a 1 (not difficult) to 4 (difficult) scale.  Finally, the five ‘labelme’ 
questions ask how consumers personally use nutrition labels and whether the labels affect 
their buying decisions. They ask if nutrition labels: are useful to the individual, are used 
by the respondent because she values her health, make it easier to choose foods, lead to 
better food choices, and whether they are better than using her own knowledge 
(1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree). I decided not to include these three variables in 
 
 
114 
 
the final model because the knowledge and priority questions capture essentially the same 
information in a less ambiguous way and to keep the model relatively simple.  
I include highest grade-level achieved to control for the effects of education. The 
foodstamp variable measures whether the respondent was eligible for food stamps at the 
time of the survey. Bmi_sp measures the individual’s Body Mass Index (BMI), a rough 
measure of individual fatness. Exercise measures how often the respondent exercises 
vigorously (1=daily, 6=rarely). Health asks for the respondent’s subjective health 
evaluation (1=excellent, 5=poor). Lcdiet asks if the individual is on a low-calorie or 
weight loss diet. Smk_100 asks if the individual has smoked 100 cigarettes in her lifetime 
and smk_now asks if they are a current smoker. Urb classifies respondents as being in a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), central city (1), MSA, outside central-city (2), and 
non-MSA (3). Income measures before-tax household income from all sources. Gender is 
coded as women,  ‘1s’, and Men, ‘0s’. Height is included as a control for body size—
taller individuals have greater caloric needs, all else equal. Age is reported in years. 
 With these independent variables, I estimated a linear regression analysis with 
survey weights to model calorie consumption. My model is similar to the one used by 
Wang, Beydoun, Caballero, Gary, and Lawrence (“Trends and correlates in meat 
consumption patterns in the US adult population”, 2010) which uses the same dataset and 
many of the same survey questions about consumer nutrition knowledge and habits to 
estimate a model of demand for meat. 
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Table 10. THANKS Model of Calorie Consumption—Estimation Results 
Variable Coefficient 
Linearized 
Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
lcdiet -236.86 45.96 -5.15 <0.001 -329.54 -144.17 
priotast 77.30 25.45 3.04 0.004 25.97 128.63 
height 17.79 3.44 5.18 <0.001 10.87 24.72 
age -10.17 0.83 -12.17 <0.001 -11.85 -8.48 
prionutr -69.45 30.29 -2.29 0.027 -130.54 -8.36 
knowledge -93.52 35.35 -2.65 0.011 -164.81 -22.23 
sex -617.43 39.40 -15.67 <0.001 -696.90 -537.97 
smk_100 60.26 22.86 2.64 0.012 14.15 106.37 
health -40.33 23.77 -1.70 0.097 -88.27 7.60 
grade -1.44 1.21 -1.19 0.241 -3.89 1.01 
foodstamp 1.63 18.67 0.09 0.931 -36.02 39.29 
race 17.97 17.07 1.05 0.298 -16.46 52.40 
bmi_sp -1.17 1.20 -0.98 0.332 -3.59 1.24 
exercise -14.13 11.33 -1.25 0.219 -36.99 8.73 
priosafe -13.67 27.43 -0.50 0.621 -68.99 41.66 
priopric -16.89 22.86 -0.74 0.464 -62.99 29.22 
priokeep -26.92 15.82 -1.70 0.096 -58.83 4.98 
prioease 24.42 25.11 0.97 0.336 -26.22 75.06 
smk_now 67.87 57.56 1.18 0.245 -48.21 183.94 
urb -11.35 36.86 -0.31 0.76 -85.68 62.99 
income 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.719 0.00 0.00 
constant 2156.77 305.65 7.06 <0.001 1540.36 2773.18 
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Table 11. Significant (P <0.05) Coefficients & Estimates at Population Means 
Variable Coef. P 
Mean 
(Women) 
Mean 
(Men) Est.(W) Est. (M) 
Priotast (T) 77.30 0.004 3.80 3.88 293.75 299.94 
Height (H) 17.80 0.011 64.42 70.10 1146.35 1247.43 
Age (A) -10.16 0.000 46.10 44.10 -468.61 -448.28 
Prionutr (N) -69.45 0.004 3.72 3.10 -258.35 -215.29 
Knowledge (K) -93.52 0.027 3.36 3.52 -314.22 -329.19 
Sex s -617.43 0.000 1 0 -617.43 0 
lcdiet -236.86 0.000 9.3% 4.0% -236.86 -236.86 
smk_100 60.26 0.012 42.1% 56.1% 60.26 60.26 
Constant 2156.77 <0.0001         
 
Table 12. Mean Calorie Predictions from THANKS Model 
Category Women Men 
Non-smoker, LC* -455.36 -317.76 
LC 1,701.40 2,474.52 
non-LC 1,938.26 2,711.38 
smk_100, non-LC 1,998.53 2,771.64 
*low-cal diet 
Results 
 The results of the regression indicate that many of the hypothesized variables are 
significant at the 5% level and are generally in the expected directions. Taller people eat 
more calories than short people, older people less than younger people, and women eat 
less than men. More knowledgeable consumers eat less, as do individuals who place a 
high priority on nutrition in their buying decisions. Not surprisingly, a higher priority on 
taste is associated with eating more calories. Individuals on a weight loss diet do appear 
to make significant reductions in their calorie consumption. I named the model 
“THANKS” because Taste (T), Height (H), Age (A), Nutrition priority (N), Knowledge 
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(K) and Sex s were among the most important variables in explaining calorie 
consumption, along with whether the individual is on a weight loss diet. 
 In light of the obesity epidemic that has taken hold since, perhaps the most 
surprising result is the mean value and rather large, negative coefficient on both the 
Knowledge and Prionutr variables. If these results are indicative of trends at the time, 
basic economic theory suggests that the priority of nutrition and the importance of 
acquiring nutrition knowledge might be enough to mitigate obesity’s rise. Since height 
does not change much after adulthood and Priotast is the only remaining coefficient with 
a positive sign, one has to wonder what other concerns may have come to override or 
supersede these priorities. 
As the chart above shows, the model predicts that the mean woman will consume 
1,701 calories if she is on a low-calorie or weight loss diet, and 1,938 calories if she is 
not, a 12.2% difference. The mean BMI for a woman in the survey population was 28.6. 
The mean man, meanwhile, consumes 2,475 calories if he is on a low-calorie or weight 
loss diet, 2,711 if not, an 8.7% difference. Mean BMI for men was 27.01. 
The results of the model also indicate that taste and nutrition priority have 
opposite signs, which was expected, and that they almost cancel one another out, on 
average. I ran a cross-tabulation for those two questions to get a better understanding of 
how these priorities interact. The chart below shows that over half (53%) of consumers 
attached the highest importance possible to both taste and nutrition. Twenty-five percent 
of respondents gave taste a 4 and nutrition a 3 while only 7.7% gave nutrition a 4 and 
taste a 3. Though Americans clearly prioritize both factors, this may be evidence that 
taste preferences can override preferences for a healthy diet. 
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Table 13. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste in Buying Decision 
  Prionutr   
Priotast 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0022 0.0028 
2 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0040 0.0088 0.0142 
3 0.0015 0.0087 0.0619 0.0765 0.1493 
4 0.0070 0.0339 0.2495 0.5319 0.8274 
Total 0.0091 0.0437 0.3154 0.6203 1 
Obviously much of the differences in consumption between men and women 
reflects physiological differences (men tend to be larger than women, on average) but it 
could also reflect differences in priorities. To see if this was the case, I performed several 
cross-tabulations (non-responses omitted from tables) between sex and the priority 
respondents’ placed on nutrition and taste in their buying decisions. The results indicate 
that 10% more women than men place the highest priority on nutrition. Tables 8 and 9 
also show that nearly 61% of women place the highest priority on nutrition and taste 
while only 45% of men felt the same. Nearly 70% of women gave nutrition a 4 while 
only 54% of men did the same. 
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Table 14. Sex and Priority Placed on Nutrition in Buying Decision 
Prionutr Men Women Total 
1 0.0066 0.0024 0.0091 
2 0.0296 0.0142 0.0437 
3 0.179 0.1364 0.3154 
4 0.2586 0.3617 0.6203 
Total 0.4794 0.5206 1 
Table 15. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste: Women Only 
  Prionutr   
Priotast 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0020 0.002 
2 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0019 0.0076 0.0101 
3 0.0018 0.0022 0.0407 0.0745 0.1201 
4 0.0029 0.0247 0.2193 0.6093 0.8627 
Total 0.0047 0.0272 0.262 0.6947 1 
 
Table 16. Priority Placed on Nutrition and Taste: Men Only 
  Prionutr   
Priotast 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0025 0.0037 
2 <0.0001 0.0017 0.0062 0.0101 0.0187 
3 0.0011 0.0157 0.0849 0.0788 0.181 
4 0.0115 0.0439 0.2823 0.4479 0.7892 
Total 0.0138 0.0617 0.3734 0.5395 1 
 
Discussion 
 Great caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. It is probably most 
important not to take the estimates and coefficients derived from the THANKS model too 
literally. A calorie is a small unit of measurement and misreporting is always a concern 
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when asking individuals about their own behavior. Furthermore, social-desirability bias 
may lead individuals to over-estimate their knowledge or exaggerate about the extent to 
which they care about nutrition. They may under-report consumption of unhealthy foods 
or over-report consumption of healthy foods for similar reasons. Since intake data was 
only collected over a two-day period, at a single point in time, it is an open question 
whether these intake patterns truly reflect prevailing consumer habits. Nevertheless, 
most, if not all, of the coefficients are what one would expect in this particular domain 
and the signs of the coefficients are theoretically consistent.  
 In comparing women and men, an interesting picture emerges: it appears that 
women prioritize nutrition in their decisions, are generally quite knowledgeable about 
nutrition, they are more likely to be on a weight-loss diet (9.3% of women versus 4.0% of 
men), and they do, indeed consume significantly fewer calories than men. Despite all of 
this, on average, women’s BMIs are higher (28.06 for women versus 27.01 for men). 
There are many possible explanations for this apparent contradiction—the most obvious 
is that women are under-reporting their calorie intake relative to men, who could be 
overestimating theirs. Women may simply not be doing enough to change their habits for 
the results to show up in BMI figures. 
 Another, speculative, possibility is that there is unacknowledged uncertainty in 
the model and insufficient data with which to reduce it. Under the assumption that many 
women had begun adopting healthy eating patterns, to the extent that these habits resulted 
in the desired consequences, one would expect for the desired behavior to rationally 
continue. The high prevalence of obesity today belies that possibility. If it is the case that 
calories are not the most important variable for explaining weight loss (i.e., they should 
not be prominent in the overweight consumers’ consequence function) then consumers 
may have failed to continue these habits simply because they were not working—they 
were not net-utility enhancing. 
Conclusion 
Unfortunately, these results do not provide much guidance with respect to how to 
improve consumers’ eating decisions. They do suggest that, at the time anyway, many 
Americans were aware of what constitutes a healthy diet and were making improvements 
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to their diets, consistent with economic theory. On average, American eating habits were 
not completely out of line with recommendations and average calorie intake was close to 
the 2,000 recommended, particularly among women. People who prioritized nutrition or 
were more knowledgeable about healthy diets ate fewer calories as well, which is 
consistent with more recent survey research (Gregory et al., 2014). The recent economic 
downturn seems to have had a positive effect on American eating habits, though this does 
not bode well for treating the United States’ ability to lose weight when the economy 
does eventually recover (Todd, et al., 2014). Based solely on the DHKS data, the positive 
trends in eating habits found therein might have been predicted to continue and lead to 
improved diet-related health outcomes. The reason for this discrepancy in results may lie 
in Americans’ inherently unhealthy underlying habits (the most prominent, accepted 
theory) or in the quality of advice consumers have received from credible sources over 
the years; clearly more research is needed along both dimensions of this problem. 
Section 4. 
Analysis of DHKS Population Using Finite Mixture Modelling 
  While the THANKS model provides some interesting insights into the behavior of 
the average American in the mid-1990s, it may be inadequate to capture more fine-
grained differences between different groups of consumers. In light of the discussion 
above, it may not be appropriate to treat all consumers as though they will all respond 
favorably to a low-fat, low-calorie diet because of unacknowledged dietary uncertainty 
regarding that diet’s technical efficacy. Finite-Mixture Modelling (FMM) is one tool for 
probabilistically identifying subpopulations within a larger population using maximum 
likelihood estimation. FMM is useful in applications where the subpopulations are 
thought to be heterogeneous but lack identifying information (Deb, 2012). 
  Since subpopulations are not easily identifiable, FMM takes an iterative approach 
to identifying the number of subpopulations (the distribution of the subpopulations is 
specified beforehand), or latent classes, within a given population. Classes are added and 
compared to previous models (with fewer classes) to see which fits the data better. FMM 
can also be combined with regression analysis in order to identify subpopulations on the 
basis of their covariates. 
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  In this section, I use FMM, and a simplified version of the THANKS model to 
identify potential systematic differences in consumption patterns among (possible) 
American subpopulations. I assume the overall population is a mixture of Gaussian 
distributions. My analysis cannot identify the source of these differences, but it may 
provide some preliminary evidence that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to nutritional 
advice is liable to be inefficient. This is particularly true if classes of consumers are 
sufficiently different in terms of their metabolism or food preferences.  
   My dependent variables are calories, total fat, carbohydrate, protein, and 
cholesterol. They, my independent variables, and their summary statistics are listed in 
Table 17 (next page, “R” refers to the survey respondent). All statistics were computed 
using the survey weights provided by the DHKS.  
BMI_prime is meant to capture the extent to which consumers are technically 
considered “overweight” as 25 is the lower bound for that category. Knowledge is a 
composite measure of the respondent’s knowledge of the advice contained within the 
Guidelines, based on survey responses. Eleven observations were dropped because 
respondents did not provide answers, leading to a sample population of 5,092. 
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Table 17. Summary Statistics for Finite Mixture Models 
Variable Type Explanation Mean 
Linearized 
Std. Error 
Calories Ratio Consumption, in kilocalories 2031.71 22.81 
Total Fat Ratio Consumption, in grams 76.066 1.108 
Carbohydrate Ratio Consumption, in grams 252.591 2.692 
Protein Ratio Consumption, in grams 79.002 0.991 
Cholesterol Ratio Consumption, in milligrams 268.664 4.613 
Notgrad Dummy 1 if R did not graduate HS 0.144 0.127 
Povcat Dummy 1 if R is below Poverty Line 0.145 0.126 
Age Ratio Age in years 44.66 0.455 
B_race Dummy 1 if R is Black 0.113 0.010 
Exercise Likert (1-6) Daily—Rarely  3.789 0.047 
Bmi_prime Ratio R’s BMI divided by 25 1.049 0.005 
Health Likert (1-5) R’s health: Excellent—Poor  2.316 0.027 
Knowledge Likert (1-4) Measure of R’s nutrition 
knowledge 
3.389 0.015 
Prionutr Likert (1-4) Priority of nutrition 3.567 0.0138 
Priopric Likert (1-4) Priority of price 3.242 0.024 
Priotast Likert (1-4) Priority of taste 3.818 0.009 
Prioease Likert (1-4) Priority of ease of preparation 3.091 0.022 
Lcdiet Dummy 1 if R is on a low-calorie diet .067 0.005 
Sex Dummy 1 if R is female .517 0.011 
  Similar to the THANKS model, these figures do not appear particularly worrying 
if they were used to speculate about the future trajectory of American health outcomes, 
including obesity. On average, Americans appear relatively knowledgeable about the 
nature of a healthy diet and, based on their reporting, the average American was not far 
from conforming to USDA recommendations for both calories and fat, broadly consistent 
with a satisficing model of behavior. 
  FMM analysis reveals that a consumer’s demand for each dependent variable may 
depend on which latent class a particular respondent belongs to. The results of each 
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model are reported separately in the pages that follow. The first 15 lines of each table 
report the regression results for each component, with linearized standard errors for each 
coefficient shown in parentheses. On the remaining four lines, I report the predicted mean 
(PredMean) for each component, the classification of respondents based on their 
estimated posterior probability (PostProb), the classification of each respondent based on 
their most likely latent class membership (LClassMemb), and the average posterior 
probabilities (AvgPP) for each latent class. 
  PredMean gives the predicted mean for the sample population if the parameters 
for a given latent class were used to model all respondents. If these predictions are 
significantly different from one another, it may be an indication that an FMM approach is 
valid because of unobserved heterogeneity within the population. Significant, 
theoretically valid, differences in coefficients between subpopulations may be further 
evidence for real differences between groups of consumers, be they metabolic, behavioral 
or both. 
The FMM procedure, implemented using the ‘fmm’ and ‘fmmlc’ (Luedicke, 
2011) packages in Stata, revealed that the survey population can be decomposed into 
three different subpopulations to model overall demand for all nutrients except protein, 
which was broken into only two latent classes (referred to as “components” in the tables 
on the following pages). When I attempted to add a third class to the protein model, Stata 
did not appear to be converging to a solution after over 1,000 iterations. As such, it is 
difficult to say whether demand for protein is better modelled with 1, 2, or more 
components because both the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) are only useful when comparing competing FMM models, 
not in isolation (Raftery, 1995). 
  In the case of the other four dependent variables, the AIC and BIC were both 
reduced after the addition of the third component while adding a fourth did not improve 
the models or prevented it from converging to a solution, indicating a 3-component 
model leads to the best fit with the data (Raftery, 1995). Further, the average posterior 
probability was over 0.70 for all latent classes, indicating the model performs reasonably 
well at predicting the correct class to which respondents belong. Estimation results and 
discussion follow. 
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Table 18. FMM-Calories-Estimation Results 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
notgrad -24.08 (64.80) 485.4** (199.1) -256.7*** (65.80) 
povcat -136.6* (77.51) 1,029*** (231.9) -11.67 (50.23) 
age -14.58*** (1.896) -22.19*** (8.263) -2.756** (1.160) 
b_race -162.4* (91.60) 2,051*** (228.5) -23.49 (66.60) 
exercise -5.579 (22.11) 28.45 (65.87) 1.878 (10.49) 
bmi_prime 154.9 (124.9) 686.4** (334.9) -122 (80.93) 
health -1.984 (23.91) -254.0** (104.5) -12 (16.10) 
knowledge -119.8 (73.21) -259.5* (133.3) -40.24 (36.03) 
prionutr -63.25 (41.94) -195.8 (151.6) -13.06 (32.36) 
priopric -66.02* (34.63) -533.6*** (193.6) 13.21 (24.61) 
priotast 72.49 (53.48) -160.2 (139.8) 53.83 (44.14) 
prioease 7.986 (41.95) 530.2*** (115.0) -47.96 (29.25) 
lcdiet -184.4** (93.07) -992.9*** (335.4) -191.5*** (70.56) 
sex -927.5*** (68.42) -1,984*** (192.1) -355.0*** (58.49) 
Constant 3,898*** (448.1) 7,034*** (865.2) 2,218*** (301.7) 
PredMean 2228.164 (580.777) 3371.163 (1549.89) 1601.396 (242.61) 
PostProb  2,120 [0.425] 246 [0.046] 2,622 [0.526] 
LClassMemb 1,638 [32.8%] 123 [2.5%] 3,227 [64.7%] 
AvgPP 0.743 0.828 0.710 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses , Population proportions & percentages in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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According to these estimation results over 96% of consumers can be divided into 
one of two subpopulations (component 1 and 3). The mean intake for component 1 is 
within about 10% of recommendations while it is 400 calories (25%) lower for members 
of group 3. Consistent with the THANKS model, both women and individuals on weight-
loss diets consume significantly fewer calories than others. The size of the coefficient on 
‘sex’, however, is rather surprising because, for component 1, it is lower than the 
coefficient in the THANKS mode (-617.4) but higher than it is for component 3. 
Similarly, the coefficient on age is negative, but much smaller for component 3. The 
model for component 2 appears to fit the data quite well and many of the same 
coefficients from the THANKS model are also statistically significant. I can only 
speculate as to why non-high school graduates in group 2 eat much more than high 
school graduates while those in group 3 eat much less.  Group 2 is quite different and 
consists of people consuming a large amount of calories. 
Table 19. FMM-Total Fat-Estimation Results 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
notgrad -8.623*** (1.961) 30.23* (17.51) -1.217 (3.150) 
povcat 1.563 (1.740) 39.21** (16.85) -7.529** (3.291) 
age -0.134*** (0.0378) -0.549 (0.348) -0.466*** (0.0677) 
b_race -1.21 (2.165) 98.32** (44.46) 2.732 (5.382) 
exercise 0.648* (0.364) -4.887 (3.317) 0.186 (0.617) 
bmi_prime -1.404 (3.463) 36.98 (31.14) 15.41*** (5.213) 
health -0.524 (0.618) -7.333 (9.815) 0.301 (1.139) 
knowledge -6.935*** (1.569) -18.45 (15.67) -3.288 (2.207) 
prionutr -1.778 (1.182) -4.992 (8.810) -6.453*** (2.240) 
priopric 0.158 (0.950) -12.88 (16.48) -0.967 (1.445) 
priotast 2.472 (1.701) -3.762 (21.55) 6.463*** (2.332) 
prioease -0.818 (0.927) 6.542 (6.499) 0.549 (1.444) 
lcdiet -7.100** (2.878) -2.66 (48.64) -14.78*** (4.393) 
sex -13.01*** (1.736) -48.96*** (16.77) -38.22*** (2.818) 
Constant 91.72*** (10.45) 293.2** (126.1) 124.5*** (17.69) 
PredMean 53.84 (10.04) 153.52 (53.53) 86.21 (23.41) 
PostProb              2,459  [0.493] 269 [0.054] 2,260 [0.453] 
LClassMemb 2,906 [58.3%] 160 [3.21%] 1,922 [38.5%] 
AvgPP 0.734 0.836 0.773 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses , Population proportions & percentages in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  For the total fat model, most consumer fell again fell into either component 1 or 
component 3. Based on their predicted means and the significant coefficients in each, 
respondents in class 1 appear to be more health conscious because they eat less fat and 
nutritional knowledge appears to have more of an impact on behavior. This may overstate 
the difference between the two groups, particularly among women, because the 
coefficients on lcdiet are much higher, and equally significant, for consumers in 
component 3. The coefficients on prionutr and priotast for component 3 are analogous to 
those found in the THANKS model but it is hard to know what to make of the large, 
positive coefficient on bmi_prime. As in the calorie model, consumers in component 2 
appear to be the least healthy but are also vastly outnumbered by the members of the 
other two classes.  Group 2 consumes a large amount of fat. 
Table 20. FMM-Carbohydrate-Estimation Results 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
notgrad -11.74 (9.015) 10.34 (45.03) -24.53*** (7.112) 
povcat -2.133 (9.307) 118.6** (48.18) -9.904** (4.851) 
age -1.782*** (0.202) -3.141*** (0.898) -0.303** (0.122) 
b_race -31.75*** (9.577) 96.09* (56.14) -8.206 (7.284) 
exercise -0.238 (1.986) -3.299 (8.348) -0.317 (1.160) 
bmi_prime -25.81 (20.64) -50.7 (63.11) -3.047 (13.38) 
health 5.048 (3.554) -11.15 (20.75) -3.032 (2.073) 
knowledge -4.593 (8.068) -34.22 (22.18) 2.339 (4.812) 
prionutr -0.887 (5.368) -21.32 (38.38) -3.91 (4.231) 
priopric -9.882** (4.987) -14.85 (31.23) 2.698 (2.773) 
priotast -7.229 (7.405) 31.59 (37.19) 2.88 (5.467) 
prioease 3.713 (4.213) 53.36*** (17.20) -3.52 (2.874) 
lcdiet -16.68 (10.52) -99.44* (59.01) -29.50*** (10.80) 
sex -101.6*** (8.642) -209.3*** (37.78) -33.05*** (5.573) 
Constant 511.4*** (48.27) 695.8*** (187.5) 240.4*** (38.21) 
PredMean 280.85 (63.53) 420.76 (149.81) 189.84 (25.38) 
PostProb 2203 [0.442] 280 [0.056] 2505 [0.502] 
LClassMemb 1,910 [38.3%] 136  [2.7%] 2,942 [59%] 
AvgPP 0.745 0.838 0.727 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses , Population proportions & percentages in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the carbohydrate model, age turns out to have a significant and negative effect 
for all three subpopulations. Race and the priority of price are significant for component 
1 but not above the 10% level for the other two groups. Poverty status is only significant 
for groups 2 and 3 but takes on opposite signs. Meanwhile, the priority of ease of 
preparation is significant for class 2 but not the others while lcdiet only predicts lower 
calorie consumption for members of component 3. Again, the coefficient on sex is 
significant and negative for all three subpopulations, which may simply be because 
women tend to be smaller, and thus have lower calorie requirements, than men.  Group 2 
also consumes more carbohydrates than others; group 2 just eats a lot of food. 
Table 21. FMM-Cholesterol-Estimation Results 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
notgrad -16.71** (7.909) 39.17 (46.37) 18.03 (14.91) 
povcat -2.961 (6.322) 101.0* (55.24) 27.15** (13.82) 
age -0.0259 (0.131) -2.052* (1.178) -0.735** (0.330) 
b_race 11.73 (7.538) 167.0*** (50.72) 36.73* (20.18) 
exercise 1.466 (1.175) -14.93* (9.031) 0.0307 (2.928) 
bmi_prime 20.01 (12.49) 75.65 (106.4) 25.21 (24.81) 
health 0.503 (2.177) -57.55 (40.79) 6.053 (5.028) 
knowledge -13.57** (5.283) -43.43 (44.43) -15.38* (9.178) 
prionutr -8.320* (4.518) -29.36 (45.62) -12.63 (10.95) 
priopric 4.139 (3.307) -38.57 (33.19) 0.9 (8.003) 
priotast 9.500* (5.511) -8.014 (102.8) 13.48 (12.72) 
prioease -1.673 (2.983) -9.581 (19.90) 0.691 (7.388) 
lcdiet -19.76*** (7.078) -33.8 (88.47) -22.58 (30.68) 
sex -51.96*** (5.175) -205.5*** (70.78) -122.7*** (22.36) 
Constant 191.2*** (36.64) 1,282 (899.5) 416.9*** (69.81) 
PredMean 157.1 (31.37) 568.9 (165.78) 332.9 (69.44) 
PostProb  4,409 [0.884] 579 [0.116] 2,133 [0.428] 
LClassMemb 2,786 [55.9%] 244 [4.9%] 1,958 [39.3%] 
AvgPP 0.802 0.838 0.811 
Robust standard errors in parentheses , Population proportions & percentages in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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At the time this survey was administered, nutrition authorities were 
recommending that Americans limit their cholesterol intake to fewer than 300 mg/day. 
By that measure, component 1, the largest of the three and the majority of the overall 
population, appears to be the healthiest of the three, based on its predicted mean. The 
significant, negative coefficients on lcdiet and knowledge are also indicative of a class of 
consumers that is rather health-conscious. Again, component 2 appears to be the least 
healthy but the estimation results do not provide much guidance as to why. It is 
interesting that the coefficient on povcat is positive for cholesterol among class three but 
the same coefficient is negative in the carbohydrate model.  In addition to problems of 
being overweight, group 2 is also moving toward problems with cholesterol. 
Table 22. FMM-Protein-Estimation Results 
Variable Component 1 Component 2 
notgrad -6.420** (2.586) 24.15 (19.08) 
povcat -0.116 (1.564) 24.7 (18.41) 
age -0.181*** (0.0490) -0.894*** (0.289) 
b_race -3.222* (1.803) 53.18** (25.32) 
exercise 0.169 (0.342) -3.212** (1.567) 
bmi_prime 0.213 (3.058) 37.20* (19.02) 
health -0.42 (0.562) -7.772* (4.347) 
knowledge -1.495 (1.248) 5.527 (8.297) 
prionutr 0.352 (1.172) -11.48 (11.07) 
priopric -0.58 (0.876) -2.529 (4.238) 
priotast 2.679* (1.419) -11.7 (14.93) 
prioease -0.686 (0.669) -2.171 (3.491) 
lcdiet -0.791 (2.380) -16 (10.38) 
sex -24.36*** (2.427) -64.40*** (7.830) 
Constant 92.54*** (11.47) 250.9** (98.01) 
Pred. Mean 72 (13.38) 116.03 (46.68) 
PostProb  4,409 [0.884] 579 [0.116] 
LClassMemb 4,713 [94.5%] 275 [5.5%] 
AvgPP 0.925 0.822 
Robust standard errors in parentheses , Population proportions & percentages in brackets 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The fact that the protein model could only be decomposed into two 
subpopulations, one of which represents over 90% of the overall population, appears to 
support my assumption in the THANKS model that protein intake tends to vary much 
less than the other nutrients discussed above. As before, women eat less protein than men 
in both models and age tends to predict lower protein intake over time for both groups 
while African Americans in component 2 are predicted to eat quite a bit more. The 
negative coefficient on exercise for component 2 may reflect the fact that people who do 
not exercise have lower protein needs. The reason for the negative coefficient on notgrad 
is somewhat unexpected but it may simply reflect the income effect of not being able to 
afford as much meat as graduates. 
Conclusion 
 I performed an FMM analysis in an effort to statistically distinguish between 
heterogeneous groups of consumers who are part of a large subpopulation. My estimation 
results seem to show that there are, indeed, significant differences between these groups 
in terms of how their knowledge, beliefs, and preferences affect their nutrient intake. I 
cannot investigate the extent to which these customers vary in terms of their metabolism 
so I cannot comment on whether their behavior would be different if they had more 
dietary options available to them.  
 Regardless of whether current USDA recommendations are correct, it is certainly 
relevant to consider the different ways in which consumers might respond to new 
information or perceived risks. Otherwise, advice directed at the entire population may 
only have the intended effect on a portion of it. It would be ideal if publicly provided 
dietary advice were tailored and marketed to reach only the consumers who are likely to 
benefit from it.  
 This could also be taken as evidence against the claim that American eating habits 
are, and have been, inherently poor. Both the THANKS and FMM models appear to 
show that Americans were relatively close to USDA advice 15 years on and, given the 
slow pace of habit change and the obvious downsides to diet-related health problems, it is 
not obvious that habits should have gone in a different direction in the time period since. 
The fact that habits have not improved or gotten worse may mean that a large proportion 
of Americans have become discouraged from changing their eating habits altogether. 
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Chapter 5.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Unfortunately, I do not know of any reliable methods for testing the hypothesis 
that public policy and major social institutions have affected consumer preferences 
drastically enough to give rise to obesity at the levels we now observe in 2016. In the 
pages above, I have explored the question indirectly by trying to understand the policy 
and institutional environment before, during, and after the onset of the U.S.’s obesity 
epidemic. The evidence from my analysis of American cookbooks shows that consumer 
preferences have, indeed, changed since the post-colonial period. Whether the change 
was for better or worse is difficult to ascertain without more information. 
By replicating Butler’s work, I have some further evidence that consumers 
respond to more abstract incentives than simply the price and taste of food. If that is the 
case, then the lack of consumer response to major health-related incentives appears all the 
more perplexing. Though increasingly popular, behavioral economics, too, has proven 
rather inadequate to the task of explaining the drastic uptick in rates of obesity. 
The THANKS model, on the other hand, shows that, around 1994, American 
consumers were aware of, and responding to the incentives the USDA first began 
emphasizing in 1980, a period of about 14 years. Based on that finding, one might have 
predicted a levelling out in obesity rates. Instead, nearly as many years later, there is little 
reason to expect a reversal, or even halt, to current trends. Have consumers simply been 
lying to obesity researchers and themselves or are the tradeoffs required to make dietary 
changes really severe? 
I offer a third explanation—that the government’s decision to endorse a particular 
viewpoint was premature and has since evolved into an institutional environment which 
dissuades consumers from trying efficient, weight-reducing diets. This may help to 
explain the apparent heterogeneity among the subpopulations identified in the FMM 
models. While the federal government may have set the stage for the current state of 
affairs by endorsing one viewpoint, that alone is not sufficient to explain current obesity 
rates, but that endorsement has given rise to a variety of organizations who are 
economically invested in the credibility of that advice. As a result, the possibility for 
major changes in this policy area seems quite remote. Even if a policymaker wanted to 
change course, the backlash from individuals and groups with a long-standing 
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commitment to the USDA message would be immense. In light of this, the most obvious 
implication is that the McGovern Committee should have excused itself from weighing in 
on matters of diet and health altogether. 
  A significant change in policy may not lead to any improvement, either, because 
who says this time will be different? Most nutritionists have been busy studying the 
efficacy of USDA’s message, not testing new hypotheses. Though I have discussed the 
more recent, strong evidence favoring the safety and efficacy of various ‘new’ diets, it 
would be foolish in the extreme to suggest that such evidence is sufficient to form the 
basis for dietary advice to be given to an entire country, especially one as large as the 
United States. What is really needed is better science related to obesity, among other diet-
related health problems. 
  It seems the most effective policy solution would be for USDA advice, and that 
which resembles it, to somehow lose all the credibility it now enjoys. Until and unless 
some new, convincing scientific breakthrough occurs, Americans will continue struggling 
to lose weight or, understandably, become resigned to an unhealthy existence which at 
least allows them to derive pleasure from their food.  
  The empirical estimation, including the regressions and the three groups estimated 
from the data, showed that most Americans are following on average the 2,000 calorie 
diet with 50% of calories from carbohydrates.  A few percent of Americans are clearly 
overeating relative to health needs, but not enough to explain the obesity epidemic.  One 
possibility, then, is that the obesity epidemic is occurring because the low carbohydrate 
diet is not visible in the overall data.  That is the point of the literature, theory, and 
estimation in this work.  The present regime is not working, and the low carbohydrate 
regime has theory to suggest it and it might work.  It should be tried. 
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